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Defendant

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

:

Pursuant to the Court's Order dated June 10, 2025, defendants, Watermill Lofts, LLC, Patrick, Campbell, Shanley Campbell, Joseph Tan, 1249 S. 21st Street LLC, PFN Associates, LLC – 2, 2115 63rd LLC, Jana Bernstein, and Jason Bernstein (collectively, "Owner Defendants") submit this supplemental brief in support of their preliminary objections to plaintiffs' complaint.¹

¹ Owner Defendants fully incorporate the arguments set forth in their preliminary objections and supporting memorandum of law filed on March 17, 2025 (Control No. 25033472) and the arguments of

INTRODUCTION

This Court properly found that each plaintiff lacks standing and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. As plaintiffs admit, plaintiff Jennifer Cooper has no standing to sue defendants, Joseph Tan, 1249 South 21st Street, PFN Associates, LLC - 2, 2115 63rd LLC, and Jana and Jason Bernstein. N.T., 6/10/25, 51:10-16 at Ex. "A." Ms. Cooper also lacks standing to sue defendants Watermill Lofts, LLC ("Watermill Lofts"), Patrick Campbell, and Shanley Campbell (the "Campbells") because she was not aggrieved by any actions of these defendants. Organizational plaintiff, Housing Equality Center of Pennsylvania ("HEC"), equally lacks standing. HEC concedes it sues only for injuries to HEC itself rather than its members. N.T., 6/10/25, 87:4-17. And that those injuries are simply that it mission frustrated and it must divert resources in response to defendants' conduct. Compl., ¶¶ 55-62. Pennsylvania courts have never allowed a plaintiff to sue a non-governmental private party based on diversion of resources theory of standing. Still, even if it did, the frustration fo mission and expenditure of money alone cannot justify standing.

Importantly, because plaintiffs have no standing the Court need not consider the substantive issue regarding whether the city of Philadelphia (the "City") can create a private right of action (they cannot). *Int. of K.N.L.*, 284 A.3d 121, 137 (Pa. 2022) ("Standing is a threshold issue and must be resolved before proceeding to the merits of the underlying action.")

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice

OCF Realty, LLC set forth in its preliminary objections filed on March 13, 2025 (Control No. 25032978).

I. PLAINTIFF JENNIFER COOPER ADMITS SHE HAS NO STANDING TO SUE DEFENDANTS JOSEPH TAN, 1249 SOUTH 21ST STREET, PFN ASSOCIATES, LLC-2, 2115 63RD LLC, AND JANA AND JASON BERNSTEIN.

In its May 14, 2025 Order, this Court correctly found that Ms. Cooper had no standing to sue defendants Joseph Tan, 1249 South 21st Street, LLC, PFN Associates, LLC-2, 2115 63rd LLC, and Jana and Jason Bernstein. Order, 5/14/25, at ¶ 3. At oral argument on June 10, 2025, Ms. Cooper's counsel conceded that Ms. Cooper did not have standing to sue these defendants. N.T., 6/10/25, 51:10-16 (emphasis added) ("Miss Cooper did not have standing against the properties that the housing testers called and that's what we – we don't dispute that.") Accordingly, Ms. Cooper's claims against defendants Joseph Tan, 1249 South 21st Street, PFN Associates, 2115 63rd LLC, and Jana and Jason Bernstein should be dismissed with prejudice.

II. MS. COOPER HAS NO STANDING TO SUE WATERMILL LOFTS, PATRICK CAMPBELL, AND SHANLEY CAMPBELL,

To maintain standing, Ms. Cooper must show she was "aggrieved" by the conduct of the defendants. To be aggrieved, Ms. Cooper must show she "has a substantial, *direct and immediate* interest in the outcome of the litigation." *Gates v. City of Pittsburgh Historic Rev. Comm'n*, 254 A.3d 803, 808 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021) (emphasis added). "A *direct* interest requires a *causal connection* between the asserted violation and the harm complained of." *Id.* (emphasis added). "An interest is *immediate* when the causal connection is *not remote or speculative*." *Id.* (emphasis

added). "Mere allegations of speculative future harm are insufficient to establish standing." *Id*.

Ms. Cooper lacks standing Watermill Lofts and the Campbells because her claims are not direct or immediate. Ms. Cooper's claims are not direct because she avers no causal connection between any conduct of Watermill Lofts and the Campbells and any harm she allegedly suffered. Ms. Cooper admits never attempted to rent a property owned by these defendants and, therefore, was never aggrieved by any conduct engaging in by these defendants. Compl., at ¶¶ 39-54. Regarding 3719 Calumet Street, which is the property owned by the Campbells, Ms. Cooper alleges only that she "toured" the property. Id., ¶ 43. But she makes no allegation that she applied, attempted to apply, or was even interested in applying for a lease for 3719 Calumet. Worst, she makes no allegation that the Campbell's denied her a lease for 3719 Calumet because of her "source of income." Likewise, regarding 4 Leverington Avenue, which is the property owned by Watermill Lofts, Ms. Cooper alleges she only "toured" that property as well. Her complaint similarly lacks any averments she applied, attempted to apply, or was even interested in applying for 4 Leverington. As with the Campbells, she makes no allegation that Watermill Lofts refused to rent her the property based on her source of income. In sum, Ms. Cooper's complaint lacks any averment regarding any conduct by Watermill Lofts or the Campbells much less conduct that caused her a harm.

Ms. Cooper's claims are also not immediate. To the extent that Ms. Cooper's basis for standing as to Watermill Lofts and the Campbells is based on her *belief* that

they would deny her a lease based on her source of income *if* she applied. This allegation is a pure speculation of a hypothetical future event which is insufficient to confer standing.

Accordingly, Ms. Cooper lacks standing against Watermill Lofts and the Campbells and her complaint against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

III. HEC HAS NO STANDING BECAUSE IT HAS NOT SUFFERED AN INJURY.

At oral argument, counsel for HEC clarified that HEC's claim for standing was based on injuries to the organization itself and not for injuries sustained by its members. N.T., 6/10/25, 87:4-17. The "injuries" that HEC allegedly sustained are that its core mission has been frustrated and that it has diverted resources to address defendants' conduct. Compl., ¶¶ 55-62. But these claims are not sufficient to maintain standing.

To begin, Pennsylvania does not permit a party to sue a private, nongovernmental defendant based on "frustration of mission." Assuming that it did, for an association, like HEC, "to have standing in its own right, it must be aggrieved; *it is not enough to show that the challenged action implicates the organization's mission in some way.*" In re Friends of Marconi Plaza, 287 A.3d 965, 974 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022) (emphasis added). In Armstead v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 115 A.3d 390 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015), the Commonwealth Court ruled that an organization with a mission of opposing illegal billboards and drafting proposed billboard legislation, lacked standing simply based on this organization purpose. Here, HEC claims its core mission is "advance fair and equal access to housing opportunities for all Pennsylvanians." Compl., ¶ 56. It, therefore, is no different from the plaintiff in *Armstead*. Accordingly, HEC lacks standing simply because its mission has been implicated.

HEC also claims it has standing based on a diversion resources. Compl., ¶ 59. However, HEC's decision to voluntarily divert resources is not sufficient to confer standing. *Ball v. Chapman*, 289 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2023) ("an organization's expenditure of resources alone ordinarily does not confer standing.") Unlike federal courts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not adopted an organization's diversion of resources as a basis for standing. Moreover, any basis for standing on formulated on federal standing principles is not availing because Pennsylvania is "not bound by the dictates of Article III of the United States Constitution." *Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Hum. Servs.*, 309 A.3d 808, 832 (Pa. 2024). Accordingly, HEC cannot maintain standing based on a diversion of resources.

If HEC's claim for standing is accepted, it would throw open the courthouse doors to litigants desiring to sue private entities for harms caused to its "core mission." For example, an organization whose core mission it is to assure that workers are paid prevailing wage and overtime, could sue private companies who it believes do not pay prevailing wage or overtime based on its frustration of mission.

Accordingly, HEC has no standing and its claims should be dismissed.

IV. THE COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS THE MERITS OF THE CASE BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING.

"Standing is a threshold issue and must be resolved *before* proceeding to the merits of the underlying action." *Int. of K.N.L.*, 284 A.3d 121, 137 (Pa. 2022) (emphasis added). "The courts in our Commonwealth do not render decisions in the abstract or offer purely advisory opinions." *Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Com.*, 585 Pa. 196, 203, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (2005). Accordingly, if plaintiffs lack standing, the Court need not consider the underlying merits of plaintiffs' claims. *Szoko v. Twp. of Wilkins*, 974 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) ("[a] determination that Plaintiff does not have standing ends this controversy . . .the court need not consider the remaining issues raised by Plaintiff on appeal."); *Equitable Gas Co., Div. of Equitable Res. v. Com., Pennsylvania Dep't of Transp.*, 504 A.2d 402, 404 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) ("we agree that petitioner lacks standing, we need not consider respondents' other arguments.")

Here, plaintiffs lack standing. Therefore, the Court need not address whether the City can create a private right of action through the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinances.²

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 1, 2025

<u>/s/Walter S. Zimolong</u> Walter S. Zimolong, Esquire James J. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Meaghan Wagner, Esquire

Attorneys for Defendants, Watermill Lofts, LLC, Patrick, Campbell, Shanley Campbell, Tan Joseph, 1249 S. 21st Street LLC, PFN Associates, LLC – 2, 2115 63rd LLC, Jana Bernstein, and Jason Bernstein.

² In all events, even if the Court does reach the issue, the City cannot create a private right of action to sue and the City cannot circumvent the requirements of 2 Pa.C.S. § 751. Owner Defendants incorporate the arguments of OCF Realty regarding the City's inability to create a private right of action set forth in OCF's opening brief and incorporates any supplemental argument of OCF in support of this position.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the date set forth below, in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 205.4(g)(1)(ii), the foregoing paper was electronically filed with the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas electronic filing system website and is available for review on the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas electronic filing system's website, which filing constitutes proper service upon counsel of record.

Date: July 1, 2025

/s/ Walter S. Zimolong

EXHIBIT "A."

Case ID: 250200568 Control No.: 25033472

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-	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
2	FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
3	CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION
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6	HOUSING EQUALITY CENTER : February Term, 2025
7	of PENNSYLVANIA and : JENNIFER COOPER, :
8	Plaintiffs
9	
10	-VS-
11	
12	OCF REALITY LLC, et al.,
13	:
14	Defendants. : NO. 00568
15	 Turne 10 2025
16	June 10, 2025
17	
18	Courtroom 602 - City Hall
19	
20	Motion Hearing
21	
22	
23	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSHUA ROBERTS, J.
24	

1	APPEARANCES
2	
3	
4	CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAW DEPARTMENT
5	WILLIAM B. SHUEY, ESQUIRE Counsel for City of Philadelphia
6	
7	PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER Sara Bernstein, ESQUIRE
8	Counsel for Plaintiffs Housing Equality Center of Pennsylvania
9	and Jennifer Cooper
10	FOX ROTHCHILD, LLP
11	W. CHRISTIAN MOFFITT, ESQUIRE Counsel for Defendants OCF Realty
12	
13	ZIMOLONG, LLC WALTER S. ZIMOLONG, ESQUIRE Counsel for Defendants
14	Watermill Lofts, LLC, Patrick Campbell,
15	Shanley Campbell, Joseph Tan, 1249 South 21st Street, LLC, PFN Associates, LLC-2,
16	2115 South 63rd, LLC, and Jana and Jason Bernstein
17	Jana and Jason Dernstern
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22	MARIE E. POLIDORO, R.P.R.
23	Official Court Reporter 215-683-8012
24	
25	

	HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25
1	EXHIBIT
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5	(Whereupon all exhibits were
6	retained by counsel.)
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HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 THE COURT: Good morning, 2 everyone. 3 ALL PARTIES: Good morning, 4 Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: This is Housing 6 Equality Center of Pennsylvania versus 7 OCF Realty, LLC, February Term, 2025, Number 056. 8 9 Can the participants identify 10 themselves, please. 11 MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, 12 William Shuey on behalf of the City of 13 Philadelphia. 14 MR. MOFFITT: Christian 15 Moffitt on behalf of OCF Realty. 16 THE COURT: Can you spell your 17 last name, please. 18 MR. MOFFITT: M-O-F-F-I-T-T. 19 MR. ZIMOLONG: Good afternoon, 20 Your Honor, Walter Zimolong on behalf of 21 Defendants Watermill Lofts, LLC, Patrick 22 Campbell, Shanley Campbell, Joseph Tan, 23 1249 South 21st Street, LLC, PFN 24 Associates, LLC-2, 2115 South 63rd, LLC, 25 and Jana, J-A-N-A, and Jason Bernstein,

Case ID: 250200568 Control No.: 25033472

1	B-E-R-N-S-T-E-I-N.
2	THE COURT: All right.
3	MS. BERNSTEIN: And good
4	morning, Your Honor. I'm Sara Bernstein
5	from the Public Interest Law Center
6	representing the plaintiffs in this
7	case, Housing Equality Center of
8	Pennsylvania and Jennifer Cooper.
9	THE COURT: All right.
10	So, Mr. Shuey, since
11	technically this is your motion, I'll
12	give you first up, but due to the nature
13	of what I'm doing here, everyone is
14	going to have equal time to say whatever
15	they want to say.
16	So let me just start, perhaps
17	my Order isn't the model of clarity, so
18	I'll start there; but, at the same time,
19	I'm still not sure I understand what
20	your argument is, so we'll work through
21	that.
22	So if I understand what let
23	me just see, I'm going to go through
24	sort of a colloquy and it's going to
25	lead up to some questions.

1	If I'm understanding what your
2	argument is, there is this Statute, this
3	Ordinance, that vests authority with the
4	Commission to enforce it, sort of,
5	because the Commission then at some
6	point and the Commission at some
7	point can just then let private
8	individuals this is your argument
9	then go file their own suit, and City
10	Counsel can pass whatever it wants to
11	pass, but it also can't pass things that
12	are in conflict with the Rules of Civil
13	Procedure and other state statutes.
14	So I'm having a hard time
15	understanding what is envisioned here,
16	because you go to the Commission and
17	then they can either do or not do,
18	depending on whatever day of the week it
19	is and then after a period of time say,
20	oh, you can go sue in court. I guess
21	sort of similar to the EOC Right to Sue
22	letter.
23	But, at the same time we have
24	these statutes, and it's a local agency
25	appeal law, it's 2 Pa. C.S. 751, and

	~ / /
1	there is a whole process, and as you may
2	be aware, I dealt with this process for
3	several years where local agency appeals
4	are handled through a local agency
5	appeal process to the Court of Common
6	Pleas.
7	So, what is envisioned by this
8	statute? What process is envisioned by
9	this statute? It seems like they're
10	trying to do both. That's my question.
11	MR. SHUEY: Thank you, Your
12	Honor, and good morning again, and thank
13	you for the opportunity to be heard on
14	this Motion for Reconsideration.
15	To get directly to the point
16	that you're raising, The Fair Practices
17	Ordinance is the City's primary vehicle
18	for fighting discrimination and unfair
19	practices in the City.
20	The Fair Practices Ordinance
21	empowers the Pennsylvania Commission of
22	Human Relations, the PCHR, or the
23	Commission, to enforce the FPO, The Fair
24	Practices Ordinance.
25	However, it does not limit

1	those harmed by unfair, illegal
2	discrimination; discrimination that has
3	been made illegal by The Fair Practices
4	Ordinance to only seeking remedy through
5	the Commission.
6	That was the case back before
7	1990 when a Private Right of Action was
8	added to the statute, what was then
9	9-1110 and in 2011 was renumbered to
10	9-1122; where today's Private Right of
11	Action is found within The Fair
12	Practices Ordinance.
13	Does Your Honor have a copy of
14	the Ordinance, or would it be helpful
15	THE COURT: I do.
16	MR. SHUEY: Okay.
17	And just as a side note, and I
18	don't think it affects anything that
19	we're talking about here, Your Honor,
20	but there was an amendment to The Fair
21	Practices Ordinance in December of 2024,
22	that's after the facts that the
23	plaintiffs are suing about, after those
24	underlying facts arose.
25	And so that would be the

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 operative version of The Fair Practices 2 Ordinance. I have a copy of that here 3 if Your Honor would like it. 4 But, I'll honestly say, as far 5 as I can tell, it doesn't affect any of 6 our analysis. 7 THE COURT: I have a note here 1132.2, added and subsequent subsections 8 9 renumbered, Bill 240060 approved September 4th, 2024, effective 10 11 December 4th, 2024. 12 Is that what you're talking 13 about? 14 MR. SHUEY: Exactly, Your 15 Honor. I have a copy of the Ordinance 16 as well. 17 THE COURT: I have it. 18 MR. SHUEY: Okay, all right, 19 just to be clear about that. 20 Yes, Your Honor, the 21 complainants, under The Fair Practices 22 Ordinance, have a right to come to the 23 -- to come to the Commission and have 2.4 their complaints investigated and have a 25 ruling or remedy through the Commission.

Case ID: 250200568 Control No.: 25033472

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1	If they are unhappy with that
2	process, they can appeal to the Court of
3	Common Pleas, but they are also given
4	the right by City Counsel to appeal
5	after the one-year investigation when
6	they asked for a Right to Sue letter.
7	THE COURT: Stop there.
8	MR. SHUEY: Yes.
9	THE COURT: Is there any
10	analogue within the City's agency
11	structure that is similar to this?
12	MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, I have
13	not researched that particular question.
14	I'd be happy to submit supplemental
15	briefing on that question.
16	THE COURT: What authority is
17	there for City Counsel to authorize
18	someone to be able to bypass the local
19	agency law?
20	MR. SHUEY: Well, the local
21	agency The Fair Practices Ordinance
22	is entirely a creation of City Counsel.
23	The PCHR is a creation of City Counsel.
24	And the Private Right of Action, which
25	the City has a right to create, is a

1 creation of City Counsel. 2 THE COURT: Right, right, but 3 again, I go back to 751, this subchapter 4 shall apply to all local agencies, yada, 5 yada, yada; so what authority is in the 6 statute, or what authority does City 7 Counsel have to bypass 2 Pa. C.S. 751? MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor 8 9 10 THE COURT: Because that is 11 essentially what you're advocating here. 12 There is -- and that is, the 13 purpose of my Order was, which again, 14 was perhaps not as artful as it should 15 have been. The path to review, as I saw 16 it, was that it can come through the 17 agency appeal process, that the 18 Commission renders a decision, they 19 create a record, and then it's an 20 agency-appeal review. 21 It can eventually wind up in 22 the Court of Common Pleas through the 23 agency review -- agency appeal process. 24 So I'm trying to understand 25 what authority or what analogue there is

1for this process, for someone to start2this process and just say, oops, I don't3like that, I'm going to file a direct4action in the Court of Common Pleas and5bypass the local agency appeal process.6MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor7 the I believe Your Honor8referenced the EEOC, and I'm not9personally suggesting that I am an10expert in anti-discrimination law, but1112THE COURT: I'm not13MR. SHUEY: but my14understanding is that they have a15similar provision, where after a period16of time there could be a Right to Sue17letter that allows somebody to take18their individual Private Right of Action19to Court.20But more importantly, Your21Honor, this is a creation that is22explicitly stated in The Fair Practices23Ordinance.24THE COURT: I know you said25that but that's		
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23 Ordinance. 24 THE COURT: I know you said	21	Honor, this is a creation that is
24 THE COURT: I know you said	22	explicitly stated in The Fair Practices
	23	Ordinance.
25 that but that's	24	THE COURT: I know you said
	25	that but that's

1	MR. SHUEY: But, Your Honor,
2	the
3	THE COURT: Any local agency
4	appeal let me finish.
5	Any local agency appeal that
6	comes up through a City agency to a
7	Court of Common Pleas, through this
8	Chapter, through 751, is a creation of
9	or by City Counsel. That's how these
10	local agency appeals get filed in the
11	Court of Common Pleas.
12	So this is not this is not
13	unique in that sense, and that is why I
14	want to understand why you're saying
15	it's unique.
16	MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor,
17	what I'm saying is, that City Counsel
18	has full authority to create a Private
19	Right of Action. They have full
20	authority to create a Private Right of
21	Action that can be enacted however it is
22	they structure it in The Fair Practices
23	Ordinance.
24	And here, in 9-11 in
25	9-1122, they have created a Private

1	Right of Action that can be realized at
2	the time well, after December 2024,
3	they don't even need to go to the
4	Commission on housing discrimination
5	issues.
6	But, in the operative statute
7	for this case, they would have had to
8	start the process with the Commission
9	and then receive their Right to Sue
10	letter.
11	There is nothing in the
12	Pennsylvania Constitution, in the First
13	Class City Home Rule Act, or in any our
14	law that the City is aware of that would
15	conflict with the ability to create this
16	Private Right of Action and to create
17	this procedure that allows the
18	plaintiffs to bring directly to the
19	Court of Common Pleas, their claims,
20	even if it interrupts this agency
21	process, which is, again, entirely a
22	creature of the City Counsel.
23	If Your Honor if I may for
24	just one second, in there is a
25	Commonwealth Court called Appeal of

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HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 Alston, A-L-S-T-O-N, and I'll be happy 1 2 to give the Court a citation on that. 3 THE COURT: Was I the judge on 4 that case? 5 MR. SHUEY: I don't know. Т 6 only know the Commonwealth opinion. 7 THE COURT: Alston? Alston? Is that his name? 8 9 That could be. MR. SHUEY: THE COURT: 10 Yeah. 11 MR. SHUEY: Okay. 12 THE COURT: Yes, go ahead. 13 MR. SHUEY: So you're familiar 14 with it then, Your Honor, I take it? 15 THE COURT: He is litigious, 16 so I may or may not be familiar with the 17 case you're discussing, but is this the 18 case about Ohio House in Fairmont Park? 19 MR. SHUEY: No, Your Honor. I 20 don't think so. 21 That case, I admit not knowing 22 anything about Mr. Alston himself, 23 again, I only read the --24 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 25 It may be a different case, as I said,

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 he's litigious. 2 MR. SHUEY: Let me find what 3 my -- okay. 4 In that case, the Commonwealth Court found that there was an argument 5 6 that there was not a Private Right of 7 Action under The Fair Practices Ordinance that was allowable. 8 9 THE COURT: Let me just make 10 sure, just to jog my memory. 11 MR. SHUEY: Sure. 12 THE COURT: Is this one where 13 he wanted a bid to operate some business out of a Fairmont Park House and then he 14 15 sued the Fairmont Park Commission? 16 MR. SHUEY: I'm going to bring 17 it up and get it right in front of me, 18 Your Honor, just so I can have the 19 facts. 20 MR. ZIMOLONG: Excuse me, Your 21 Honor, and I don't mean to interrupt 22 counsel, but since this is an unreported 23 opinion --2.4 THE COURT: Hang on. 25 MR. ZIMOLONG: -- we would

1	like a copy and
2	THE COURT: Hang on.
3	MR. ZIMOLONG: we object.
4	THE COURT: Hang on, just let
5	him pull it up.
6	MR. SHUEY: Yup, the Ohio
7	House, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: All right.
9	MR. SHUEY: And here's a copy
10	for counsel.
11	So, yes, this does deal with
12	the Ohio House, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	MR. SHUEY: Okay.
15	The Commonwealth Court found
16	that their review there were two
17	arguments being made, one was that there
18	was not a Private Right of Action under
19	The Fair Practices Ordinance and they
20	THE COURT: Do you know how
21	that case got to me?
22	MR. SHUEY: No, I do not, Your
23	Honor.
24	THE COURT: It got to me
25	through a local agency appeal.

1	MR. SHUEY: Okay.
2	The Commonwealth Court briefly
3	talks about the history of pre-1990, The
4	Fair Practices Ordinance, and finds
5	and how if the Commission found that a
6	case was unsubstantiated, it was
7	unsubstantiated, then that would be the
8	end of the inquiry at that point, that
9	would be the end of the case.
10	And they say that in contrast
11	here, Section 9-1122, Subsection (1) of
12	the Ordinance, added in 1990, now
13	provides a Private Right of Action to
14	seek redress from the trial Court to
15	open claim.
16	Which, I guess, I just bring
17	that forward for the purpose of the
18	history here, that it was important to
19	City Counsel that there be an
20	opportunity for the plaintiffs to be
21	heard in the Court of Common Pleas.
22	THE COURT: But there is;
23	there is. That's why I'm trying to
24	understand I hear everything you're
25	saying, but I still don't understand why

1	this is unique.
2	There is, every litigant,
3	whether it's a zoning case, whether it's
4	a zoning board case, whether it's any
5	kind of appeal from a City agency, you
6	have the ability to come and appeal to
7	the Court of Common Pleas through 751,
8	and so why is this different?
9	MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, the
10	question that I would direct Your
11	Honor's attention to is not necessarily
12	why is it different from others, but
13	whether or not the City Counsel has the
14	authority under the Home Rule Act to
15	enact this procedure.
16	And there is nothing in the
17	agency law that would prevent them from
18	creating a Private Right of Action.
19	City Counsel can create a
20	Private Right of Action, just as the
21	general assembly can. They can create a
22	Private Right of Action where somebody
23	has no need to go to any Commission or
24	any Court or any City agency first.
25	They can file directly with the Court of

1	Common Pleas.
2	In this case, they created a
3	procedure that starts with the
4	Commission and then can go to the Court
5	of Common Pleas, and that is within the
6	City Counsel's authority to do so.
7	I'll remind you, Your Honor,
8	as I'm sure Your Honor is aware, of the
9	Supreme Court's the Supreme Court's
10	explanation about the authority of the
11	City of Philadelphia in Nutter versus
12	Dougherty, which says that whenever
13	there is an ambiguity, it must be read
14	in favor of the municipality and its
15	authorities.
16	THE COURT: So again, and I'm
17	not I'm not necessarily done with
18	this yet, but again, 751 subpart A says
19	except as provided in subsection B, this
20	subchapter shall apply to all local
21	agencies regardless of the fact that a
22	statute expressly provides that there
23	shall be no appeal from an adjudication
24	of an agency, or that the adjudication
25	of an agency shall be final or

conclusive or shall not be subject to review.

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And then Sub B, the exception is, the provisions of this subchapter shall apply to any adjudication; which under any existing statute may be appealed to a Court of Record, but only to the extent not inconsistent with such statute.

10 So what you are saying, if I'm 11 hearing you correctly, is that, yes, 12 this exists, but City Counsel can create 13 a Private Right of Action that bypasses 14 this through their statutory Ordinance 15 creating function?

MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor, I'm not -- I'm not sure I would adopt the word bypass, as opposed to there being an alternative path for the plaintiff to get to City Counsel.

As Your Honor is aware, there are consequences to taking an agency appeal through the 75 Pa. -- sorry, 2 Pa. C.S. 751, such as the record that is created and therefore is binding on the

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1 Court of Common Pleas. 2 The right that is created in 3 The Fair Practices Ordinance, the 4 Private Right of Action that is created, 5 allows a complainant to go directly to 6 the Court of Common Pleas with their 7 complaint. And that is an authority that City Counsel has. 8 It's an 9 authority that is not restricted by any 10 other law of the Commonwealth. 11 So, a cynic might THE COURT: 12 say that the process created here is 13 completely a loser. 14 In other words, City Counsel 15 created this sort of checkpoint where 16 you have to go through the Commission, 17 but they don't really need to ever do 18 anything. They can just, at some point, 19 pass you off and say, after a period of 20 time then you have to go to Court, and 21 they never really have to do anything, 22 or adjudicate anything because in every 23 single situation, after a period of 24 time, they can just say, go sue in 25 Court.

1	MR. SHUEY: The Commission was
2	established in 1951 and has been charged
3	with enforcing the FPO, since the FPO's
4	creation in 1963.
5	Certainly, it is its intent to
6	ensure that the citizens of Philadelphia
7	get remedied for any illegal
8	discrimination that falls under
9	THE COURT: Why don't we do it
10	here?
11	MR. SHUEY: their purview.
12	Well, Your Honor, the
13	investigation, as stated in the
14	complaint and we're at the
15	preliminary objection stage, so you have
16	to accept the facts as stated in the
17	complaint the investigation was
18	ongoing after one year. The plaintiff's
19	requested and received their Right to
20	Sue letter.
21	But these are not
22	THE COURT: Well, hang on.
23	MR. SHUEY: Sorry.
24	THE COURT: Is there a
25	discretion? Could the Commission have

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	~ / /
1	said, no, we're not going to issue a
2	Right to Sue letter? Because that's not
3	how I read the statute.
4	MR. SHUEY: I agree with you,
5	Your Honor. I don't believe there's a
6	discretion in that, and if there is, I
7	will supplement I will correct that
8	in a supplemental briefing, but my
9	understanding is that there is no
10	discretion in that.
11	THE COURT: So after 100 days,
12	which in the life of the cases, as we
13	all know is not very long, they can
14	anybody can just go to Court?
15	MR. SHUEY: If they follow the
16	procedures and get their Right to Sue
17	letter, yes.
18	THE COURT: Well, I think we
19	just said, they don't need a Right to
20	Sue letter. What happens if nothing
21	happens on the 101st day, did they
22	need a Right to Sue letter, like do they
23	need to request a Right to Sue letter or
24	is it self-executing and that it
25	automatically happens?

	~ <i>, , , ,</i> ,
1	MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, I'm
2	not an expert in the Commission and its
3	particular the particularities of its
4	procedure.
5	We do have people that can
6	answer that question or I can submit it
7	in supplemental briefing, but my
8	understanding is that the plaintiffs
9	have to request the Right to Sue letter.
10	And if plaintiff doesn't
11	THE COURT: Hang on.
12	MR. SHUEY: If plaintiff
13	doesn't dispute that
14	THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on.
15	And then 265 days later, and
16	I'm just so there is also a provision
17	in here, which I haven't really thought
18	through how they go along with one
19	another, if within one year after the
20	filing, the Commission dismisses the
21	complainant, or has not entered into a
22	conciliation agreement, the Commission
23	must also notify the complainant.
24	And then they can also bring a
25	case into the Court of Common Pleas if

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1	that doesn't happen in a year.
2	MR. SHUEY: Yes, Your Honor,
3	and I think what everything that you're
4	pointing to highlights is that the
5	intention of The Fair Practices
6	Ordinance, the intention of 9-1122 is to
7	ensure that the complainant's rights
8	were not foreclosed; that they have a
9	right to bring their cause of action to
10	the Court of Common Pleas.
11	In fact, that is the language
12	of 1122, that their rights to bring a
13	cause of action are not foreclosed.
14	That appears to be the guiding
15	star the guiding light of City
16	Counsel when they're creating these
17	Ordinances; that they want to ensure
18	that complainants are able to get to the
19	Court of Common Pleas and bring that in
20	a timely manner.
21	And so, they have that
22	authority. They have that right to do.
23	THE COURT: All right.
24	Now, briefly
25	MR. SHUEY: Yes.
1	THE COURT: And I jumped right
----	--
2	in, so I'm going to circle back.
3	MR. SHUEY: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Before I turn it
5	over to the defendants, just so you know
6	where I'm going here, I'm going to give
7	you an opportunity to say whatever else
8	you want to say, but I do have a couple
9	of other questions moving from the
10	procedure slightly. We may revisit it.
11	Is the argument of the
12	plaintiffs here that the defendants were
13	obligated to do whatever they let me
14	state it another way.
15	Is it the argument that the
16	defendants were obligated to accept
17	Section 8 housing?
18	MR. SHUEY: Yes, Your Honor.
19	So I would like to
20	THE COURT: Hang on. Hang on.
21	Hang on.
22	MR. SHUEY: Okay.
23	THE COURT: So City Counsel's
24	Ordinance compels all landlords in
25	Philadelphia to accept Section 8

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 housing? 2 MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, this 3 is an issue that the plaintiff's counsel 4 is ready to talk about in more depth. 5 I'm happy to --6 THE COURT: It's your 7 Ordinance. MR. SHUEY: Absolutely, and 8 9 I'm happy to answer it, but I wanted to 10 say that we have, you know, split up our 11 intended arguments. 12 THE COURT: All right. So for 13 purposes of argument --14 MR. SHUEY: But, but --15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 16 MR. SHUEY: I'm happy to 17 address that Your Honor. 18 Sorry, am I going to fast? 19 THE COURT: I'm just having a 20 hard time understanding how landlords 21 can be compelled to -- all landlords 22 must accept Section 8 housing, how that 23 is what the intention of this statute, 24 that can't be. 25 The Fair Practices MR. SHUEY:

1 Ordinance bans discrimination in hous:	inq
2 based on source of income. It	
3 specifically	
4 THE COURT: No, you can't ju	ust
5 restate what the statute says. What	the
6 purpose is, is what you're arguing, is	S
7 that all landlords in the City of	
8 Philadelphia must accept Section 8	
9 housing?	
10 MR. SHUEY: This is not	
11 uncommon, Your Honor.	
12 THE COURT: What do you mean	n
13 it's not uncommon? Where is? Where i	is
14 it else? Where else is it?	
15 MR. SHUEY: May I ask counse	el?
16 She probably knows the other states, 1	but
17 there are quite a few	
18 14 states?	
19 MS. BERNSTEIN: 160	
20 jurisdictions across the country.	
21 MR. SHUEY: There are 160	
22 jurisdictions across the country where	e
23 this has been a	
24 THE COURT: Out of a million	n,
25 out of thousand, how many jurisdiction	ns

1	are we talking about?
2	MR. SHUEY: A great question,
3	Your Honor, and again, that has been
4	prepared by counsel for the plaintiffs.
5	But, the point is, there are
6	quite a few states that require this.
7	There are quite a few municipalities
8	that require this. And the City has the
9	authority to do it and it's not
10	conflicted out by any federal, state or
11	local law.
12	This is not an uncommon
13	requirement. And what is important, I
14	think, about it, is that discrimination
15	against those who receive housing
16	assistance, which is what the housing
17	choice voucher is, or also known as
18	Section 8, is invidious, it's pervasive,
19	and it is something that the City
20	Counsel has demonstrated time and time
21	again that they are concerned about.
22	The Housing Choice Voucher
23	Program was created is created and
24	acted by Congress, by the federal
25	government to ameliorate the problems of

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segregation and unaffordable housing in the United States.

3 These kinds of source of 4 income discrimination laws, they go 5 directly to those issues to ensure that 6 even when somebody can -- that when 7 someone can afford an apartment, nobody is asking the landlord, as I understand 8 9 it, no one is asking them to reduce 10 their rents; but when they can afford 11 it, with the help of The Housing Choice 12 Voucher Program, they are allowed to do 13 so. 14 THE COURT: Can I just ask

another practical question then? MR. SHUEY: Of course, Your

Honor.

18 So, what has --THE COURT: 19 pardon my characterization, because I'm 20 just reading a cold record, and I'm not 21 intending to -- but it seems to me that 22 this was an artificially created 23 situation in the sense that the 2.4 organization put up someone to go look 25 for housing, and so what happens is, any

1 person who is on Section 8 then could 2 theoretically have a cause of action 3 that you're describing here. 4 MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor 5 6 THE COURT: Because they can 7 go to any landlord that doesn't accept Section 8 and not even be legitimately 8 9 interested, just find out that that 10 landlord doesn't accept Section 8, and 11 low and behold, according to what the 12 plaintiffs are arguing here, they have a 13 cause of action. 14 MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor, 15 first of all, we're at the preliminary 16 objection stage so we have to accept 17 those facts --18 THE COURT: That's my point. 19 Hang on, you can't keep interrupting me. 20 MR. SHUEY: Sorry, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: That's my exact 22 point. 23 Basically, what you're saying 2.4 is any plaintiff could do what this the 25 plaintiff did and have a cause of action

1 under this Ordinance. 2 MR. SHUEY: A cause of action arises when they're denied housing in a 3 4 manner that is illegal under the FPO and 5 that is what is proposed here. 6 THE COURT: Well, I don't 7 believe that is what the facts here say 8 The pleading says that they though. 9 inquired -- the pleading says they 10 inquired and they were told that these 11 landlords didn't accept Section 8, isn't 12 that right? 13 MR. SHUEY: That's my 14 understanding, yes. THE COURT: So they weren't --15 16 MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor 17 18 THE COURT: Let me finish. 19 So what you're doing is saying 20 that's a denial. So that goes back to 21 my point, which is anyone who is on 22 Section 8 could do the same thing and 23 have a cause of action, isn't that 2.4 right? 25 MR. SHUEY: I think that at

1	the end of the day, they'd have to prove
2	that they were actually denied the
3	housing, that is part of the
4	THE COURT: But that's not
5	what happened here.
6	MR. SHUEY: Well, Your Honor,
7	I'll allow plaintiff's counsel to speak
8	for the plaintiffs.
9	We accepted the facts as they
10	were in the complaint. The City is here
11	as a plaintiff intervenor specifically
12	because we are concerned about the
13	affects of the arguments proposed by the
14	defense.
15	THE COURT: All right. So why
16	don't we
17	MR. SHUEY: I would like to
18	I'm sorry, I keep interrupting.
19	THE COURT: It's okay. Go
20	ahead, go ahead.
21	MR. SHUEY: I would like to
22	point out, however, Your Honor, that
23	testing in housing discrimination law is
24	a very old practice that goes back to
25	practicing to try and fight racial

1discrimination as far back, I think it's2the 1940s, but certainly 1950s when3there were problems with blockbusting4and racial discrimination in housing.5And I do not think that is a6new thing in the housing discrimination7rule.8THE COURT: Okay.9MR. SHUEY: So I would just10put that11THE COURT: Do you want to12turn it over to your co-counsel here?13MR. SHUEY: Well, I want to14address any other questions that the15Court has16THE COURT: The questions now17are for your co-counsel.18MR. SHUEY: Okay.19I do have maybe some other20things to add, but21THE COURT: Before I turn to22defendants, I will give you an23opportunity to add anything you want to24add.25MR. SHUEY: Thank, Your Honor.		
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21THE COURT: Before I turn to22defendants, I will give you an23opportunity to add anything you want to24add.	19	I do have maybe some other
22defendants, I will give you an23opportunity to add anything you want to24add.	20	things to add, but
23 opportunity to add anything you want to 24 add.	21	THE COURT: Before I turn to
24 add.	22	defendants, I will give you an
	23	opportunity to add anything you want to
25 MR. SHUEY: Thank, Your Honor.	24	add.
	25	MR. SHUEY: Thank, Your Honor.

1	MR. MOFFITT: Your Honor,
2	before plaintiffs get started, I do want
3	to note the defendants object to her
4	participation. The plaintiffs did not
5	file a motion for reconsideration.
6	As to the preliminary
7	objections against them, they stand at
8	this point.
9	THE COURT: I hear you. Your
10	objection is noted.
11	My Order also said the
12	parties, I don't specify which parties
13	should be prepared to address all
14	issues.
15	I get you. I got your
16	objection, but we're going to create a
17	record.
18	You can do whichever one you
19	want. You can stand there. You can go
20	to the middle podium. Whatever is your
21	preference. Just speak into the mic,
22	any mic.
23	MS. BERNSTEIN: Good morning,
24	Your Honor.
25	Would Your Honor prefer for me

1	to begin by addressing some of the
2	questions you've already raised, or I'm
3	happy to wait for Your Honor to
4	THE COURT: You can start, and
5	then I'll it probably won't be long
6	before I jump in.
7	MS. BERNSTEIN: So, Your
8	Honor, quickly on the Private Right of
9	Action piece, there is something that I
10	want to point out there.
11	In the way that the statute,
12	The Fair Practices Ordinance is
13	operative, and the first main point is
14	that we would not characterize this as
15	an appeal, that this is not an appeal
16	because there was not an agency finding.
17	THE COURT: I know it's not an
18	appeal. That is my whole point.
19	MS. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
20	THE COURT: My point is, it
21	should go back to the agency, let the
22	agency create a record, and then the
23	party aggrieved by the agency decision,
24	can appeal under 751. That is where I
25	was going with my questions.

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1	I believe this is more
2	appropriate for an agency appeal. What
3	I had a problem with initially, was that
4	it was filed straightaway as a civil
5	action.
6	Go ahead.
7	MS. BERNSTEIN: On that point,
8	Your Honor, the complaint was filed
9	first with the Commission in August of
10	2023. It was after the year of what we
11	read as exclusive jurisdiction. That's
12	written into Section 9-1122 of The Fair
13	Practices Ordinance, that then
14	plaintiffs requested the Right to Sue,
15	in essence.
16	Your Honor made the analogy to
17	the EEOC. I think that is a good
18	analogy. So the way that I read then
19	The Fair Practices Ordinance, to take it
20	from the beginning is that the sections
21	that come before 9-1122 are the process
22	at the Commission.
23	So if the Commission were to
24	you know, come up with findings after

the 100 days of the investigation, but

25

39

1 they did not do that here. 2 THE COURT: Right, that was 3 one of the pinchpoints here because the 4 statute itself feeds into the 751 5 structure with 9-1119, Judicial Review. 6 MS. BERNSTEIN: Correct. 7 THE COURT: So what we have here is, whoever drafted this statute 8 9 decided, no, we're going to do both. 10 We're going to have the agency appeal 11 process and we're going to have this 12 other thing where they can just go 13 straightaway to the Court of Common 14 Pleas. 15 And my questions to Mr. Shuey, 16 and drawing on my experience from doing 17 agency appeals from the City is, I know 18 of no other statute, no other Ordinance 19 that creates such a structure where you 20 can either appeal through the agency 21 appeal process and go up through 751 or 22 have your own Right of Action. 23 It's not like someone 2.4 aggrieves in a zoning hearing can decide, you know what, I'm going to file 25

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 a civil action against the zoning board. 2 It doesn't work like that. 3 There is an agency appeal 4 process where you need to appeal the 5 zoning decision. 6 But what we have here is, 7 again, I don't know exactly the logic behind it, well, I can guess; someone 8 9 decided, we're going to do this two ways 10 for whatever reason, and so I don't know 11 of any other process where this is 12 provided. So those are my questions. 13 To put a finer point on it, I 14 was a little obtuse perhaps, those are the finer points I was making to Mr. 15 16 Shuey; which is, I don't know of any 17 other statute that has 1119 and 1122. 18 You can choose one. You can't choose 19 both. 20 MS. BERNSTEIN: And it may be 21 an acknowledgment on City Counsel's 22 behalf, Your Honor, that the Commission 23 has limited resources. 2.4 And so while the Commission is 25 invested with an enforcement apparatus,

1	it also is a recognition that it may not
2	be able to adjudicate every claim before
3	it, and the City Counsel's interest is,
4	as Mr. Shuey described, to not foreclose
5	complainants of their day in court.
6	THE COURT: Do you know who
7	can fund the Commission?
8	MS. BERNSTEIN: I'm sorry?
9	THE COURT: Do you know who
10	can fund the Commission to give them
11	more resources? You don't have to
12	answer because we all know the answer.
13	Go ahead.
14	MS. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
15	Those were the elements I
16	wanted to address on the Private Right
17	of Action piece just based on your
18	questions for Mr. Shuey, and then I'm
19	happy to turn to either Housing Equality
20	Center Pennsylvania's standing or the
21	preemption question you're asking with
22	regard to the whether Housing Choice
23	Vouchers are actually mandated to be
24	accepted.
25	THE COURT: Let's start

1	with so come back to the question I
2	asked, which is, I think you you
3	don't disagree with the premise that the
4	position you're advocating is that all
5	landlords in the City of Philadelphia
6	must accept Section 8 Housing Vouchers?
7	MS. BERNSTEIN: I do disagree
8	with that premise, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Oh, okay. Well,
10	go ahead.
11	MS. BERNSTEIN: So the
12	argument is not that every landlord
13	under The Fair Practices Ordinance must
14	accept vouchers. It's that landlords
15	cannot discriminate on the basis of
16	source of income; that includes things
17	like child support, it includes things
18	like alimony, Social Security payments.
19	It also includes housing subsidies, like
20	a Housing Choice Voucher Program.
21	And it's important, I think,
22	especially at this stage of the
23	preliminary objections, is to look at
24	the facts in the complaint and see that
25	this is a situation where there are no

1	allegations whatsoever that go to the
2	individualized situation of the tenant,
3	or the individualized situation of the
4	landlord.
5	It's not as if the landlords
6	said that they applied to enroll in the
7	program. They were not accepted into
8	the program, nothing of that nature.
9	It was just, you need not
10	apply here, and that kind of blatant
11	discrimination is a violation of The
12	Fair Practices Ordinance when it's based
13	on a protected class, which in this
14	case, is source of income.
15	THE COURT: Say that again.
16	MS. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
17	The language of The Fair
18	Practices Ordinance does not mandate
19	participation in the Housing Choice
20	Voucher Program. What it does is
21	prohibits discrimination on the basis of
22	source of income.
23	That can take many forms. It
24	can take the form of child support
25	payments. It can take the form of

1 Social Security payments, or SSI 2 payments. It can also take the form of 3 housing subsidies. 4 And in this case, of course, 5 both plaintiffs, because there are two, 6 an individual Miss Jennifer Cooper, and 7 then also the Housing Equality Center of Pennsylvania, had the Housing Choice 8 9 Vouchers, so that's the discretion here that's relevant. 10 11 THE COURT: But in a Venn 12 diagram -- sorry, if I incur a Venn 13 diagram, it does seem, and again, 14 correct me because I want to make sure I 15 understand, that what you're saying is, 16 if someone on Section 8 applies for 17 housing and they're told don't apply 18 here, then they're being discriminated 19 on the basis of their income? 20 MS. BERNSTEIN: That's 21 correct, Your Honor, but that, we argue, 22 is different from mandating 23 participation in the program. 2.4 So, to take a hypothetical, 25 which might be helpful in this case.

1	Let's say that there's a situation where
2	there is an advertisement for an
3	apartment online and more than
4	one person applies for that apartment.
5	An individual with a Housing
6	Choice Voucher applies, an individual
7	without a Housing Choice Voucher
8	applies, and the individual without the
9	Housing Choice Voucher, let's say, is
10	willing to pay more than the advertised
11	amount, you know, above what the payment
12	standard allows because it is not true
13	that The Fair Practices Ordinance is
14	mandating that landlords accept lower
15	payment than what they're, you know,
16	advertising or otherwise seeking. That
17	might be a situation where the landlord
18	reasonably chooses the tenant who was
19	able to pay more, and the Housing Choice
20	Voucher tenant, in that case may not
21	have an allegation that their rights are
22	being or rather that there's an
23	unlawful behavior under The Fair
24	Practices Ordinance.
25	But that's not what happened

1	here. What happened here was, there's a
2	property management company that says
3	we, essentially, have a policy of
4	practice of not accepting Housing Choice
5	Voucher Programs, and so you need not
6	apply here.
7	And if we were to accept the
8	premise that an oral statement, which
9	is, you know, none of our units accept
10	here was Housing Choice Vouchers, but
11	none of our units accept you on the
12	basis of whatever
13	THE COURT REPORTER: Can you
14	let the siren pass, please.
15	THE COURT: Yes. Hold on.
16	MS. BERNSTEIN: I was just
17	winding up here.
18	THE COURT: Go ahead.
19	MS. BERNSTEIN: So, if we were
20	to accept the premise here, that an oral
21	statement that effectively discourages,
22	and/or deliberately discourages
23	individuals to apply for an apartment
24	based on a protective class under The
25	Fair Practices Ordinance is not

1	discrimination, I think it would lead to
2	an absurd sort of result where, you
3	know, discrimination could occur on any
4	basis
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MS. BERNSTEIN: and as long
7	the tenant had not yet applied, their
8	rights would be foreclosed. That is not
9	what The Fair Practices Ordinance
10	intends.
11	THE COURT: Okay. I
12	understand what you're saying. I need
13	to think about it. I'm not sure I'm
14	going to agree with you, but I get what
15	you're saying.
16	MS. BERNSTEIN: If I may, Your
17	Honor, I do think that the analysis
18	it really goes to the heart of the
19	federal preemption question and the
20	analysis there, which many courts all
21	around the country have undertaken,
22	which is whether or not localities
23	I mentioned before there are
24	160 of them, about, throughout the
25	United States that have source of income

1 protections; whether or not localities 2 can have source of income protections, 3 and if that's preempted by a program 4 that is voluntary. None of those courts have 5 6 found that the federal program is -- it 7 preempts those local Ordinances because the Program, the Housing Choice Voucher 8 9 Program is meant to expand opportunities 10 for affordable housing in safe 11 neighborhoods and be people's choice. 12 And that's exactly what the 13 source of income protection does here. 14 You can't discriminate against this 15 person solely on the basis of the fact 16 that they plan to pay their rent in this 17 one way. It gives them an opportunity 18 to live in a neighborhood of their 19 choice. 20 THE COURT: I have a note 21 If you could just address it. here. 22 MS. BERNSTEIN: Sure. 23 THE COURT: Paragraph three of 2.4 my Order sustains the POs as to Joseph 25 Tan, 1249 South 21st Street, PFN

1 Associates, 2115 South 63rd, and Jana 2 Bernstein and Jason Bernstein. 3 And I believe my notes here 4 indicate that there was -- they were 5 never implicated in anything, and so I 6 sustained the POs on that basis. 7 Those were the -- what I understand, never properties they 8 9 actually saw; they never actually toured 10 them, but they called management 11 offices. So it does in a sense go back 12 to my question to Mr. Shuey, which was, 13 why anyone on Section 8 couldn't just do 14 the same thing to create a cause of 15 action. 16 So is it your argument that 17 those defendants are in the case because 18 the properties that they own, that were 19 managed, they were told -- the inquirers 20 were told that they don't accept Section 21 8? 22 MS. BERNSTEIN: Yes, 23 there's --2.4 The individual owner 25 defendants in this property -- excuse

1	me, in this complaint are there for sort
2	of two separate reasons. One is, those
3	are the properties that Miss Jennifer
4	Cooper sought and there were particular
5	properties that she sought, and then
6	there were also the properties that the
7	testers from Housing Equality Center of
8	Pennsylvania inquired with.
9	THE COURT: Right.
10	MS. BERNSTEIN: So what we
11	were responding to in our motion was
12	owner/defendant's argument that
13	Miss Cooper did not have standing
14	against the properties that the housing
15	testers called and that's what we we
16	don't dispute that.
17	THE COURT: All right, so the
18	ones that
19	So drawing a distinction, your
20	folks called we're calling the
21	"testers", called those places and
22	that's the basis of the cause of action,
23	whereas the other properties, Calumet,
24	Leverington, Ridge Avenue, those were
25	ones where she actually attempted to get

1 a lease? 2 MS. BERNSTEIN: Correct, as 3 pled in the complaint, Your Honor, 4 toured -- called the property management 5 office after that tour. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. BERNSTEIN: Your Honor, if I may, and we can finish this line of 8 9 questioning, of course, but I do want to 10 give Your Honor an analogous statute, 11 City statute with a procedure like The 12 Fair Practices Ordinance just because 13 Your Honor was requesting one. 14 THE COURT: Go ahead. 15 MS. BERNSTEIN: It's The Fair 16 Workweek Ordinance which is 9-46117(a). 17 THE COURT: I've sat in 18 Statutory Appeals for two years and ten 19 months. I never heard of that statute. 20 What is the cite? 21 MS. BERNSTEIN: It's 22 9-46117(a). 23 THE COURT: 9-4611 sub 7, 24 sub(a)? 25 MS. BERNSTEIN: Correct.

1THE COURT: All right.2Is there anything else you	
2 Is there anything else you	
3 want to add? I want to give the	
4 defendants an opportunity.	
5 MS. BERNSTEIN: Sure.	
6 THE COURT: I've been going	3
7 back and forth, and I assume my time	
8 with them will be shorter, but I want	t to
9 make sure that both, you and Mr. Shue	эу
10 have an opportunity to make any argum	ment
11 you want to make so we can have a	
12 complete record and if I have any	
13 questions on anything else I can ask.	
14 MS. BERNSTEIN: Yes, two	
15 things, Your Honor, if I may just	
16 briefly address Housing Equality Cent	cer
17 of Pennsylvania standing	
18 THE COURT: Sure.	
19 MS. BERNSTEIN: as a fai	ir
20 housing organization.	
21 And, you know, as Mr. Shuey	Y
22 has already discussed, there is a lor	ng
23 history of Fair Housing Organizations	5
24 having standing to redress harms.	
25 It also though, importantly	<i>.</i>

1	meets the Pennsylvania standard for
2	standing because Housing Equality Center
3	is an aggrieved party with a
4	substantial, direct, and immediate
5	interest in the outcome of this
6	litigation.
7	And so, you know, just
8	recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
9	and Allegheny Health Center held that,
10	you know, professional organizations
11	that provide particular services for
12	individuals can meet that standard.
13	So in Allegheny Health, for
14	example, when patients needed abortion
15	services, they sought the medical
16	provider.
17	Cited in the case, is another
18	case I think is really helpful, which is
19	Daulphin County Public Defenders, which
20	is where individuals excuse me,
21	indigent criminal defendants need an
22	attorney, they too seek a public
23	defender.
24	THE COURT: So you're not
25	arguing organizational standing, you're

1	arguing your own standing?
2	MS. BERNSTEIN: We are arguing
3	organizational standing
4	THE COURT: Okay.
5	MS. BERNSTEIN: for Housing
6	Equality Center of Pennsylvania. Of
7	course Miss Cooper has her own standing
8	as a separate plaintiff.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MS. BERNSTEIN: Yes.
11	So that analysis, I think in
12	Allegheny Health is really helpful to
13	think about. Housing Equality Center's
14	interest is clearly direct.
15	So had Housing Equality Center
16	responded to its own anonymous
17	allegation of defendant's discriminatory
18	conduct and this is important because
19	Your Honor mentioned before about, you
20	know, being able to simply respond
21	like, essentially, seek out this
22	litigation.
23	Housing Equality Center's pled
24	in the complaint had an anonymous
25	allegation of defendants' discriminatory

1 behavior. That is separate from 2 Miss Cooper. 3 And so had they responded to 4 that anonymous allegation with the 5 testing investigation that revealed no 6 discrimination, they would not be a 7 plaintiff in this suit, but that is not what happened. 8 9 What happened is that the 10 investigation did reveal a pattern of 11 source of income discrimination, and 12 that's what led Housing Equality Center 13 to conduct a mailing campaign to over 14 4400 units in Philadelphia, around the 15 units in question to educate tenants 16 about their rights under The Fair 17 Practices Ordinance; Facebook 18 advertisement campaign that was viewed over 2100 times; discussions with legal 19 20 services providers to offer their 21 educational services. 22 But for the discrimination 23 that was found as a result of the 2.4 testing investigation, Housing Equality 25 Center would not have had to shift its

1 resources from other core activities to 2 combat that discrimination. 3 And that's really similar to 4 what you see in Alleghany Health where 5 the medical providers needed to shift 6 their treatment plans for patients, 7 their billing practices, as a result of this exclusion coverage. That was the 8 9 subject of the complaint. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Anything 11 else? 12 MS. BERNSTEIN: Yes, just one 13 other thing if I can just, you know, speak to a procedural question to 14 15 apprise the Court, which was raised 16 earlier. 17 Plaintiffs did not file a 18 motion for reconsideration in this case, 19 as Your Honor is aware, based on the 20 May 14th Order dismissing the complaint 21 without prejudice. 22 And that is, in part, because 23 the plaintiffs do intend to appeal the 2.4 entirety of the Order, not just those 25 paragraphs that the City intervener

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 filed its Motion for Reconsideration on; 2 which is paragraphs one and five. 3 And that deadline is very fast 4 approaching, this Friday, June 13th. 5 THE COURT: I'm aware. 6 MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you so 7 much, Your Honor. Thank you. 8 THE COURT: 9 Mr. Shuey, anything else before I turn it over to the defendants? 10 11 MR. SHUEY: Very briefly, Your 12 Honor. 13 First of all, the City thanks Ms. Bernstein for a more articulate 14 15 explanation of what the FPO requires and 16 we would like to adopt that. 17 I also would like to point 18 out, particularly this issue of the 19 local agency law, Your Honor. Two 20 things, the first is that the local 21 agency law allows -- provides the 22 procedure for complainants to appeal to 23 the Court of Common Pleas. 2.4 The Fair Practices Ordinance 25 also allows another procedure to get to

1 the Court of Common Pleas. These aren't 2 necessarily in conflict. And when there is not a 3 4 conflict there, we would like to direct 5 your attention to; of course, again, the 6 Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 7 Nutter, saying that there should be -any other duty should be willfully 8 9 construed in favor of the municipality 10 in doing so. 11 Also, as the basics of 12 statutory construction that the affect 13 of all interpretation of construction of 14 statutes is to ascertain and effectuate 15 the intention of the legislature, which 16 here it seems quite clear that the 17 individuals should be given a right to 18 take matters in the Court of Common 19 Pleas. 20 Your question that repeatedly 21 is, how -- are there any other statutes, 22 ordinances, that work in this manner. 23 And so I would just say that, even if 2.4 this were unlawful -- it sounds like it 25 may not be based on what Ms. Bernstein

has just said about the Fair Workweek Act, it still doesn't mean that City Counsel can't do it. It still would be fully within the City Counsel's authority to do so. And finally, Your Honor, if you're not inclined to reconsider and vacate the back portion of the May 14th Order, we would ask for an opportunity	
3 Counsel can't do it. 4 It still would be fully within 5 the City Counsel's authority to do so. 6 And finally, Your Honor, if 7 you're not inclined to reconsider and 8 vacate the back portion of the May 14th	
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<pre>7 you're not inclined to reconsider and 8 vacate the back portion of the May 14th</pre>	
8 vacate the back portion of the May 14th	
9 Order, we would ask for an opportunity	
10 to supplement, to do a supplemental	
11 brief.	
12 This is not an issue that is	
13 raised by the defendants in their	
14 briefing. It's not an issue that was	
15 directly raised or mentioned in the	
16 Order. And so an opportunity for us to	
17 review and provide briefing on the	
18 interplay between the agency law, agency	
19 appeal law and The Fair Practices	
20 Ordinance and an attempt to research for	
21 other like instances, would be	
22 appreciated, to hopefully be helpful to	
23 the Court.	
24 THE COURT: So, Mr. Shuey,	
just to go back, and after I hear from	

the defendants I'll figure out what I'm 1 2 doing here. 3 I hear what you're saying, but 4 again, I have a problem with the fact 5 that we have 1119 and 1122 in here, and 6 I am not convinced that both can live in 7 harmony, but that is --Again, maybe I'll give you an 8 9 opportunity to visit that in more detail 10 in a supplemental brief. I don't know, 11 but that really was the focus. And 12 perhaps when I was asking questions in 13 the beginning I wasn't as precise with 14 what I was really getting at, but we'll come back around that. 15 16 MR. SHUEY: Okay. 17 And if Your Honor would like 18 me to address the relief requested at 19 this point --20 I'm going to deal THE COURT: 21 with that at the end. I want to hear 22 from the defendants. We've been going 23 at it for awhile. 2.4 MR. SHUEY: Thank you, Your 25 Honor.

1	THE COURT: Thank you, Mr.
2	Shuey.
3	Who is going to go first?
4	MR. MOFFITT: I will.
5	THE COURT: Go ahead.
6	MR. MOFFITT: Good morning,
7	Your Honor. Again, Christian Moffitt of
8	behalf of OCF Realty, which is the
9	property manager who has been sued here.
10	Your Honor, I believe that you
11	have kind of crystalized and gotten
12	right to the heart of the issue here,
13	which is that the City of Philadelphia
14	and the City Counsel can come up with
15	whatever ordinance they want.
16	However, when it conflicts
17	with or goes outside of the limits of
18	power that are put in place by them
19	against them by either the Home Rule
20	Act, the Pennsylvania Constitution, or
21	the General Assembly, that statute is
22	ineffective.
23	And here, as Mr. Shuey noted,
24	the briefing in this case focused on the
25	Home Rule Charter; but that being said,

1 I think Your reference to the Local 2 Agency Act is particularly well taken. 3 The General Assembly has put 4 specific limitations in place, specific 5 procedures in place for what has to 6 occur before you can appeal from a local 7 agency law, and that is not what happens here under The Fair Practices Ordinance 8 9 as grafted. 10 THE COURT: Well, it can. 11 There is a path to that. 12 MR. MOFFITT: Under Fair 13 Practices Ordinances as grafted, yes, 14 but not under The Local Agency 15 Procedures Act. 16 THE COURT: No, what I'm 17 saying, which is following from where I 18 started is, the Act has both. 19 MR. MOFFITT: Right. 20 THE COURT: So -- and let me 21 just sort of rewind because you jumped 22 in; both sides briefed the Home Rule 23 Act. 2.4 And so you spend a lot of time 25 with the Home Rule Act, does the Home
1	Rule Act do anything to prevent what's
2	in the Ordinance?
3	MR. MOFFITT: Absolutely, Your
4	Honor. Section 13131 of the Home Rule
5	Act, which is what the argument is
6	focused on, does provide limitations on
7	what the City of Philadelphia and City
8	Counsel can do with respect to
9	enforcement of its Ordinances.
10	The specific language of the
11	statute says that Ordinances, Rules, and
12	Regulations adopted under the authority
13	of this Act or under the provisions of
14	any charter adopted or amended
15	hereunder, which is exactly where The
16	Fair Practices Ordinance comes from,
17	shall be enforceable by the imposition
18	of fines, forfeitures, and penalties.
19	It says absolutely nothing
20	about the creation of a Private Cause of
21	Action that can be brought directly into
22	the Court of Common Pleas. And that is
23	the principle you know, that is our
24	principle argument.
25	City of Philadelphia v.

1	Schweiger (sic), back in 2004, the
2	Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged
3	that municipalities, including the City
4	of Philadelphia, are creatures of the
5	state that have no inert powers of their
6	own and they only they possess only
7	such powers of government as are
8	expressly granted to them and as are
9	necessary to carry the same into effect.
10	Here, the General Assembly has
11	given them a specific way to enforce
12	their Ordinances and it's not provided
13	for another course of action like
14	providing for a Private Cause of Action.
15	And it's a basic and
16	well-established black-letter policy
17	that more specific statutes take
18	priority over more general statutes.
19	The most recent case that I
20	found was In re: Borough of Downingtown,
21	which was 639 Pa. 673 161 A.3rd 844, 871
22	and that was a 2017 case.
23	And here you have specific
24	statutes that specifically limit the
25	general authority that the City has to

1	enforce, you know, put Ordinances in
2	place for the health, general welfare,
3	et cetera, of the City.
4	THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
5	MR. MOFFITT: Okay.
6	Turning to the Section 8
7	issue, yes, the argument that was put
8	forward just now is that the Ordinance
9	doesn't mandate participation in Section
10	8.
11	I would agree that the
12	language of the Ordinance does not. It
13	simply says that discrimination is
14	prohibited on behalf of a number of
15	protective classes, including source of
16	income. It does not mention Section 8
17	in and of itself.
18	However, the argument is made
19	that if you don't participate in Section
20	8 and we test you, whether we're a Fair
21	Housing Organization or we're an
22	individual, if you say that you don't
23	participate in Section 8, that now there
24	is a cause of action.
25	So it doesn't mandate

1participation in Section 8, but2nonparticipation in Section 8 gives rise3to a cause of action. Again, that's4absurd. It leads to the exact same5result.6Now here, OCF is a property7management company that principally8represents individuals who own one,9maybe two rental properties. These10aren't large organizations. And OCF has11to take the direction from its clients.12If its clients do not13participate in Section 8, OCF can't14participate in Section 8 and mandate15that its clients participate.16Participation in Section 8,17one, is voluntary under Federal Law.18And two, it is not something that19everybody can participate in. There are20limitations on who can participate in21Section 8.22And you can't accept Housing23Choice Vouchers or any other kind of24Section 8 vouchers, unless you25participate in the program and you		
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24 Section 8 vouchers, unless you	22	And you can't accept Housing
, 2	23	Choice Vouchers or any other kind of
25 participate in the program and you	24	Section 8 vouchers, unless you
	25	participate in the program and you

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 satisfy all the qualifications of being 2 able to participate in Section 8. 3 So to put a blanket -- a 4 requirement on anybody who wishes to 5 rent residential real estate in the City 6 of Philadelphia and participate in this 7 involuntary program, it's simply unworkable. 8 9 And that is our principle argument with respect to the preemption 10 11 issues and, you know, the impact of this 12 source of income Ordinance directly on 13 both OCF and its clients. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. MOFFITT: So I would be 16 happy to answer any questions Your Honor 17 has. 18 THE COURT: Any response on 19 the standing argument? 20 MR. MOFFITT: On the standing 21 argument, I'll be honest with you, Your 22 Honor, I do a lot of Fair Housing Law 23 across the country. Organizations like 2.4 HIPAA, absolutely, typically have 25 standing to bring these claims.

1	THE COURT: All right.
2	MR. MOFFITT: We do not object
3	to that. That was not an argument that
4	we raised in our preliminary objections.
5	THE COURT: Thank you.
6	Anything else?
7	MR. MOFFITT: No, I have
8	nothing else, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: All right.
10	Mr. Zimolong?
11	MR. ZIMOLONG: May it please
12	the Court, Your Honor, Walter Zimolong,
13	and as I said, what I'll call, what I'll
14	refer to as the individual defendants.
15	I want to primarily focus my
16	remarks on the standing argument, which
17	we just concluded on.
18	First, just for the record,
19	the Court's decision as it relates to
20	standing was not assailed on the motion
21	for reconsideration and the plaintiffs
22	have not filed their own reconsideration
23	based upon the Court's decision on its
24	standing.
25	Quite frankly, Your Honor,

1	because this Court has ruled that
2	THE COURT: Let me just pause.
3	MR. ZIMOLONG: Sure.
4	THE COURT: I don't need to
5	MR. ZIMOLONG: Sure.
6	THE COURT: So the City filed
7	its motion for reconsideration. The
8	City obviously has standing as an
9	intervener under
10	MR. ZIMOLONG: Okay.
11	THE COURT: The intention of
12	the organization was to appeal if the
13	City didn't do what it did, so we get
14	they're going to get there one way or
15	another. I hear what you're saying, but
16	just because they didn't raise it in a
17	motion for reconsideration, doesn't mean
18	that it's not an issue that they are
19	going to continue to contest.
20	So, that's neither here nor
21	there, I suppose, but go ahead.
22	In other words
23	MR. ZIMOLONG: But let me
24	THE COURT: if I don't do
25	anything today and the appeal deadline

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 is Friday and they appeal, they are 2 going to appeal on standing. 3 MR. ZIMOLONG: You're right, 4 Your Honor. Let me put a finer point on 5 it then. 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 MR. ZIMOLONG: I just wanted 8 to make sure that that was clear and I 9 wanted my remarks to be reflected on the 10 record, but I do appreciate Your Honor's 11 concerns and I think they're practical 12 concerns that I fully accept. 13 But standing is important --14 deciding this issue on standing is 15 important because if the Court does not 16 have standing, it does not need to 17 address the more difficult issue of the 18 Private Right of Action. It becomes an 19 advisory opinion at that point. 20 To get to the Court's 21 argument, which was never clearly 22 answered by my colleagues on standing 23 is, does every party that has a Section 2.4 8 voucher become a potential plaintiff, 25 vis-a-vis a party that does not accept

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1	Section 8 housing?
2	Absolutely, unequivocally,
3	that is the case and that is what was
4	pled by the plaintiffs in this case.
5	Contrary to what the
6	plaintiffs have described in their
7	argument as their basis of standing that
8	they need not apply, the basis for
9	standing as pled in the complaint is
10	much lower.
11	In fact, what they've alleged
12	is, in certain instances, there were
13	phone calls placed. And what they said
14	were the response they received was,
15	excuse me, none of the owners are
16	approved to accept these vouchers. And
17	that's absolutely factually correct.
18	As Mr. Moffitt discussed, you
19	just even if you wanted to accept
20	Section 8 Vouchers, you can't accept
21	them. You have to be approved. It's a
22	Federal program.
23	You just can't go down to the
24	PHA and say, I want to start accepting
25	Section 8 Housing Vouchers tomorrow.

1	There is a process for that. Not
2	everyone everybody is approved by HUD.
3	So, to accept the basis of
4	standing where someone who is not
5	currently in the program, responds
6	truthfully, either I don't accept them
7	at this time; which is replete
8	throughout the complaint, or none of my
9	rentals are approved for them at this
10	time, you're subject to a Private Right
11	of Action by that plaintiff for
12	compensatory damages, punitive damages,
13	attorneys' fees, injunctive relief.
14	That is what the plaintiffs are saying.
15	So, every landlord, to
16	ameliorate any risk they have under this
17	Ordinance, any landlord in the City of
18	Philadelphia wishing to ameliorate that
19	risk, must participate in the Section 8
20	Housing Voucher Program.
21	THE COURT: Can we look at
22	approved well, in the context, it
23	sounds like approved could be used in
24	two ways though. It could be literally
25	approved by HUD or it could be approved

1	by me, the landlord.
2	MR. ZIMOLONG: Even if the
3	landlord said, sounds like a good idea,
4	I'd love to accept that. The landlord
5	could not accept that. That is a
6	Federal Government payment that comes
7	through the PHA, from HUD through the
8	PHA directly to the landlord's coffers.
9	They would still need to
10	fulfill all the duties and obligations
11	imposed on them by the Department of
12	Housing and Urban Developments' very
13	robust body of regulations. You have to
14	be inspected. You have to be approved.
15	So, this is a months-long
16	process, by which a landlord would need
17	to get approved for that. And the only
18	way you can truthfully say we will
19	accept your voucher is to be approved.
20	THE COURT: So, it's your
21	position, and again this may be
22	premature on preliminary objections, but
23	none of your individual clients were
24	technically approved by HUD to accept
25	Section 8 at the time of the

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 1 MR. 7TMOLONG: None of them 2 were approved. 3 THE COURT: Okay. MR. ZIMOLONG: None of them 4 5 were approved by HUD. 6 Now, here is an analogy, Your 7 Suppose the City of Philadelphia Honor. passed an Ordinance that said all 8 9 mechanics need to work on Ferraris, and 10 you take your car --11 And if somebody, a Ferrari 12 owner, takes their vehicle to a mechanic 13 that says, look, I only work on Fords. 14 I've only been trained to work on Fords. 15 I'm only approved to work on Fords. 16 It's ridiculous the person doesn't have 17 to work on a Ferrari. 18 What the plaintiffs are saying 19 is, oh, City Counsel passed such an 20 Ordinance, even -- suppose Ferrari, I'm 21 sure Ferrari, I don't know, I don't own 22 a Ferrari and I never had one fixed, but 23 I'm sure that to work on Ferraris, 2.4 Ferrari probably has a pretty exacting 25 regimen for their mechanics to work on

1	those vehicles.
2	And the Ford mechanic says,
3	look, I would love to work on your
4	Ferrari, but I'm not approved. I
5	haven't gone through Ferrari's training.
6	I don't know how do it. I can't do it.
7	What they're saying is, well,
8	you know, City Counsel passed such an
9	Ordinance, the mechanic is
10	discriminating against Ferrari owners.
11	No, even if the mechanic wanted to work
12	on the Ferrari, he is not approved by
13	Ferrari to work on it. It's an
14	analogous situation.
15	I do want to draw in on a
16	little bit, Your Honor, that the
17	extraordinary nature of this
18	Ordinance
19	You know, the City, they sort
20	of danced around, they alluded to some
21	other jurisdictions. There is not
22	another Ordinance in the City of
23	Philadelphia, outside of this maybe
24	The Workplace Ordinance, or within the
25	Discrimination Ordinance, let alone

1anywhere else in the Commonwealth of2Pennsylvania where a local governmental3authority like the City of Philadelphia4has authorized a Private Right of5Action, where a plaintiff could bring a6Private Right of Action, essentially7turn themselves into a mini District8Attorney or Attorney General to sue a9private plaintiff sorry, sorry, a10private defendant like my client and11recover compensatory damages, punitive12damages, attorneys fees, and injunctive13relief. It can't be one.14Now, imagine the Pandora's box15that is opened if this Court accepts16that a local agency like the City of17Philadelphia can do that.18Now, the plaintiff's have19described housing discrimination in this20Ordinance as altruistic, and it may be21from their perspective. But, what the22City of Philadelphia and what my23colleagues view as altruistic, there are		
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21 from their perspective. But, what the 22 City of Philadelphia and what my	19	described housing discrimination in this
22 City of Philadelphia and what my	20	Ordinance as altruistic, and it may be
	21	from their perspective. But, what the
23 colleagues view as altruistic, there are	22	City of Philadelphia and what my
	23	colleagues view as altruistic, there are
24 other things that other jurisdictions	24	other things that other jurisdictions
are also going to view as altruistic.	25	are also going to view as altruistic.

1	Can a conservative
2	jurisdiction, conservative local
3	municipality create a Private Right of
4	Action against abortion clinics?
5	Apparently, they can.
6	Apparently they say
7	apparently under the plaintiff's line of
8	thinking, there is nothing that's
9	prohibited under the Home Rule Charter
10	or any other enabling legislation or the
11	Pennsylvania Constitution that would
12	prevent a local municipality in
13	Pennsylvania from passing an ordinance
14	that says, if somebody opens an abortion
15	clinic, or someone operates an abortion
16	clinic, we're going to authorize
17	individuals to privately sue those
18	abortion clinics for compensatory
19	damages, attorneys' fees, punitive
20	damages.
21	Nothing prevents that under
22	the Pennsylvania Constitution or
23	whatever local agency enabling
24	legislation there is. That is what
25	they're saying.

1	And I'm not sure the Court's
2	willing to go that far. I'm sure any
3	Court in Pennsylvania isn't willing to
4	go so far to say that.
5	And I can give other examples
6	as well, Your Honor, but I think that
7	one, I think, highlights it.
8	The other issue I would like
9	to mention, Your Honor, as I'm not
10	really sure on the basis of standing
11	what the basis of standing is as it
12	relates to the two groups of plaintiffs.
13	The plaintiff as to the
14	individual plaintiff, Miss Cooper, it's
15	undisputed that she had no interaction
16	whatsoever with all but a handful of the
17	other defendants.
18	So, as to Mr. Tan, 1249 South
19	21st Street, PFN Associates, 2115 63rd
20	LLC, Jana Bernstein, and Jason
21	Bernstein; Miss Cooper had absolutely no
22	intersection with those plaintiffs. She
23	didn't tour any of them. She didn't
24	attempt to apply to those units.
25	And maybe I misunderstood, but

	· · · ·
1	I don't believe that Miss Cooper has any
2	standing as it relates to her and I
3	don't believe that the organizational
4	plaintiffs, as I'll describe, have any
5	standing as well.
6	But I think, clearly, she has
7	no standing, and perhaps plaintiff's
8	counsel has conceded that, but I wanted
9	to be certain on that.
10	Now, as to the places that she
11	did tour, she never actually applied and
12	was rejected based upon; she just on her
13	own said, all right, I'm going to choose
14	not to apply. I don't think that's
15	basis for her individual standing.
16	But, turning to the basis for
17	standing that the organizational
18	plaintiff raises, I thought I heard
19	plaintiff's counsel say they're not
20	arguing organizational standing, they're
21	arguing their own standing.
22	THE COURT: Well, they're
23	arguing organizational standing.
24	MR. ZIMOLONG: Okay.
25	So, if I understand correctly,

1 they're arguing organizational standing. 2 They're arguing that members of their 3 organization have standing in their own 4 right to bring these cases. 5 Diversion of resources is 6 standing on their own right. So this 7 argument that we had to divert resources to combat this pernicious practice, 8 9 that's standing in their own right, but 10 they're saying they're not standing in 11 there own right. They're standing --12 they're based upon organizational 13 standing. 14 But, even if they misspoke, 15 there has never been -- this diversion 16 of resources argument, Your Honor, is a 17 very narrowband of standing that has 18 only been accepted and recognized in 19 cases against government action. No 20 Court has ever authorized it to allow a 21 plaintiff to bring a private action 22 against a private defendant. 23 Imagine there was a contractor 2.4 out there who -- imagine there was an 25 organization that says, look, we want to

1	make sure our goal is to make sure
2	workers know that they have the right to
3	organize, and we want to uphold that.
4	And there is this company out
5	there that really hates unions, right,
6	and now we have to divert our resources
7	to educate those workers that they're
8	violating Federal Labor Law because
9	they're a union buster and they don't
10	want their employees to join unions.
11	They're saying that that gives
12	them standing to sue that employer for
13	violating Federal Labor Law.
14	One step over is saying, look,
15	I'm an organization that doesn't want
16	people to breach their contracts.
17	You've got a company over
18	here, they breach their contracts with
19	impunity. Well, I have to divert my
20	resources to educate people. You know
21	what, don't do business with that
22	company. They are a notorious breach of
23	contractor; right, they're always
24	ripping people off.
25	Does that person now have a

1	Private Right of Action to bring against
2	some company in saying, oh, you know,
3	we're trying to assure compliance with
4	the law? No, standing does not hinge on
5	assuring compliance of the law, whether
6	you divert resources or not.
7	So, this diversion of
8	resources argument is completely
9	specious. If it was a government entity
10	and you had to divert resources to
11	educate them to comply with the law,
12	standing exists; but not against a
13	private defendant.
14	And, again, you're opening a
15	Pandora's box to say diversion of
16	resources provides a basis to bring a
17	cause of action against individual
18	defendants.
19	And in this case, individual
20	tenants, in my client's case, they're
21	mom and pop folks; you know, one, two,
22	units. You know, these aren't
23	And, look, I think the Court
24	can draw its own conclusion as to why
25	the plaintiffs picked the mom and pops

1	and didn't pick the people that own 200
2	or 250 units, because they know they
3	wanted us to roll, but we didn't.
4	So, Your Honor, I respectfully
5	request that the Court's Order be
6	affirmed; that there be no relocation or
7	reconsideration of it.
8	I think the easiest way to do
9	that, Your Honor, is to say, there is no
10	standing in this case, and perhaps the
11	argument over whether this Private Right
12	of Action exists can be, you know, left
13	to another plaintiff who does have
14	standing.
15	Your Honor, one last point on
16	this concern articulated by the City of
17	Philadelphia that this will somehow
18	damage other Ordinances or plaintiffs to
19	bring causes of action, under other
20	Ordinances that contain similar Private
21	Right of Actions.
22	As Your Honor knows, this
23	Court's Order dismissing the action is
24	limited to the litigants in this case.
25	Nothing prevents the City or the

1	organizational plaintiffs or
2	Miss Cooper, should they have standing
3	for bringing a case against some other
4	person.
5	So that is completely I
6	don't think the fears of the City of
7	Philadelphia are warranted here because
8	all this Court is ruling on is the case
9	before Your Honor, the litigants before
10	Your Honor. There has not been a
11	challenge. The Court hasn't issued a
12	declaratory judgment or an injunction
13	against the enforcement of the
14	Ordinance. Thank you, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	MR. MOFFITT: Your Honor, if I
17	may clarify?
18	THE COURT: Go ahead.
19	MR. MOFFITT: What I wanted to
20	clarify is that to the extent that the
21	Court determines that the Private Cause
22	of Action itself is invalid, then I
23	agree with Mr. Zimolong that there is no
24	standing.
25	My statement before had to do

1	with generally speaking, testers had
2	been found testing organizations had
3	been found in violation of the Fair
4	Housing Act, violations of the PHRA, and
5	other State analogues, that they
6	actually do testing and things like
7	diversion of resources.
8	In those instances where there
9	is an actual violation of the statute,
10	there is an actual Private Cause of
11	Action that's allowed thereof and found
12	to have standing.
13	THE COURT: Okay.
14	MR. MOFFITT: I just wanted to
15	clarify that.
16	THE COURT: Thank you.
17	Turning back to Ms. Bernstein,
18	let me just make sure I understand
19	because it is where Mr. Zimolong sort of
20	left off.
21	I asked you a question, and I
22	probably shouldn't have gotten
23	clarification on my own, I asked you
24	whether you're seeking your own standing
25	or organizational standing. What I

1	meant by organizational standing was, by
2	virtue of your members being aggrieved,
3	the organization has standing.
4	Are you contesting that your
5	organization has standing because the
6	organization itself has been aggrieved,
7	or organizational standing in the
8	technical sense because members have
9	been aggrieved?
10	MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you for
11	asking and for the clarification.
12	It is that the
13	organizational organization itself
14	THE COURT: Okay.
15	MS. BERNSTEIN: not as a
16	member-based organization, yes. Thank
17	you.
18	THE COURT: Got it.
19	Anything else?
20	Since you're standing,
21	anything else standing, standing,
22	standing anything else that you want
23	to add or respond to while you're up?
24	MS. BERNSTEIN: One or two
25	things, Your Honor, I guess.

1	One is just to say that there
2	were just numerous characterizations of
3	the Housing Choice Voucher Program and
4	the process that plaintiffs disagree
5	with.
6	And just to remind the Court
7	that at this stage, which is that of a
8	preliminary objection based on a
9	demurrer, we're heading into a category,
10	generally speaking, demurrer.
11	And, you know, I really don't
12	want to stand here and tell the Court,
13	you know, this one piece isn't true
14	because of this and cite you to the
15	regulations, unless you want to me to,
16	but, I think it's an important point
17	just to verify.
18	THE COURT: No, and I think
19	it's important to set the boundaries
20	where we are, as far as
21	MS. BERNSTEIN: Yes.
22	THE COURT: As far as I see
23	it, I'm either going to
24	Well, we'll get to that in a
25	minute, but you're correct, I don't need

1	a back and forth on the facts and this
2	and that. There are legal concepts that
3	drove my initial decision and that's
4	really what we're talking about today.
5	MS. BERNSTEIN: Okay.
6	THE COURT: Not the facts, and
7	that's why I was a little hesitant to
8	get into some factual questions although
9	sometimes we've deviated there, but
10	that's not going to be the basis for
11	doing that.
12	MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you,
13	Your Honor.
14	And the last thing I would
15	add, just around Miss Cooper's standing,
16	because I didn't address that very
17	specifically.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MS. BERNSTEIN: Miss Cooper's
20	standing is really based on two
21	elements; one is on, just the written
22	language of the causes of action in The
23	Fair Practices Ordinance themself, which
24	contemplates situations where oral or
25	verbal communications are made that,

1 quote, interfere with opportunities to 2 rent. 3 This goes to the argument that 4 because she didn't actually submit an 5 application she, therefore, would not 6 have standing. 7 There's also a helpful case, Allison versus The Pennsylvania Human 8 9 Relations Act, which under the State 10 Human Relations Act deals with a very 11 similar situation where a black 12 applicant for an apartment was told that 13 race, quote, could be a factor. 14 And the Court found that that 15 language, you know, deliberately then 16 dissuaded the tenant from applying and 17 she had standing still to pursue her 18 claims under the Human Relations Act. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 Mr. Shuey, anything else? 23 MR. SHUEY: Your Honor, the 2.4 City of Philadelphia understood the 25 May 14th, 2025 Order to reject the

1	arguments, particularly of OCF, that the
2	City of Philadelphia does not have the
3	authority to create a Private Right of
4	Action.
5	If that is a misunderstanding,
6	then I would like to address the
7	arguments made today by my colleague,
8	regarding specifically 1331 and their
9	contention that the City has no
10	authority to create a Private Right of
11	Action.
12	THE COURT: Say that again
13	without using so many negatives.
14	MR. SHUEY: The City of
15	Philadelphia understood the May 14th,
16	2025 Order as a rejection of
17	defendant/landlord's arguments,
18	specifically the argument that the City
19	is incapable of creating a Private Right
20	of Action.
21	In other words, we understood
22	the Order to acknowledge, implicitly,
23	that the City of Philadelphia can create
24	a Private Right of Action as a general
25	concept, as a general concept.

	~ / /
1	THE COURT: If Friday
2	MR. SHUEY: If that is not
3	right, I would like to address that
4	issue since we did not get to it
5	earlier.
6	We've been here a while, so I
7	don't need to if I am right about that,
8	but if that is not right, I would like
9	to address my colleagues'
10	THE COURT: If Friday comes
11	MR. SHUEY: arguments.
12	THE COURT: and I don't do
13	anything, and you appeal, they're going
14	to argue they're still going to make
15	the same Home Rule Charter argument on
16	appeal, even though my Order doesn't
17	specifically find that is the basis for
18	me sustaining their POs.
19	MR. SHUEY: Yes, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: So what are you
21	suggesting right now? I'm having a hard
22	time following you.
23	MR. SHUEY: If Your Honor is
24	going to reconsider the Order, vacate
25	the May 14th Order, and institute a new

	~ / /
1	Order that says, oh, actually the City
2	of Philadelphia cannot create a Private
3	Right of Action at all, I'd like to be
4	heard on that before that happens.
5	THE COURT: How is that
6	different than
7	MR. SHUEY: Because that is
8	the argument that defendant landlord
9	defendants made.
10	THE COURT: How is that
11	different than what I did?
12	MR. SHUEY: Well, because your
13	May 14th, 2025 Order does not say that.
14	What your May 14th, 2025 Order
15	says, is not that the City has no
16	ability or authority to create a Private
17	Right of Action, but simply that the
18	Ordinance at issue, The Fair Practice
19	Ordinance, does not create one for
20	housing discrimination. That's two very
21	different things.
22	THE COURT: All right. I hear
23	what you're saying. That's what your
24	response to the POs are for.
25	MR. SHUEY: Yes, Your Honor.

1	THE COUPE, Co is theme
1	THE COURT: So is there
2	something that's in there that you want
3	to add that you didn't have an
4	opportunity to argue?
5	MR. SHUEY: Not specifically,
6	Your Honor. Just that it was brought up
7	today and I haven't responded to that
8	specifically since we didn't
9	THE COURT: Go ahead. I just
10	want you to be brief. I believe it was
11	a pivot from, in essence, keying off
12	Well, let me just also say
13	this. I'm going to give you an
14	opportunity, I think, where we're headed
15	here, to brief this, but I haven't fully
16	thought this through yet. It's coming
17	to me though.
18	So, you're going to have an
19	opportunity, because I believe what the
20	argument was, was that taking my
21	keying off what I said about the local
22	agency, which is, that statute the
23	City can't institute a cause of action
24	or the statutory framework that would be
25	in conflict with that; roughly speaking.

1 I'm not putting words in 2 defendant's mouth necessarily, but 3 that's roughly what I understood the 4 argument to be and it needs to be fudged 5 out a little bit, but they were using my 6 questions to you originally in some of 7 the points I made during your initial argument to say that the Home Rule 8 9 Charter; even if it does allow the City 10 to create an action, it has to be 11 consistent with the local agency law 12 framework. 13 MR. SHUEY: That is not my 14 understanding of counsel's argument, but 15 if Your Honor is going to allow us 16 further supplemental briefing, I 17 certainly can continue there. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 Do you have anything else you 20 want to add because what I'm going to do 21 is vacate my Order, but not reverse it. 22 I'm just going to vacate it, because the 23 appeal deadline is Friday. So, if I 2.4 don't vacate the Order by Friday, then 25 your time to appeal is going to run.

1I'll give the parties an2opportunity to supplement with whatever3you want to supplement, taking into4account the questions I ask, and any5other issues, and then I'll issue a new6Order that will perhaps more precisely7state what I wanted to state and take8into account the arguments and whatever9other solution the parties have made.10MR. SHUEY: That process works11for the City of Philadelphia, Your12Honor. Thank you for that opportunity.13In our motion for14reconsideration, we only ask that first15and fifth get stricken, but I think,16Your Honor, understands it has to be the17whole thing.18THE COURT: So what's going to19happen is, I have to vacate the Order20in order for this to work, I have to21vacate my entire Order.22So I'm going to vacate the23entire Order and then what will happen		~ , , ,
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22 So I'm going to vacate the	20	in order for this to work, I have to
	21	vacate my entire Order.
23 entire Order and then what will happen	22	So I'm going to vacate the
	23	entire Order and then what will happen
24 is, in essence, from a mechanical	24	is, in essence, from a mechanical
25 standpoint, the PO is going to be	25	standpoint, the PO is going to be

1 reactivated. So they'll all be sitting 2 there again, and so I'll give the 3 parties --4 I'll enter an Order doing 5 this. I'll give the parties an opportunity, I'll give you 14 days just 6 7 to file some briefs in further support of your preliminary objections, taking 8 9 into account what we said here today. 10 We're not going to wait for 11 the transcript. I'm sure you can still 12 order the transcript, but I don't want 13 to wait to get the transcript. You are 14 all here and so we don't need to get the 15 transcript to do that, but I'll give you 16 an opportunity to file supplemental 17 briefs in support of your positions. 18 MR. SHUEY: Thank you, Your 19 Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 So just so it's clear, by the 22 end of today, I'll issue an Order 23 vacating my Order of May 14th and 24 reinstating the preliminary objections 25 to where they were.

1I will give the parties an2opportunity to file supplemental briefs,3and then I will consider the preliminary4objections anew-ish, and then you can5and then you'll get a new Order6disposing of them at some point in the	
3 and then I will consider the preliminary 4 objections anew-ish, and then you can 5 and then you'll get a new Order	
4 objections anew-ish, and then you can 5 and then you'll get a new Order	
5 and then you'll get a new Order	
6 disposing of them at some point in the	
7 next couple of weeks.	
8 MR. SHUEY: Thank you, Your	
9 Honor.	
10 THE COURT: Is there anything	
11 else anyone wants to add?	
12 MS. BERNSTEIN: No.	
13 MR. SHUEY: No.	
14 THE COURT: Nothing?	
15 MR. MOFFITT: Not from OCF,	
16 Your Honor.	
17 THE COURT: Thank you.	
18 MR. ZIMOLONG: A point of	
19 clarity on the briefing schedule.	
20 THE COURT: Yes.	
21 MR. ZIMOLONG: Is the Court	
22 contemplating simultaneous divisions of	
23 briefing	
24 THE COURT: Yes, yes.	
25 MR. ZIMOLONG: Okay. I would	

1	just I would respectfully request
2	that since it was the plaintiffs that
3	are advancing these arguments, that it
4	be a responsive
5	THE COURT: You heard
6	Look, Mr. Zimolong, you heard
7	what everyone said. I can't imagine the
8	written submissions are going to be that
9	much different than this.
10	I threw some questions at the
11	City that, perhaps, they weren't
12	expecting, but questions that you may
13	not have been expecting either.
14	Everyone can submit what they need to
15	submit at the same time.
16	You've already had an
17	opportunity to brief this, so we don't
18	need to prolong this anymore. I'll give
19	you all three weeks, which should be
20	more than enough time to submit
21	simultaneous briefs and then we'll go
22	from there. All right. Thanks, guys.
23	MR. SHUEY: Thank you, Your
24	Honor.
25	MS. BERNSTEIN: Thank you.

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25MR. MOFFITT: Thank you very much, Your Honor. MR. ZIMOLONG: Thank you. THE LAW CLERK: That concludes today business. Court is adjourned until the call of the crier.

HOUSING EQUALITY vs. OCF REALTY, et al., 6-10-25 CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me on the trial of the above cause and that this copy is a correct transcript of the same. MARIE E. POLIDORO, RPR Official Court Reporter (The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or supervision of the certifying reporter.)