

*Applewhite, et al. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.*  
**No. 330 MD 2012**

# **EXHIBIT 4**

**Petitioners' Disclosure of Expert Reports**

**Evaluation of Pennsylvania's Photo ID Law Education Efforts**

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## **Evaluation of Pennsylvania's Photo ID Law Education Efforts**

### **I. Qualifications**

I currently hold the Samuel A. Stouffer Endowed Chair in Communication and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, with appointments in the Annenberg School for Communication and the Department of Political Science. My area of research expertise is communication and politics, and I have written numerous books and academic journal articles on this subject. My Ph.D. is in Communication from Stanford University, where I trained with one of the founders of the field of information campaigns, Professor Everett Rogers, as well as many other experts in the field.

Since that time I have received numerous awards and honors for my research in political communication. In 2011, I was awarded the Lifetime Career Achievement Award in Political Communication from the American Political Science Association. In 2008 I was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a non-partisan honorary organization founded by John Adams at time of the American Revolution to encourage prominent scholars to work together on behalf of the democratic interests of the republic.

My research articles have appeared in the top journals published in both communication and political science fields. I teach courses in both disciplines in research methods, elections and voting behavior, public opinion, and the impact of media on political knowledge and attitudes. My books have received a number of academic honors including the Goldsmith Book Prize from Harvard University, the Robert Lane Prize in political communication from the American Political Science Association, and the Doris Graber Prize for Most Influential Book on Political Communication published in the last ten years. For my institutional leadership in advancing methodological innovations in studying the opinions and beliefs of the mass public, I also received the American Association for Public Opinion Research Warren Mitofsky Innovator Award.

As detailed on my curriculum vita in Appendix A, before joining the University of Pennsylvania, I was a Professor at The Ohio State University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I currently serve as Director of the Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics in the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania. I was paid a consulting rate of \$250 an hour to prepare this report.

### **II. Executive Summary**

After passing the new Photo ID Law, the Department of State launched a statewide Voter Education Campaign for the November 2012 election with two stated goals: 1) to make eligible voters aware of the new law and the kinds of photo ID that would qualify, and 2) to convey information about how to obtain a free photo ID for those registered voters who do not already possess suitable identification. Because the Pennsylvania Photo ID Law had a fairly complex set of requirements, this campaign constituted a relatively difficult and complex educational task.

With the help of vendors selected by the Commonwealth, and funds provided by the federal Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), this information campaign utilized several forms of paid media (including letters, postcards, television, radio, newspapers, billboards, transit ads, online ads, and fliers), public meetings and other outreach, and earned media (including press releases and public statements) to communicate information about the Photo ID Law to the public. Most of these materials focused on the first goal (to make voters aware of the law and the kinds of photo ID that would qualify) but did not focus on the second goal (to convey information about how to obtain a free photo ID). The campaign directed voters who needed more information to a 1-877 number and the VotesPA website. With complex messages, this kind of referral strategy is fairly common, but it creates additional hurdles to get the necessary information to the public.

The campaign did not meet standard and well-known best practices for successful information campaigns. Most importantly, the campaign did not assess whether the public understood its central message, nor did the campaign have any means of assessing its effectiveness in accomplishing its stated goals, despite many available low cost means of doing so. As a result, there is no empirical evidence that all eligible voters were reached, or that those reached were able to get the information and assistance that they needed. Moreover, after the injunction was issued, the Commonwealth did not take steps at the polls to identify voters who lacked ID for additional outreach. Based on the nature of the campaign, the information conveyed and the techniques used to convey that information, it is my opinion to a reasonable degree of certainty that the campaign did not succeed in achieving its stated goals.

I understand that since the November 2012 election, the Commonwealth has not undertaken any paid educational efforts related to the Photo ID Law or how to obtain acceptable identification. Instead, the Commonwealth has relied on an earned media strategy to generate news coverage of the Photo ID Law. It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of certainty that earned media is not an effective tool to achieve the stated educational goals.

It is well known in the study of elections that when additional hurdles are put in front of voters, this generally reduces turn-out. Based on a number of analyses of the impact of strict photo ID laws on voter turnout, to a reasonable degree of certainty, I expect that turnout will be decreased by 2 to 3 percent relative to what would otherwise be expected in Pennsylvania in any given election year.

It is also my opinion that the law’s impact on public perceptions of the legitimacy of elections must take into account several factors: the impact of (i) fewer voters voting, (ii) negative coverage of the enforcement of the law, for example, older voters being turned away from the polls for lacking ID, and (iii) misstatements about the integrity of elections by those defending the law. These factors all have the effect of undermining public confidence in election results.

My opinions are based on my experience, training, research, academic and professional literature, and review of materials from this case, including those identified in Appendix B.<sup>1</sup> All of my opinions are expressed to a reasonable degree of professional certainty. I reserve the right to continue to review the record in this case and to supplement and amend my report, particularly given my understanding that additional documents and materials may be provided by the Commonwealth.

### III. Background on Photo ID Law

Pennsylvania's new Photo ID Law required for the first time that all in-person Pennsylvania voters present photo ID as a condition for voting. The law also required that the Commonwealth provide voters who needed ID with a Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") photo ID card at no cost. The law also required the Department of State (DOS) to implement a voter education campaign to educate voters about the photo ID requirements (the "Voter Education Campaign"), and the Secretaries of State and Transportation were to disseminate information to the public about the availability of the free PennDOT identification for voting.

In order to understand the complexities faced by the Voter Education Campaign, it is useful to review the events that transpired during the period of time in which the campaign was planned and implemented. Those events included the following:

- **The Photo ID Law was passed on March 14, 2012.** The legislature's plan for providing liberal access to a free ID appears to have been to issue the already-existing PennDOT non-driver's ID to those without an acceptable form of photo identification. Because obtaining the identification required a trip to a PennDOT facility, and the secure PennDOT ID required a birth certificate with a raised seal, a Social Security card, and other documents, this plan made access difficult for many citizens. By definition, voters who do not drive also had additional difficulties getting to PennDOT, which does not have driver's license facilities in every county.
- **On April 18, 2012, the Commonwealth changed the requirements for obtaining a PennDOT ID.** A press release was issued to announce that if a person formerly held a PennDOT ID or a Pennsylvania Driver's License, no additional documentation was required to obtain ID so long as PennDOT could find the person in its computer system.
- **On May 23, 2012, DOS announced simplified methods for obtaining a birth certificate for Pennsylvania-born voters.** This change eliminated the need for individuals to pay for a copy of their birth certificate if the person was born in Pennsylvania, and it implemented a 10-day process to obtain the birth certificate for free. However, these changes only applied to native-born Pennsylvanians, and this process still required two separate trips to PennDOT in order to obtain ID.

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<sup>1</sup> A reference list of literature and other material cited in this report is also attached as Appendix C.

- **On July 20, 2012, DOS announced that a new free ID would be issued starting the last week of August.** The new ID was called the DOS ID, although voters had to go to PennDOT to obtain it. The DOS ID did not require a birth certificate, but still required two proofs of residence, date of birth and a Social Security number for those who had one.
- **On August 27, 2012, PennDOT began issuing the DOS ID.** Voters were not permitted to obtain a DOS ID until they were unable to obtain a PennDOT ID. In particular, native-born Pennsylvanians lacking a birth certificate were required to make two trips to PennDOT before they were able to apply for a DOS ID.
- **On September 25, 2012, new procedures for the DOS ID were implemented.** As of this date, the DOS ID was supposed to be available to all registered voters with only one trip to PennDOT. Voters were only required to provide a name, date of birth, Social Security number and address.
- **On October 2, the Court barred the Commonwealth from enforcing the law's requirement that voters show a photo ID to vote.** As a result, the Commonwealth began telling voters that they would be asked but not required to show photo ID during the November 2012 election.
- **On November 6, 2012, the election was held.** Poll workers were supposed to ask for but not require ID and were supposed to provide information to any voters who lacked an ID about the Photo ID Law and how to obtain ID.
- **After November 6, 2012, the Commonwealth ended all paid education efforts.** The only educational efforts continued after the November election have been sporadic "earned" media efforts (e.g., a few press releases that have been ineffective at generating any significant free media coverage). When the Department of State submitted its budget request to the Governor in December 2012 through February 2013, no money was requested to continue paid educational efforts in fiscal year 2013-2014.

It is clear from this sequence of events that the specific requirements and availability of the free voter ID were not finalized until the fall of 2012. The numerous changes to those requirements and availability made the already difficult task of educating the public about the new law even more difficult. The requirements and availability of the free ID were in flux through the end of September, so the information that needed to be conveyed to the public also changed. However, the emphasis of the campaign remained the same, and voters were unlikely to be adequately alerted to these changing requirements. Given the timing of many of these changes, the handouts, fliers, FAQ handouts, posters and advertisements that were distributed throughout the summer of 2012 did not and could not reflect the final requirements and availability of the free voter ID. As a result, the information conveyed by many of the materials distributed in the summer of 2012 ultimately proved to be inaccurate and often misleading.

In addition, it appears that roughly half of the media budget was spent before October 2, 2012, when the message was still that voters would be required to show photo ID to vote, and

that the other half of the media budget was spent after mid-October when the message changed to “You will be asked but not required” to show ID to vote. As a result, roughly half of the messages that were distributed to voters stated that a photo ID was required to vote, but the other half said a photo ID was not required.

As described further below, the temporary suspension of the law could have been used as an educational opportunity; instead, the shift to the “asked but not required” message contributed to further confusion surrounding the message. Accordingly, any future efforts to educate the public about the photo ID law will have to start largely from scratch in order to present a clear and consistent message.

#### **IV. Distribution of Messages**

The distribution of television, radio, newspaper, and other ads for the Voter Education Campaign was handled by Harmelin Media through the November 2012 election. Harmelin purchased television time, and placed radio and newspaper ads that were produced by Red House Communications. After the election on November 6, 2012, the Commonwealth ceased paid advertising efforts and has focused its education efforts on generating earned media.

By using multiple forms of media, the campaign avoided the pitfalls of any one approach. Different media are good for different purposes, so this strategy was sensible. For example, television is best at making a large number of people aware of something; print ads and web ads tend to be useful only when someone is looking for and interested in that specific information. This is because readers control the focus of attention with print (whether on or offline) whereas the television screen controls viewer attention with television. Likewise, letters and postcards are most likely to be read if they appear to be personally relevant to the specific individual who receives it, rather than junk mail such as other campaign materials distributed widely during presidential and local elections.

##### **1. Television**

Because the majority of funds were used for television ads, I focused particularly on understanding Harmelin’s approach to this medium. It appears that a “shotgun” approach was used, buying TV time on a variety of programs in the major TV markets in an attempt to reach the general public. Because the campaign goals indicated that “everyone” should be made aware of the change in the law and know how to obtain a free ID, an approach that did not target any specific population segments was perceived to be appropriate.

Reach and frequency estimates have been provided by Harmelin for the six largest Pennsylvania television markets. Reach refers to the unduplicated audience in a given market. For some markets, such as Harrisburg-Lebanon, the reported reach of the television campaign was quite high (95%), whereas in other major markets it was less impressive (85%). However, these numbers should not be interpreted as the percentage of adults in each market who were actually exposed to the campaign or paid attention to the ad. Reach figures do not take into account people who were not paying attention to the television or who left the room during the program’s commercial break. Reach is an estimate of exposure opportunities, not actual delivery.

In part, this is also because reach is not directly measured. Instead it is a rough approximation that is inferred from the number of Gross Ratings Points (“GRPs”) that are purchased. Starting from GRPs, reach is inferred based on “reach curves,” and there are many varieties of estimation techniques that can be used. Some scholars complain that “today’s computer printouts give our reach and frequency estimates the aura of mathematical certainty” (Ephron, 1992). However, the formulas used are based on a limited number of observations, the fit of the curve is never perfect, and sampling errors may compound the total margin of statistical error. Nielsen unfortunately does not divulge the technical details of its samples. Although ad agencies still offer clients reach and frequency data, it is common knowledge that reach percentages are consistently higher than the number of people who saw an ad (due to multi-tasking and ad avoidance via new technologies such as TIVO and DVRs) and much higher than the percentage of people who recall seeing an ad.

Moreover, it is important to note that the Harmelin reach/frequency numbers refer to people in homes with a television. Approximately 4 % of Pennsylvania households do not have televisions, so they would not be included in these reach/frequency numbers and would not have been reached by the television campaign. (TV and Cable Factbook 2013)

Geographic issues also limited the television campaign’s ability to reach all eligible voters. Outside of the six major media markets, there was no information on reach or frequency. In two television markets, Buffalo-Niagara Falls and Youngstown, television advertising only appeared on cable, and 30 percent of the Pennsylvania population does not have cable (Nielsen, 2011). This eliminated any chance that eligible voters without cable in those markets might see the television ads. In three other counties—Tioga, Potter and Fulton, there was no television advertising reaching these populations at all. Newspaper ads were purchased instead, but newspapers are read by those already more politically involved, so they cannot play the same role in a campaign that television does –promoting basic awareness.

## 2. Mailings

Secretary Aichele sent a letter in July 2012 to registered voters who could not be matched to a PennDOT identification. The letters told recipients that if they had never had a PennDOT driver’s license or PennDOT photo ID, then “you may need further documentation such as a birth certificate, social security card and two proofs of residency.” The letter also stated that “the Department of State is working with PennDOT to develop an alternative form of Photo identification for voting purposes only that would be available to those who are unable for some reason to obtain a PennDOT photo ID.”<sup>2</sup> This description does not make the free photo ID sound very easily obtainable, and these voters do not appear to have been sent follow-up information regarding how to obtain a free DOS ID card once the card was available. In addition, these letters were not sent to registered voters who had a PennDOT identification that would be expired for more than a year on Election Day and thus not valid for voting, even though those voters were in the same position as a voter who could not be matched to a PennDOT ID at all.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> PA-00091313

<sup>3</sup> I understand that at recent depositions of voters without ID, Respondents’ Counsel has suggested that voters could mail in an application for ID and thereby expedite the process or



The postcard mailing to households with a registered voter used the largest proportion of the media budget in order to notify registered voters by mail about the law change. Postcards were mailed to approximately 5.8 million homes in September 2012. The postcards were sent shortly before DOS changed the DOS ID requirements to make the DOS ID easier to obtain. As a result, the postcards affirmatively told voters that a free ID was available at a PennDOT Driver's License Center ("DLC") with "supporting documentation." Although the postcard lists the DOS ID as an acceptable ID for voting, it does not say what the DOS ID is, where to get it, that PennDOT would distribute a Department of State product, that it is obtainable without documentation, or that it is obtainable even if a voter has been turned away by PennDOT in the past for not having enough required documentation. The postcard was sent only in English, although the media plan originally called for a Spanish version.

DOS employee Megan Sweeney also discussed a mailing insert that was prepared by DOS and provided to Commonwealth agencies to send out to residents between May 1 and September 30, 2012. She said there were approximately 700,000 copies of the mailing insert, with approximately 500,000 of them going to customers of the Department of Aging as part of a Medicare/Medicaid mailing to elderly residents. Sweeney stated that the insert was provided to the agencies for use as of May 1, and that the insert was not revised after that point. As a result, the mailing contained no information about the existence of the free DOS ID card, nor did it inform recipients how to obtain the DOS ID card.

### 3. Distribution of other Media

Materials provided by Harmelin Media summarized the distribution of other media in terms of a common metric known as "impressions".<sup>4</sup> Impressions are not the same as the number of unique individuals reached by a message (i.e. reach) or the frequency with which the average person viewed a message (known as frequency). Instead, an impression refers to the number of people who *may have* seen an article in a magazine or newspaper, may have heard an ad on the radio, watched something on television, or may have seen something on a web page or blog. It refers to an opportunity for exposure rather than an actual exposure.<sup>5</sup> For example, if an advertisement for the "Show It" campaign appears in a monthly magazine that has 1.8 million readers, then 1.8 million people may have potentially seen the article, and advertisers will call this 1.8 million "impressions" even though many readers may have never visited that page, and those who did may not have noticed this ad. Impression calculations assume that 100 percent of the readers/viewers saw the advertisement, although that assumption is known to be materially inaccurate; actual readership will always be much less.

The Harmelin impression numbers (based on Nielsen estimates) instead represent the maximum number of people who potentially could have seen the ads. They do not take into account whether people actually saw it, only whether the ad aired on a show with a particular rating. Particularly in an era of time-delayed viewing and multi-tasking while viewing,

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avoid having to go to PennDOT. No information on this possibility was part of the education campaign, including in the mailings instructing voters to go to a PennDOT DLC.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, HM-000008.

<sup>5</sup> It also does not provide any measure of whether the audience understood the message.

impressions are known to over-estimate actual exposure. These metrics do not account for those who fast forward past the ads, leave the room to do something else, or simply leave the TV on all day as background noise. It is for precisely this reason that Nielsen has been heavily criticized within the advertising industry for not keeping up with many technological advances. (see, e.g., Economist 2013).

When impression numbers are added together as Harmelin does in its summary report, they are further inflated by double-counting; for example, the same person who may have seen the ad during a 7:30 p.m. television program also likely saw it during the 8:00 pm program. Likewise, if radio is on in the background, impressions are said to be created regardless of whether any people are actually present to listen.

In the context of web advertising, these numbers also represent the maximum number of people who could have seen an ad, not the number who actually did. They ignore the ad's placement on the page (it may require a user to scroll down in order to be able to see the ad at all), as well as its size, visibility and so forth. The results can be skewed by multiple page views by one visitor, as well as other variations.

For all of these reasons, the number of impressions that an ad has is generally taken with a grain of salt by advertisers; it is considered a navigational metric but not a measure of effectiveness. As a recent article in *Advertising Age* declared in its headline, "The Lowly Ad Impression Has Become Meaningless, So Let's Kill It: Time to Stop Deceiving Ourselves and Others." (Morgan 2011). Although impressions were intended to serve as a "catch-all metric" across media, many argue that this metric does more harm than good. Different media are useful for different purposes, and equating different types of media exposure (a web pop-up on which one must click in order to proceed, versus one of 12 ads on a web page all competing for people's attention) makes little sense. Because the number of impressions delivered has little to do with the number of real people who are reached by an advertisement, and it also tells us nothing about the frequency with which people encountered it, many now advocate "better metrics on real audience numbers versus targeted impression metrics" (Shapiro 2012).

Given the many concerns voiced about impressions, and the widespread consensus that impressions cannot tap campaign effectiveness, impressions are not a useful metric to use in evaluating the effectiveness of the Voter Education Campaign.

#### **4. Community Meetings**

The public outreach aspect of the campaign was largely handled by Bravo Group. Bravo estimated that they attended approximately 130 events with voters, and that there were anywhere from 5 voters to approximately 150 voters at those events (with one large event that had between 200 and 300 attendees). DOS employees also attended events; most of the DOS outreach was handled by Megan Sweeney, who estimated that she attended between 40 and 50 events with anywhere from 10 to 250 voters.

The public outreach efforts included distributing fliers and handouts to various groups and at events. For example, Bravo distributed 10,000 copies of a voter ID information card to

food pantries, churches and shelters, and various iterations of a DOS ID Frequently Asked Questions document were also distributed. However, given the numerous changes to the process and requirements for receiving free voter ID during the summer and fall of 2012, these materials frequently became inaccurate. For example, the voter ID information card that Bravo distributed 10,000 copies of did not mention the free DOS ID at all, because it was distributed before the DOS ID was made available. Instead, the voter ID information card listed other acceptable IDs, and then told voters “If you are a registered voter and do not have one of these IDs, and require one for voting purposes, you are entitled to get one **FREE OF CHARGE** (with supporting documentation) at a PennDOT Driver’s License Center.”<sup>6</sup> It did not list the supporting documentation, but instead referred voters to the website or 1-877 number for more information.<sup>7</sup> A voter who happened to receive one of these voter ID cards after the DOS ID became available would not have known that there was a new, easier-to-obtain ID available based on this handout.<sup>8</sup>

It is worth noting that when events involved meetings of civic groups, the attendees were likely to be those who already had identification and/or were actively politically engaged (e.g., Dutta-Bergman 2005). Events oriented around other purposes (music, food, entertainment) have the potential to reach less politically active voters, but in those cases, there is seldom a presentation, so voters would have to know they needed ID in order to know to come to a booth or table and gather information or ask questions. There is no indication that attending these types of events reached those in need of identification and those who are not sufficiently engaged in politics to know that a new identification requirement had been imposed.

## 5. Earned Media

I understand that since the November 2012 election, the Commonwealth’s education efforts have been focused on earned media instead of paid media. Earned media refers to communication opportunities that are not paid for but are instead “earned” via holding events or making official announcements that are then deemed newsworthy by the press. Most typically, earned media come from press releases or press conferences held by public officials, with the hope that this information will reach citizens via newspaper or television news.

Based on past research and experience, I do not believe that an education campaign that focuses largely on earned media will be effective at educating Pennsylvania voters about the Photo ID Law. On the one hand, earned media has always been a mainstay of high-level election campaigns. Candidates for federal office often make speeches and appearances that are widely covered by the press. On the other hand, because of increased competition in the news media environment, earned media is now much harder to earn than it was in the pre-cable, broadcast-only television era. This is true for two distinct reasons, both driven by increased competition for media audiences.

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<sup>6</sup> PA-00106974

<sup>7</sup> Bravo did not attempt to determine what level of access recipients at food pantries and shelters would have to the Internet to look up additional information.

<sup>8</sup> DOS did prepare one handout that was specifically geared towards telling voters about the DOS ID card. It is unclear how many individuals received this DOS ID Frequently Asked Questions handout.

The increased competition for audiences means that media are less likely to cover press releases or press conferences that involve less audience-grabbing issues. Certainly, the technical details of voter ID would not be expected to draw large audiences to a program. As a result, the press (both television and print) is less likely to cover political events of this kind than they were historically. Cable television essentially ended the “golden age of presidential television” (Baum and Kernell, 1999), so that now even presidents often cannot command television attention.

In addition, now that television viewers have so many different television options from which to choose, only those who are already highly politically interested and involved tend to watch the political portion of television news or read the local newspaper (see Prior, 2007). Although local television news still attracts sizable audiences, this is primarily for its segments on weather and sports, not politics. Moreover, newspaper readership has been in steep decline for some time, and newspaper readers are even more politically involved than television watchers, so they are not likely to be the people who most need to be reached with Voter ID messages.

The Commonwealth recently issued a press release about the DOS ID card that provides a good example of these issues. The press release, which was issued on June 25, 2013, as a statement from Secretary Carol Aichele in advance of trial in this matter, discussed the DOS ID card and how to obtain it. As expected, the press release generated little to no meaningful coverage. I used Newsbank and Lexis-Nexis to examine coverage of this announcement in the top ten newspapers in Pennsylvania. These included the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, The Tribune-Review, The Morning Call, The Patriot News, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Intelligencer Journal/Lancaster New Era, The York Daily Record and the Reading Eagle, as well as many additional newspapers in smaller markets that are archived by Newsbank and Lexis-Nexis. I searched for any article mentioning voter ID or voter identification from the day of the press release up to the present (June 30, 2013). Although there were a few passing mentions of voter ID in articles about the Supreme Court decision on the Voting Rights Act, there was no coverage whatsoever of this press release.<sup>9</sup>

The day after issuing the press release, Secretary Aichele also conducted a personal meeting with the editorial board of the Sun Gazette at which she discussed voter ID. Even then, the Sun Gazette’s headline focused on Aichele claiming “voter ID law valid” and the article did not specifically refer to the DOS ID card at all.<sup>10</sup>

In the end, the two factors I discussed above – a lower likelihood that the press release/event will be covered by the press at all, and a lower likelihood that the marginally politically interested will be exposed to or pay attention to such information – collude to make earned media a less potent channel of communication than it once was, particularly for voter education. In an increasingly competitive media marketplace, where news content tends to lose

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<sup>9</sup> The press release went out on the PR Newswire and this wire is covered by Lexis-Nexis, but the press release was apparently not picked up as a story by any of these newspapers.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.sungazette.com/page/content.detail/id/593981.html>

money and produce low ratings, and non-news content is always available as an alternative, it is increasingly difficult to rely on earned media.

## V. The Challenge of Information Campaigns

Huge sums of money are spent on information campaigns every year. As has been learned from many years of effort, they are far from assured of success. As evidenced by the classic 1940s publication, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail," there are a multitude of reasons why the best intentioned campaigns may fail: "Interested people acquire more information than the uninterested; different groups interpret the same information differently," and so forth (see Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947). Successful efforts require more than simply large budgets, and small budgets spent wisely can go a long way toward achieving a campaign's goals.

It is seldom enough to simply put a message out in front of the public; instead, successful campaigns achieve their goals because they incorporate the many lessons learned from past experience. In the United States, information campaigns have been implemented and their effectiveness studied scientifically since World War II. A few examples from recent history serve to highlight the ongoing challenges of executing successful information campaigns.

Between 1998 and 2004, the federal government spent over \$1 billion on the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (see Hornik, Jacobsohn, Orwin, Piesse, Kalton, 2008). The campaign was managed by a well-respected advertising firm working with the Partnership for a Drug-Free America. The campaign involved an unprecedented nationwide television ad blitz that was extremely successful in exposing its target audience to the message. Overall, 94 percent of American youths were exposed to one or more anti-drug message per month. The median frequency of exposure was 2 to 3 ads per week.

Despite these extremely high levels of exposure, there was no evidence that the campaign decreased drug use. In fact, greater exposure to these advertisements was associated with increased likelihood of initiating marijuana use. Post hoc research identified the problem as the fact that the ads featured kids using drugs, and thus convinced youths that more teenagers were using drugs than they had previously thought. By making drugs appear more popular and thus more socially acceptable, teenagers exposed to the campaign became more likely to try marijuana.

Even public service advertisements that have won national awards for their beauty and creativity can fail to achieve their intended effects (e.g., Cho and Salmon, 2007; Cialdini 2009). For example, one public service announcement widely praised by the advertising industry featured a Native American canoeing from a clean forest up through a progressively more littered river to a metropolitan area, where trash was tossed from automobiles into the river. The Native American sheds a tear for emphasis at the end of the ad as the slogan appears: "People Start Pollution, People Can Stop It."

Research suggested that the ad was ineffective, and possibly even counter-productive in its effects on littering, despite its artistic acclaim. This is because the ad primarily emphasized how common littering was, rather than providing specifics on what people could do about it. As

many scholars have noted, “Intuition is not a substitute for empirical research... Because a message attracts attention, is salient, funny, artistic, colorful, memorable or charming does not necessarily imply that it will be persuasive” (Crano, Siegel, Alvaro, 2013: 298). Unfortunately many past mass media campaigns have been based on “little more than horse sense and uninformed assumptions” (Crano, Siegel and Alvaro, 2013). In particular “approaches based merely on the designers’ intuition may backfire (Maio, Haddock, Watt, Hewstone and Rees 2009).”

In another example, an AIDS-prevention campaign urged people to “talk to your partner” as a means of reducing the risk of spreading AIDS. The campaign was quite successful at getting people who talked to their partners to feel less at risk. However, talking appeared to serve as a substitute for action rather than as a facilitator of actions such as condom use. Moreover, men with extensive sexual histories were particularly likely to talk to their partners, thus promoting a false sense of security among their partners. That led to less condom use in precisely those relationships where it was most needed (Cline, 2013).

## **VI. Best Practices**

Because information campaigns are such challenging endeavors, I will discuss at length below the characteristics of messages, message distribution and follow-through that enhance the chances of campaign success. A large-scale review of successes and failures of information campaigns suggests that campaigns have the greatest probability of success when they emphasize a low-cost, high-reward behavior. Adoption of such behaviors can be greatly influenced by public education campaigns. For example, one extremely effective media campaign encouraged parents to put babies to sleep on their backs rather than on their stomachs in order to reduce the risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). This campaign reduced SIDS deaths by 50 percent (Hornik, 2013). It was successful in part because putting babies to sleep differently did not involve large amounts of time, money or inconvenience relative to the potentially huge benefit.

As applied to the Voter Education Campaign, this pattern points to the importance of messages that emphasize the supposed low cost and effort of obtaining appropriate voter ID even if a voter has previously been denied ID by PennDOT. In reality, I understand that obtaining ID for many voters is not a low cost and low effort requirement, especially because voters must get themselves to PennDOT to obtain the ID. But for those who could get to PennDOT with little cost and effort, it was critical to tell people about the newly relaxed requirements for a DOS ID as of September 25, 2012. That is particularly true given that prior to that date, some voters had tried and failed to obtain ID from PennDOT. Thus, the Voter Education Campaign had to overcome an even higher hurdle to be effective.

Throughout the long history of information campaigns, efforts have been made to accumulate lists of best practices. These are standards to which competently-executed information campaigns are now expected to adhere. These principles are designed to avoid precisely the kinds of failures described above. The U.S. Government has a vested interest in seeing that its funds are spent in the most efficient and effective way possible, so it has even assembled blue-ribbon panels of experts in this area to capitalize on their collective wisdom from

thousands of past campaigns (see, e.g., National Research Council, 1991; Backer, Rogers and Sopory 1992; Rice and Atkin, 2013; Backer et al., 1990) in order to put together the best practices for information campaigns. I discuss those best practices in connection with the Voter Education Campaign below.

Research on consumer advertising can also inform best practices for information campaigns to a certain extent, but there are also some important distinctions. Most consumer purchases involve relatively small investments of time or money. They seek to make a consumer aware of a product that he or she may subsequently purchase. Consumer behavior of this kind is considered a low-involvement decision, meaning that it does not involve a great deal of thought or consideration (Krugman, 1965), nor does it take any more of a person's time and energy than buying a different product on the shelf would. It also does not require a high level of commitment; a consumer can decide not to buy the product again (or to buy a different product next time).

Elections, on the other hand, are essentially "one day only" sales. In the context of voter ID, either the voter decides in advance to take the multiple steps necessary to acquire identification before the election itself, or they miss the opportunity to vote. A voter cannot typically decide on Election Day that she should obtain a photo ID and go to the polls. As a result, throughout the summer of 2012, going to a Driver's License Center (DLC) to obtain appropriate ID was what was known as a "high involvement" decision. It took both time and money to accomplish (for transportation and potentially for time off work during the day). For example, those without a driver's license were required to make one or more trips to a PennDOT Driver's License Centers (DLC) specifically for the purpose of obtaining voter identification. The same remains true for the DOS ID.

In general, mass media are very effective at making people aware of an issue or product, but much less effective at getting them to undertake highly involved activities. Even today, assuming that a person has been successfully educated by the campaign about photo ID and knows that he would qualify for a free ID, the process for obtaining an ID still involves a number of steps (including locating the nearest PennDOT facility (which might not be in your county), arranging transportation to the facility, and in some cases taking time off work to go to PennDOT during limited hours of operation). This sequence of steps requires a high level of involvement by an individual even under the best of circumstances (i.e., when a person already knows they need photo ID, has access to the internet or a non-rotary phone, access to transportation during the work day, etc.). As a result, a television campaign by itself is unlikely to produce this desired outcome. In most cases some kind of follow-up is necessary to produce action even among those already reached by the media campaign.

The best practices that I will be referencing throughout this report were distilled by panels of experts from years of research involving information campaigns of all kinds, dating back to the 1940s and continuing through the present day (see National Research Council, 1991; Backer, Rogers and Sopory 1992; Rice and Atkin, 2013; Backer et al., 1990). In this report, I use these standards as the basis for analyzing the 2012 Voter ID Education Campaign in Pennsylvania. These best practices - all of which come from the published sources mentioned

above - will be identified and numbered in the discussion to follow. I will be discussing the following best practices for information campaigns:

Best Practice #1: It is critical for information campaigns to set clear and specific goals.

Best Practice #2: Effective campaigns use pretesting to ensure that campaign messages have the expected effects on target audiences.

Best Practice #3: Formative evaluation is critical to the success of a media campaign.

Best Practice #4: Effective campaigns combine media with interpersonal, face-to-face strategies.

Best Practice #5: More effective campaigns involve high profile celebrities and figures such as sports stars and musicians to draw attention to the message among those who are not naturally drawn to such content.

Best Practice #6: Segmentation and targeting of campaign audiences by demographics is often relatively ineffective compared with segmentation by other variables that relate directly to impediments to the desired outcome.

Best Practice #7: Mass media campaigns are often unsuccessful because their designers have little knowledge of the characteristics of the target audience.

Best Practice #8: Effective campaigns must address the existing knowledge and beliefs of target audiences that are impeding accomplishment of the intended outcome.

Best Practice #9: Effective campaigns are coordinated with direct service delivery components so that immediate follow through can take place if a message prompts action as intended.

Best Practice #10: Effective campaigns also address the larger social-structural and environmental factors impinging on producing the desired response.

Best Practice #11: More effective campaigns take into account the need to motivate the intended audience.

Best Practice #12: The timing of a campaign helps determine campaign effectiveness. If people learn information but do not make use of that information right away, the information is likely to be forgotten.

**1. Best Practice #1: It is critical for information campaigns to set clear and specific goals.**

Best practices suggest that *it is critical for information campaigns to set clear and specific goals*. In the case of the 2012 Voter ID Education Campaign, goals were dictated by the new law itself, and by the Pennsylvania Department of State in its Requests For Quotations (“RFQs”) from vendors. In the RFQs, vendors were asked to provide their own understanding of



these goals as well. In order to evaluate whether the campaign had clear and specific goals, and whether the campaign was able to subsequently achieve them, I examined the consistency of the goals set forth by the law, the DOS and the vendors.

The law that triggered the 2012 Voter Education Campaign required that PennDOT issue a photo ID card free to any registered elector who declared that he or she did not possess adequate proof of identification under the new law. Moreover, the Commonwealth was charged with disseminating information to the public at large about the proof of identification requirements and the availability of the free ID cards.

Prior to the Photo ID Law's passage, a Department of State "Photo ID Marketing Proposal" listed five objectives of a marketing campaign to educate voters about the law:

1. Assuring voters no one will be denied the right to vote because of this law
2. Educating voters on the new requirement
3. Educating voters on the types of ID they can use to vote
4. Educating voters on where they can get a free photo ID if they do not already have an acceptable ID
5. Providing voters with ways to obtain additional information about the photo ID requirement.<sup>11</sup>

Different target audiences for the education campaign were identified in the RFQs. In the earliest RFQ (RFQ No. DOS 2012-1, issued in April 2012), the Department of State stated that "Preliminarily, the Department has identified the target audience as all eligible voters in Pennsylvania, approximately 9,611,000 citizens. All of these voters must be made aware of the new photo identification requirement."<sup>12</sup>

In response to requests for clarification to the earliest RFQ, the Department of State subsequently indicated in an amendment "that the entire pool of registered voters is the target audience." Later in the same document, however, it indicated the priority is to "inform the general voting population," not just registered voters.

After no vendor was hired in response to the April 2012, RFQ, two additional RFQs were issued in June, splitting the message and ad creation functions from the community outreach and public relations RFQ. At this point, the creative services RFQ (RFQ No. DOS 2012-4) formulated a relatively focused set of two goals for the campaign:

"The legislation requires the Department to conduct a voter education and outreach campaign. The primary goal of this campaign is to inform voters of the new requirements

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<sup>11</sup> PA-00007166

<sup>12</sup> PA-00005610

and ensure that no one will be denied the right to vote because of the new law. The messaging under this campaign is strictly limited to voter education, with a strong focus on the photo identification requirement. Voters must know that they must bring photo identification to the polls and, if they do not have acceptable photo identification, they must know how to obtain it.” (RFQ #DOS-2012-4 at p. 25)

The creative services RFQ implied that there were two target audiences, one for purposes of general education about the existence of the new law, and a second that needed information on how to obtain a suitable ID:

“Preliminarily, the Department has identified the target audience as all eligible voters in Pennsylvania, approximately 9,611,000 citizens. All of these voters must be made aware of the new photo identification requirement. If voters do not have acceptable photo identification, they should be informed of how to obtain one and should be directed to the Department’s website for detailed information. The Department is committed to ensuring that every eligible voter is informed of the new requirement, is prepared with photo identification on Election Day and is able to cast a vote.” (RFQ #DOS-2012-4 at p. 26)

This more focused description identifies two specific goals: 1) informing all Pennsylvania citizens about the new requirement, and 2) telling people who do not have acceptable ID how to obtain it. This statement of goals undoubtedly provided useful guidance; however, the many different iterations and inconsistent restatements of the campaign’s goals that preceded it may have made it difficult for the vendors to choose which central messages to emphasize.

Shortly thereafter, in July 2012, Deputy Secretary Shannon Royer suggested that he believed poll results indicating that “82 percent of Pennsylvanians are aware of Pennsylvania’s Photo ID Law and know, in fact, that a voter ID will be required to vote in November.” It is unclear whether this reminder language marked another change in the goals of the campaign.<sup>13</sup>

Although the campaign did eventually hone in on two specific goals, they were not well-defined at the beginning of the process, and thus there was little focus by the DOS or vendors on designing the campaign around achieving those two specific measurable goals. Instead, it

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<sup>13</sup> If one were targeting only the remaining 18 percent of the population referred to by Deputy Secretary Royer, one would call for a different kind of information campaign than that the Department of State suggested in its RFQ. It appears that the vendors understood there to be a broader goal, however; for example, the proposal from Red House Communications, the vendor ultimately selected to provide creative services for the campaign, states that “only those most attentive to the activities of the state legislature may know of the new requirement of photo ID in order to vote.” Indeed as Red House Communications described the task, “The important challenges of the Department of State General Election Voter Education Media campaign are to not only inform new and current eligible voters of the new law’s requirements, but also to ‘retrain’ voters and modify deeply imbedded voting behavior.” This description casts the task as far more substantial than simply reminding voters to bring their Photo IDs.

appears that effectiveness was loosely defined as simply running a campaign about the new law and putting some kind of message in front of the public.

**2. Best Practice #2: Effective campaigns use pretesting to ensure that campaign messages have the expected effects on target audiences.**

The cleverest, most creative ads are seldom the ones that communicate a message most clearly and effectively. Jokes and double entendres (messages that convey more than one meaning) are often missed by the audience, especially because people pay relatively little attention to ads when they watch them at all. Thus *effective campaigns use pretesting to ensure that campaign messages have the expected effects on target audiences.*

Advertisers typically find out about potential problems with their message during message pretesting; as a result, many advertising agencies require ads to be pretested before they are aired. Typically, a small group of people representing the target audience is assembled to watch an ad and react to it, either in the context of a focus group setting or one-by-one in another setting. They are then queried about their understanding of the ad and what they learned from it. This helps advertisers to assess potential confusion or misinterpretation as well as to determine how efficiently the message educates the public. Pretesting can be done in-house or farmed out to another vendor, but it need not be expensive or time consuming; message pretests can be initiated and completed in-house within a 24 hour period. Because test audiences pay far more attention to messages than people do when watching ads in their own homes, understanding on the part of test audiences serves as the lowest bar that all ads should be able to meet.

The Commonwealth did not conduct any pretesting of the paid media campaign for voter ID. Red House Communications described the concept of the campaign as “Voters demonstrate their desire to vote by ‘showing it.’”<sup>14</sup> The message of the campaign - “If you want to vote, show it!” - was a double entendre. As Carol Aichele explained the campaign in a September 12, 2012 letter, “We are encouraging Pennsylvanians to show that they care about our country by voting, and we are reminding them that they now must show acceptable photo identification on Election Day.”<sup>15</sup>

The fact that the “Show It” campaign relied on a double entendre was not an accident; Red House Communications explained that the “Show It” campaign was intended to be a double entendre. The problem with using a double entendre as the central campaign message is precisely that it is a double entendre: it can be understood in multiple ways. Without message pretesting, there is no way to know whether those exposed to the ad understood the “you will need to show ID” message, as opposed to just understanding the “show your enthusiasm for voting” message. The campaign did not engage in any pretesting to determine whether the target audience was likely to understand the ads or whether the ads were able to convey the necessary information to the target audience.

Moreover, this double entendre is particularly strong at conveying the “show enthusiasm for voting” portion of the message. In the “Show It!” television ads, for example, both the video

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<sup>14</sup> PA-00101835

<sup>15</sup> PA-00099915

and the audio portions of the ads furthered the impression that this was a message about showing one's enthusiasm for the election. The ads focus on a series of different people making general statements that appear to be about the importance of voting: "If you care about this election. If you have an opinion. If you want a voice. If you want to make a difference. If you want to vote, then show it." The "Show it!" message is repeated as various types of IDs are flashed by in quick succession by actors and actresses. The ads go on to have a voice-over narrator state "To vote in Pennsylvania on Election Day, you need an acceptable photo ID with a valid expiration date. Find out more." A 1-877 number and the VotesPA web address are shown and the narrator instructs viewers to visit those for more information. The advertisement ends with another statement that appears to be about the importance of voting: "If you care about this country, it's time to show it."

Television ads in which the audio and video convey different messages are notoriously subject to misinterpretation. For example, in an AT&T television ad, a group of men are shown who have gone fishing for the weekend. It rains constantly. We see the men huddled in a cabin cooking hamburgers while one of them talks by phone to friends back home. The man on the phone is staring into a frying pan full of hamburgers as he says, "Boy, you should see the great trout we've got cooking here." Among other things, test audiences were asked what the men were cooking for dinner. They overwhelmingly answered "trout." Because the intended humor was lost on even a highly attentive test audience, a revised version had to be produced and pretested that accentuated the hamburgers to a much greater extent (see Schudson 1995). The significance of this example is that when the audio and video convey *different* messages rather than reinforcing one another, it is easy for viewers to misinterpret or miss part of the message.

If one were to hear the "Show it!" ads without focusing on the superimposed 1-877 number and VotesPA web address or the visual images of various types of ID, it would be easy to interpret the ad as a call to show your enthusiasm for voting and the electoral process. The people pictured in the ads do not say anything about Voter ID - they simply state, "Show it!" while holding up IDs - and their faces are generally the focus of viewer attention. A viewer would have to specifically focus on the flashed IDs and/or the voice-over in order to understand the Voter ID part of the double entendre.

Radio ads that aired as part of the "Show It!" campaign also used the "If you care about this election . . ." audio directly from the television ads, followed by several repetitions of the phrase "Show it." Given the limitations of radio (namely, no visual component), a person listening to the ad has no way of knowing what the pronoun "it" refers to until the end of the ad, when the voice-over instructs voters that they will need to show an acceptable picture ID with a valid expiration date to vote in Pennsylvania on Election Day and then lists a few acceptable IDs. For those listeners who understood the voter ID portion of the double entendre at that point, the radio ad also includes the 1-877 number and the website address for more information. However, people listening to the radio are seldom ready to write down a phone number or web address (for example, many people listen to the radio while driving), yet the ad makes no attempt to repeat the phone number or the website address.

In addition to helping an advertiser determine whether an ad is sufficiently understood by the target audience, pretesting helps an advertiser determine whether an ad effectively conveys a

message to the target audience. Pretesting of the “Show It” campaign could have revealed that it unintentionally fails to meet one of the campaign’s two primary goals: telling people who do not have acceptable ID how to get one. The “Show It” campaign refers voters to the Commonwealth’s 1-877 number and the Votes PA website for more information,” but it provides no reason to do so. Instead of telling people to call for details on how to get a free ID without additional documentation, it does not address this issue at all.

Without any pretesting to ensure that viewers understood the “Show It” message as intended, the use of a double entendre was a risky strategy (see, e.g., Shen and Bigsby, 2013). It is impossible to know how many people misinterpreted this campaign.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, pretesting of the message would not have been difficult for Red House to implement. Gloria Blint of Red House indicated that even projects with a “fairly modest budget” have utilized message pretesting, and Red House was apparently able to return \$75,000 of its fee in this matter to the Commonwealth, suggesting that excess funds were available for pretesting.

### **3. Best Practice #3: Formative evaluation is critical to the success of a media campaign.**

In the absence of message pretesting, a well-executed information campaign would at a minimum utilize formative evaluation. Formative evaluation is a type of early evaluation that takes place during the design of a campaign, but before it is broadly implemented. It is essentially a built-in feedback loop that allows campaigns to alter course to some degree after launching a campaign, but before much of the media budget has been spent. *Formative evaluation is critical to the success of a media campaign.* Sometimes it is a small-scale dry run, and other times it might be a pilot test in a smaller context, but it always includes an evaluation of effectiveness. Regardless of the form it takes, formative evaluation frequently results in important changes that are critical to the eventual success of a campaign.

Gloria Blint of Red House acknowledged that Red House had used such formative evaluations to test the effectiveness of some of Red House’s other projects, but not for the Voter Education campaign. Moreover, she agreed that there is simply no way to eyeball an ad and accurately judge whether the message will be effective or ineffective. That difficulty is the reason the blue ribbon panel commissioned by the U.S. Government championed the expanded use of formative evaluation in designing media campaigns, highlighting the frequent gap between a campaign’s intended message and the message as understood by audience members.

Without directly talking to target audience members, there is simply no way to know how a message is being interpreted. The Red House proposal indicates that no audience research was

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<sup>16</sup> DOS received some indications of voter confusion during the campaign. For example, one state representative wrote to Secretary Carol Aichele that the ads were “offensive” because instead of explaining the new Photo ID Law in clear and objective terms, the ads questioned people’s patriotism by suggesting that voters without ID did not care about the election. It is unlikely that the Commonwealth intended that message to be conveyed. Another person wrote to DOS to complain that the ads implied that a driver’s license was the only photo ID acceptable for voting, despite the fact that several other forms of ID were acceptable. No changes were made to the campaign following this feedback.

done to prepare the proposal other than looking at a census table breaking down Pennsylvanians by age, race and gender. The proposal itself might have included a research component, but the activities labeled “audience research” in the proposal involved conducting interviews with Department of State staff and with employees of Harmelin Media, not with any members of the actual target audience.

**4. Best practice # 4: Effective campaigns combine media with interpersonal, face-to-face strategies.**

It is well known that mass media campaigns alone are seldom successful in generating the kind of behavioral response that information campaigns desire. For this reason, *effective campaigns combine media with interpersonal, face-to-face strategies*. Events are thus ideal opportunities for forcing greater levels of attention to the topic and conveying more detailed information. Interactive events also provide the opportunity for relaying information tailored to a specific audience rather than referring people to a website or phone number and hoping they will take the initiative. Because of the opportunities for face to face communication that they provide, the Voter Education campaign was wise to utilize community events as a means of reaching people with the voter ID message.

Ms. Sweeney indicated that she only helped a small number of people one-on-one at those events. Moreover, Ms. Sweeney could not recall being asked specifically about the DOS ID at any event. She reported that she was frequently asked whether a driver’s license would qualify as acceptable ID, and that most of the time the questioner’s driver’s license was current and thus acceptable as ID. Given that the driver’s license was so commonly shown in the “Show It” advertising campaign, one would expect the campaign to have at least conveyed to voters the fact that a driver’s license was acceptable. If the campaign did not convey that basic information, then it is doubtful that the far more complex information about the DOS ID got through to audiences.

**5. Best practice #5: More effective campaigns involve high profile celebrities and figures such as sports stars and musicians to draw attention to the message among those who are not naturally drawn to such content.**

It is an accepted best practice that *more effective campaigns involve high profile celebrities and figures such as sports stars and musicians to draw attention to the message among those who are not naturally drawn to such content*. A common example in the election context would be the Rock the Vote outreach campaign to encourage young people to vote. In the Voter Education Campaign, the only public appearances for the campaign were by Department of State employees such as Secretary Carol Aichele and Megan Sweeney or by Bravo staff members and employees of Bravo’s subcontractor. Those individuals might be of interest to those already deeply involved in Pennsylvania politics, but they are not likely to draw mass public attention to an issue that only political insiders follow closely. In particular, Bravo acknowledged that there were no events scheduled with musicians or athletes that might attract a college-aged audience.

**6. Best Practice #6: Segmentation and targeting of campaign audiences by demographics is often relatively ineffective compared with segmentation by other variables that relate directly to impediments to the desired outcome.**

*Segmentation and targeting of campaign audiences by demographics is often relatively ineffective compared with segmentation by other variables that relate directly to impediments to the desired outcome.* In the case of voter ID, the relevant impediment is not having a driver's license. I understand the Petitioners' other experts as well as the Respondents' employees estimate that hundreds of thousands of registered voters lacked an acceptable driver's license.

The practical burden of the new law on a person who has a driver's license is substantially less than for someone who does not have one. Although other forms of ID such as passports and military IDs also qualified as acceptable ID, those holding these other forms of ID are likely to overlap to a large extent with people who have driver's licenses. For example, a recent national survey found that only 3.9 percent of eligible voters in 2012 reported having a passport, but no driver's license (American National Election Study 2013). This means the other forms of ID are limited in the extent to which they ease the overall burden on voters. Compounding this initial discrepancy between drivers and non-drivers is the fact that this same resource—owning a driver's license—also provides access to the transportation that is necessary to get to a PennDOT office. Owning a driver's license has no bearing on eligibility to vote, but it doubly compounds the burden faced by certain groups who are less likely to hold driver's licenses. Thus, those without driver's licenses were the most obvious target population for the Voter Education Campaign and would have benefited the most from specific information about how to obtain a free voter ID.

In their RFQ, DOS noted several groups that were particularly important to target in the Voter Education Campaign, including minority voters, younger voters and senior citizens (p. 26-7). Toward that end, the campaign included some Spanish language television and radio ads, as well as ads on radio stations popular with African-Americans. Some newspaper ads were also placed in foreign language weeklies. These groups are frequently less likely to have driver's licenses due to age, financial status, or due to an urban location where driver's licenses are less necessary, so the decision to target those groups made sense. The Voter Education Campaign, however, did not provide those groups with specific information about obtaining a free voter ID, but instead provided those groups with more exposure to the same "Show It" message used for the general outreach.

**7. Best Practice # 7: Mass media campaigns are often unsuccessful because their designers have little knowledge of the characteristics of the target audience.**

The Commonwealth did not attempt to conduct audience research on the segment of the population in Pennsylvania that lacked driver's licenses and the difficulties they face in getting photo ID prior to the Voter Education Campaign. However, research conducted on this segment of the population in other states can be instructive here. Based on audience research in Wisconsin, using driver's licenses as the main qualifying ID disproportionately affects certain subgroups (see Pawasarat, 2005). Around 23% of those aged 65 and over do not have a driver's license or photo ID, and 70 percent of these people are women. Minorities and the poor are the

most likely to lack driver's licenses. In Wisconsin, less than half of African Americans and Hispanics have a valid driver license compared to 85 percent of white adults. Given that Pennsylvania has a larger Black population than Wisconsin (6.5% in WI compared to 11.3% in PA), the disproportionate impact in Pennsylvania would likely be on an even greater scale. I understand that Petitioners' other experts have confirmed this type of disparate impact in Pennsylvania through database analyses.

Young minority adults are even less likely to hold drivers licenses, thus making it more difficult for them to join the ranks of voters. Interestingly, young Americans of all races and ethnicities are now driving less than earlier generations. The reasons for this shift appear to be mainly financial; the cost of owning and operating a car is now more than \$8,700 a year, and that was before gas prices increased to their current levels. The high costs of gasoline, insurance, maintenance and parking combine to make driving a less attractive option for those without substantial incomes (Florida 2012). To the extent that less driving represents an ongoing trend, it could have more significant consequences for the ease of voting in the future.

Young voters who are college students also have less need for automobiles, and may not want to forfeit a driver's license from their home state, which would be necessary in order to vote in Pennsylvania if they lack another form of identification (such as college identification with an expiration date). In this respect, the Pennsylvania Photo ID Law is even more restrictive than the Transportation Safety Administration rules for security at airports and the rules for buying alcohol. College students can use an out of state photo ID to board airplanes or buy alcohol, but not to vote.

In short, by using a "one-size-fits-all" message, the campaign planners missed many opportunities to target specific population segments with the information they were likely to need. For example, rather than simply encouraging them to "Show It!" young voters could have been offered practical information on how to get a free photo ID, advice on how to obtain transportation to a PennDOT center, and motivation to obtain a photo ID for voting as well as other purposes. By talking to people and finding out about the impediments facing those who do not have driver's licenses, the media campaign could have better addressed these obstructions.

**8. Best Practice # 8: Effective campaigns must address the existing knowledge and beliefs of target audiences that are impeding accomplishment of the intended outcome.**

Ultimately, getting a message in front of eligible voters is the least difficult part of a campaign. Making them understand the message is much more difficult, particularly if the message contradicts their existing beliefs or experiences. If Pennsylvania voters had the mistaken impression that they need a driver's license or a birth certificate or some additional documentation in order to vote, that misinformation needed to be corrected through media messages informing them that there was a free DOS ID card available that did not require birth certificates or other documentation. That message was not the centerpiece of any portions of the "Show It" campaign. Without additional research, it is impossible to know precisely how many people remain misinformed. However, as the complaints received by the DOS indicated, we definitely know there were some who interpreted the message this way.



**9. Best Practice #9: Effective campaigns are coordinated with direct service delivery components so that immediate follow through can take place if a message prompts action as intended.**

Information campaigns seek first to educate the public, but usually their ultimate goal is to get people to act. Whether the goal is to encourage people to quit smoking or engage in safer sex practices, facilitating behavior is the bottom line. Likewise, in the case of the Voter Education Campaign, the most important outcome based on the requirements of the law was to make sure that no one who wanted to vote was unable to do so due to the new law. In order to accomplish this clearly stated goal, the “Show It” campaign had to educate everyone about whether they did or did not have a suitable photo ID already, and then motivate those who did not already have a suitable photo identification to start the process of acquiring one.

The Voter Education Campaign consistently referred people to the 1-877 telephone number and to the VotesPA website in order to obtain information about whether they already had acceptable ID and how to obtain one if they did not. These two components were the essential elements facilitating follow-through behavior.

The 1-877 telephone number is only generally accessible during regular office hours (Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.). If one calls outside of regular office hours, one cannot obtain information or leave a message. This may present problems for those who work during the day, because they will be unable to find out more about the law or request that someone send them more information about the law unless they are able to call the 1-877 phone number during the day. At the very least, it would be preferable to have a pre-recorded message about how to obtain voter ID so that voters will not have to call more than once. In addition, the after-hours recording identifies the number as being for “the Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation,” and does not mention voter ID, so it is not apparent that one has the right phone number for more information on voter ID.

If one calls during office hours, after selecting a language (English or Spanish), the next phone menu has an option to press for voter ID. If one presses the number for voter ID, then the next menu offers only one option: press “1” again to talk to someone about voter ID. The five times I called in June 2013 all required being put on hold until someone was available after making it past the first three phone menus.

In addition, getting to any information requires a non-rotary phone (Press 1 for this, etc.). Although many people may think of rotary phones as a thing of the distant past, according to the company that purchased AT&T’s phone leasing division, around 350,000 people nationwide still have rotary phones, and these are primary elderly and economically disadvantaged people (KiroTV.com, 2010). Precise figures are not available for how many Pennsylvanians have rotary phones.

The VotesPA website was intended to serve as the “heart of [the] campaign” (PA-00008802) and the main way people would learn more about how to get ID. As an initial matter, those without Internet were at a disadvantage in getting additional information. According to the

U.S. Department of Commerce, 22 percent of Pennsylvanians have no internet use whatsoever, whether broadband or dialup, at home or work (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012).

For those people who have access to the Internet, the VotesPA website address is intended to be easy to remember due to its obvious association with voting. Particularly because it is often referenced in the state's materials as simply "the VotesPA website," it is important that "VotesPA" is enough to get people to the right location. Standard practice would be to obtain all suffix variations of the Internet address so that all suffix variations of this address (e.g., .gov, .org, .net, etc.) would direct people to the VotesPA website. That way, if a person accidentally types "VotesPA.gov" or "VotesPA.org" instead of "VotesPA.com," they will still get the information they seek. The Commonwealth has not purchased those additional suffixes for the VotesPA website, however.<sup>17</sup> A user must correctly type "votespa.com" in order to get to the VotesPA website.

The homepage of VotesPA.com is where most people who are interested in further information will first land. The design of this page features a picture of one of several individuals at the top of the page (the individuals change to reflect different ages, genders, and races). There is a dropdown menu next to the individual's picture, and people who click on it are asked to choose among 12 possible options following the phrase "I am ...":

- Citizen with a disability
- College student
- Convicted felon, Misdemeanant or Pretrial Detainee
- Experienced Voter
- Member of the Military
- Older Pennsylvanian
- Overseas Civilian Voter
- Person Who Has Recently Moved
- Person with Recent Name Change
- Property Owner in More than One County
- Voter Who Wants to Change Political Affiliation
- First-Time Voter

This approach is not intuitive as a means of obtaining information about Pennsylvania's Photo ID Law. A person could fit into more than one of these categories or into none of them at all, and as a result, it is unclear how to proceed from here. In addition, if the person selects one of those options, she is taken to a subsequent webpage that provides specific information about issues affecting voters in that category, but none of those subsequent web pages provide information about the free DOS ID or the Photo ID Law.

In order to obtain information about the Photo ID Law, a user must refrain from selecting one of the twelve options from the drop down menu. Instead, the user must realize that she needs to scroll further down the Votes PA home page and click generally in the area displaying

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<sup>17</sup> Currently, VoteSPA.org directs one to an advertising page and VotesPA.gov and VotesPA.net generate errors.

the driver's license and the "Voter ID" label. It is not readily apparent that this area contains a link to other information; only by scrolling to the bottom of the web page will a user see the language, "Click here for more information on PA's Voter ID law."

Overall, this layout did not provide a quick or intuitive way to obtain the kind of information people would be seeking. Web site evaluations routinely demonstrate that any information not immediately apparent in the browser at the top of the page is easily missed either because people do not know there is additional material below and/or because they are disinclined to scroll down. Material that requires scrolling down is thus very likely to be missed.

Moreover, people are not as interested in the law as a whole as they are in how they personally might get the information they need. If the user clicks on the "Voter ID" link, the subsequent webpage includes information about voter ID, including a list of acceptable IDs. If the user clicks on the "Department of State ID" link in that list, the user is taken to the DOS ID Frequently Asked Questions handout. In addition to the list of acceptable IDs and various other Frequently Asked Questions handouts, the subsequent webpage also contains the following information:

"If you do not have one of these IDs, and require one for voting purposes, you may be entitled to get one **FREE OF CHARGE** at a PennDOT Driver License Center. To find the Driver License Center nearest you, and learn what supporting documentation you will need to get a photo ID visit PennDOT's Voter ID Website or call the Department of State's Voter ID Hotline at 1-877-VotesPA (868-3772)."

If one clicks on this third link to PennDOT's Voter ID Website, then additional useful information is provided on "Obtaining a Free ID for Voting Purposes."

The existence of a free DOS ID without the documentation requirements of a PennDOT ID would seem to be the most important part of the message to convey to eligible voters to make ID liberally available, particularly for individuals who tried to get a PennDOT ID last year and were turned down. The language on the subsequent webpage does not communicate the idea that there is a free and easily obtainable ID, however; in particular, the webpage states that a person "may" be able to obtain an ID for free and suggests that at least some "supporting documentation" will be required to obtain the "free of charge" ID.

Assuming one knows that one can obtain an ID by visiting PennDOT, further confusion results from the hours listed online for driver's license centers. Although the language suggests that a person can obtain a DOS ID at a Driver's License Center, it appears that an eligible voter needs both a Driver's License Center and a Photo License Center to be open *simultaneously* in order to successfully obtain a photo ID in one trip.<sup>18</sup> The hours for each are not always the same. I was unable to locate any place on the PennDOT website where that information was explained to the public. Nor was there any suggestion that a voter ID could be obtained through a mail-in application or by going somewhere other than a DLC.

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<sup>18</sup> PA-00089418

In summary, the VotesPA website is not designed with the user foremost in mind. Many approaches have been developed to make it easier for users to find the right information on websites. In order to avoid disadvantaging less educated segments of the population, it is particularly important that people not be required to read long pages of text in order to get the information they need. For example, a natural approach in this case would have been a main page that says, 'Click here to find out if you have an acceptable photo ID, and how to get a free one if you do not.' Then people would be asked a series of simple branching questions such as, "Do you have a valid driver's license?" If not, the next question would ask about another form of ID. Based on answers to the smallest possible number of total branching questions, website users would be told precisely what to do, where to go if necessary, and how to get help with transportation if needed. Expecting citizens to search many different pages in order to gather the information they need only adds to their burden and makes it unlikely that they will be able to locate the necessary information.

**10. Best Practice #10: Effective campaigns also address the larger social-structural and environmental factors impinging on producing the desired response.**

One of the largest structural barriers to obtaining photo ID is transportation. For seniors living in certain kinds of care facilities, identification issued by those facilities is acceptable for voting, but many care facilities do not issue identification to their residents. And no voter has a right to have their care facility issue them identification. Thus, only for those who live in care facilities that have chosen to issue ID, the need to get to PennDOT may be solved, but for all others, the problem remains.

Voting on Election Day is made generally accessible for residents of Pennsylvania by virtue of approximately 9,300 different polling places, so that most citizens can get to their polling place with minimal hardship. I understand that there are only 71 Driver's License Centers, however, and nine counties have no Driver's License Center at all. There are also no Mobile Voter ID units in Pennsylvania.<sup>19</sup>

The Commonwealth's public outreach vendor, Bravo, appears to have been aware of this issue in its original proposal. Bravo suggested in its initial proposal that some form of free transportation be provided by the Commonwealth. However, DOS did not pursue that proposal. DOS did not establish a formal or systematic means of providing people with transportation to PennDOT. Megan Sweeney indicated that she occasionally heard of ride assistance and would informally pass that information along if she had it. Instructions were also sent to county Shared Ride programs that they were to take people to PennDOT for voter ID even if that required the vehicle to cross county lines. These transportation options did not always operate smoothly; for example, one "glitch" occurred because Shared Ride drivers were requiring riders to already have photo ID in order to travel on a reduced fare. That was a problem given that the purpose of these people traveling on Shared Ride was to go to PennDOT in order to obtain photo ID. Moreover, these transportation efforts - including the county Shared Ride program and the

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<sup>19</sup> These mobile ID units have been offered in other states with Photo ID Laws similar to Pennsylvania's.

information Ms. Sweeney obtained and passed on - have not been incorporated into the Commonwealth's paid advertising campaign, so most voters likely remain unaware of them.

In sum, the campaign was neither designed to nor did it in fact advertise any solutions to the practical problems that were likely to prevent voters from responding effectively to the educational campaign even if it had successfully conveyed all of the desired messages to voters.

**11. Best Practice #11: More effective campaigns take into account the need to motivate the intended audience.**

To achieve the Voter Education Campaign's stated goal ("that every eligible voter is informed of the new requirement, is prepared with photo identification on Election Day and is able to cast a vote"), the ads needed to motivate people by telling them they could obtain a free photo ID from a PennDOT location. The lack of this information in the messages became even more significant after the DOS ID card became available with fewer documentation requirements. *More effective campaigns take into account the need to motivate the intended audience.* The paid advertising campaign did not mention that a person could obtain a free DOS ID, particularly if the person had previously been turned down for a PennDOT ID. It is unclear why someone without a photo ID would go to the website or call the phone number unless they knew that doing so would help them obtain one.

When the injunction delayed the implementation of the Photo ID Law, the education campaign continued with a slightly modified message. While keeping the same theme and format, all of the media messages were revised to state, "You will be asked, but not required to show a photo ID." However, the ads were not revised to provide voters with specific information about how to obtain a free DOS ID. As with the previous "Show It!" message, the Commonwealth and Red House did not pretest the new "Show It!" message to determine whether audiences understood it.

Because the kinds of documents that were required for free ID changed many times during 2012, it was difficult, if not impossible, for voters to keep abreast of the latest information on what was required for a free ID. For those who had already tried unsuccessfully to get a PennDOT ID or a DOS ID under the stricter documentation requirements, it seems unlikely they would know to look into the matter a second time after making a failed trip to PennDOT, unless they were given specific information as to why they should return to PennDOT again.

In short, audiences needed a clear message that the requirements had changed and that there was a good reason to try again. They needed to hear that everyone who was registered to vote could obtain a free photo ID for voting purposes, regardless of whether they had documentation. Instead, DOS employees have indicated that they felt the ads did not need to emphasize the availability of the free DOS ID given that the ads continued to refer viewers to the website and phone number for information.

DOS also abandoned parts of the paid ad campaign after the injunction was issued, rather than using them to provide more detailed information to voters. For example, prior to the injunction, DOS and Harmelin had budgeted for and intended to use robocalls to provide

information about the Photo ID Law to voters. Megan Sweeney has stated that the robocalls were canceled because they were deemed potentially “too confusing” to voters.<sup>20</sup>

The canceled robocalls were an opportunity to inform people that a free voter ID was now available to all registered voters without need for additional documentation. As in Red House’s Pittsburgh AIDS Project, the robocalls could also be designed to permit the person who received the call to press a button during the call to be connected directly to the 1-877 number for more information. For example, because the new ID was known as the “DOS ID” rather than the PennDOT ID, it was not obvious that one should go to PennDOT rather than the Department of State in order to acquire one. Robocalls would have provided an ideal opportunity to connect people to the resources they needed in order to follow through and obtain a photo ID.

**12. Best Practice #12: The timing of a campaign helps determine campaign effectiveness. If people learn information but do not make use of that information right away, the information is likely to be forgotten.**

Given the delayed implementation of the new law after the injunction, face to face contact with voters at the 2012 polls was another important educational opportunity. If voters showed up at the polls to vote in 2012 without valid photo ID, those people were precisely the target audience that needed to be educated about acceptable forms of ID and about how to obtain a free ID. The Commonwealth was supposed to have poll workers distribute voter ID information fliers at polling places to such voters. Assuming such fliers were actually given out, distributing fliers via polling places was, in general, a very good idea. Future behavior is always best predicted by past behavior, and this approach would have targeted precisely those people unlikely to have photo ID with them at the next high-turn-out election. The timing of this effort was problematic, however, because people tend to either act on new information right away, or not at all.<sup>21</sup> *The timing of a campaign helps determine campaign effectiveness. If people learn information but do not make use of that information right away, the information is likely to be forgotten.*

At the time a voter ID flier received on Election Day becomes important to act upon – perhaps two or four years from when the voter obtained it, when he or she needs to obtain voter ID for the next election - the voter is very unlikely to still have this flier. It is doubtful that voters would see obtaining voter ID as an urgent matter on or shortly after Election Day when

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<sup>20</sup> The television ads were similar enough that Harmelin received complaints from people who saw the revised post-injunction ads and believed they were still seeing the pre-injunction ads. It does not appear that adjustments were made to the television ad campaign as a result of this confusion.

<sup>21</sup> Even for voters who wanted to act right away, the flier did not highlight the new, more easily obtained DOS ID. Neither the fliers nor the polling site posters highlighted the DOS ID. They listed the DOS ID along with other forms of ID that were acceptable for voting, but they did not state that the DOS ID was available with no documentation. Gloria Blint of Red House stated that Red House did not produce any materials that included this particular point, nor is she aware of any materials that were produced by other vendors or by the Department of State that focused on telling people about how to get a free ID.

they have just cast a vote and may not do so again for two to four years. Ideally one would want to convey the information when they have a reason to act soon, and to provide them with concrete details on precisely what to do next.

Face to face contact in polling places could have been used far more effectively to identify target audience members for voter ID outreach before the next election. As voters signed in, poll workers should have been instructed to notate the name and address of each person who did not have ID with them so that those voters could be contacted shortly before the next election to ensure that they had an opportunity to obtain suitable ID.

This would not help the Commonwealth reach those voters who did not come to the polls because they did not have ID and wrongly believed they needed it to vote, but it would be an effective way to identify a subset of the people who want to vote and do not have photo ID. The issue of timing is crucial to getting people to act before a deadline. Obtaining a comprehensive list of people who could be targeted down the road would have been extremely valuable and well worth the necessary investment. If the Commonwealth had made this investment in November 2012, any future educational efforts would be significantly advanced.

## **VII. Evaluation of Campaign Results**

Many of the Commonwealth's claims about the effectiveness of the Voter Education Campaign referred to the amount of HAVA money spent educating voters. Money spent is known to be a very poor gauge of campaign effectiveness. Likewise, the number of ad "impressions" or Gross Ratings Points are poor predictors of campaign success. Evaluative metrics must focus specifically on getting people to demonstrate the desired behavior that serves as the goal of the campaign.

The Red House Proposal appropriately emphasizes "measurable results," as the *raison d'être* for the Voter Education campaign. Moreover, from the past client case studies provided in Red House's proposal, it is clear that they have incorporated concrete success metrics into other campaigns that they have run.<sup>22</sup> Those success metrics were not applied to the Voter Education Campaign, though, and Gloria Blint noted that the DOS RFQ did not request any evaluation of effectiveness.

At times, large numbers have been tossed around somewhat indiscriminately to indicate effectiveness. For example, Melissa Rutz of Harmelin stated in her September 20, 2012 summary of the media campaign that "TV/Cable is the main driver of the media plan," and that "by utilizing this medium we will reach 12,696,379 PA households." Harmelin has subsequently clarified that the word "population" should have been used instead of "households," and that that number came from 2010 US Census figures. By comparison, the voting age population in Pennsylvania is estimated by the Department of State to be between 9 and 10 million people.

Large numbers of impressions are also frequently mentioned, but as noted above, these are merely navigational metrics, not effectiveness metrics. They indicate that a message was put out there, but not that it was seen by citizens, understood by them, or acted upon.

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<sup>22</sup> See examples at PA-00101858.

It appears that DOS considered and rejected the concept of assessing the effectiveness of the Voter Education Campaign by reference to the voters who arrived at the polls without photo ID. In the addendum to the first RFQ in April 2012, DOS was specifically asked whether assessments of the effectiveness of the campaign would be made at polling places by keeping track of those who had not received the Voter ID message and thus arrived unprepared. DOS stated that it would not sponsor any polling place surveys.<sup>23</sup>

The Voter Education Campaign's goals included telling voters without ID how to obtain it and motivating those people to actually obtain the ID that would allow them to vote. I understand that less than 17,000 registered voters have obtained free identification for voting purposes, while the Commonwealth's witnesses, the Court, and Petitioners' other experts have all consistently estimated that more than a hundred thousand registered voters still lack acceptable identification. By that measure alone (i.e., people obtaining IDs), the campaign did not succeed.

### **VIII. Future Efforts**

After the November 2012 election, the Commonwealth stopped all educational efforts that cost any money. No paid efforts were undertaken to tell voters that they could vote without ID in the May 2013 election. The focus has been entirely on "earned" media, and I have discussed above why earned media is not a sufficient tool to educate voters about the Photo ID Law or how to obtain ID.

I understand that the current proposed budget for 2013-2014 for the DOS may have recently been increased to include \$2.1 million in additional money related to the Photo ID Law and that some amount of this may be intended for education efforts. I have also reviewed a June 3, 2013, email from DOS Deputy Secretary Shannon Royer regarding the request for more voter education funds for additional educational efforts. It appears that the new voter education efforts are intended to largely repeat the paid efforts in the 2012 voter ID education campaign. It also appears that these efforts would be directed by the same Department of State personnel with the same outside vendors as the 2012 campaign, and with the same campaign message.

Deputy Secretary Royer's email further discusses using the same untested "Show It" creative materials. Deputy Secretary Royer also indicates that the new Voter Education Campaign will not incorporate certain aspects of the prior campaign, including the use of a vendor to assist with public outreach, placement of newspaper, transit, and billboard ads, and reaching out to voters statewide with a mailed postcard or letter.

If the Photo ID Law is to take effect going forward, it will be necessary for the Commonwealth to engage in a new voter ID education campaign. If DOS is able to obtain funding for a voter ID education campaign, Deputy Secretary Royer's proposal for additional educational efforts does not resolve the problems I have identified with the 2012 Voter Education Campaign. In particular, this proposal would not address or alleviate the voter

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<sup>23</sup> PA-00009500



confusion that likely ensued as a result of the competing messages broadcast in the fall. (Voters were first told that they must show ID to vote, and later told that they would be asked but not required to show ID to vote.)

Most importantly, this proposal does not include any steps to evaluate whether voters understand the Voter Education Campaign, and it does not include any steps to evaluate the effectiveness of that campaign at helping voters who lack photo ID obtain it. This proposal also fails to address the underlying infrastructure issues - discussed in more detail above - that make it difficult for voters who lack ID to get to PennDOT.

## **IX. Photo ID Law's Likely Impact on Voter Turnout**

Any time new obstacles to voting are introduced, people are less likely to make it to the polls (see, e.g., Harder and Krosnick 2008). Political scientists tend to conceptualize this in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, that is, the costs in terms of time, money and inconvenience relative to the benefits of getting to vote. Although photo ID laws are a relatively new form of obstacle, there is plenty of evidence that as the cost of voting increases, voter turnout declines (see Hershey, 2009 for a review). For example, Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) showed that early closing dates for registration lowered turnout by over 6 percent. The number of hours registration sites were open had still further effects.

In addition, political scientists have found that “active” motor-voter laws, that is, when driver’s license center employees must take the initiative to ask people if they would like to register to vote when they get their license, produced a 4 percent turnout increase relative to states with no motor voter program. Notably, simply making registration materials available at DLCs did not have any effects (Knack 1995). Highton and Wolfinger (1998) estimate that Election Day registration, that is, combining registration and voting into one trip, increases turnout by 8.7 percent relative to a 30-day registration closing date, and the increases came primarily from the young and residentially mobile segments of the population (see also Knack, 2001; Powell, 1986).

Research suggests that citizens are sensitive to both the costs and potential benefits of voting. Potential voters realize that the chance that any one person’s vote will affect the outcome of an election is infinitesimally small, but when it is a close race, people are more likely to vote because they feel more likely to make a difference. What this reveals is that the cost-benefit ratio is fairly easy to tip when additional costs – of either time or money – are introduced. Given the small chance that one’s vote will matter, any additional hassle may tip the scale in the other direction.

This is true of even very minor inconveniences, such as rain. Rain is known to depress turnout, and snow has even greater effects (Fraga and Hersh, 2010). Other factors – such as a highly competitive, close race – can counter these effects and increase the chances that people will turn out to vote in any given year. Turnout is always a function of a multitude of factors acting simultaneously.

The United States is already infamous for its relatively low levels of voter turnout relative to other democratic countries. But such comparisons are somewhat unfair, in part because many other democracies automatically put citizens on the voting rolls without need for registration (see Hershey, 2009). In addition, Americans are asked to vote more frequently and on more elected positions than are people in other countries. In other words, the burden on voters in the US is already quite high compared to places that have fewer elections and that select a simple party slate, for example. So it is not only how interested people are in politics, but also the large demands made on voters that affects American turnout.

According to the best available records, Pennsylvania's turnout in 2012 was 5.7 million of the 9.6 million citizens eligible to vote (McDonald, 2013). This represents 59.4 percent of the Voting Eligible Population (excluding ineligible felons and non-citizens), and 57.1% of the Voting Age Population. In the 2012 presidential race, 67.6 percent of those registered to vote in Pennsylvania cast ballots. Since the 1960s, this figure has ranged from a high of 88 percent to a low of 63 percent. The current 2012 figure represents the third lowest turnout since 1960.

Although a stated goal of the Voter Education Campaign was to make sure that everyone who wants to vote can do so, realistically some members of the public who lack appropriate ID will find the costs of obtaining one too high. The most recent review of the impact of similar laws suggests that states that have implemented restrictions similar to Pennsylvania's should expect a 2-3 percent decline in turnout over what would have otherwise occurred in any given year (see Silver, 2012).

In order to understand why the many studies of turnout effects strike some as inconsistent or inconclusive at best, it is important to understand that not all of these studies address the same questions. There are basically two types of studies that attempt to address the question of whether photo ID laws affect turnout. One type uses survey-based random samples of the state's population to find out if people possess acceptable ID and thus estimates the percentage of eligible voters who do not (e.g., Hood and Bullock, 2008). This approach has been criticized on a variety of grounds. First, the people surveyed may report having ID when they actually do not have qualifying ID, or they may have expired IDs or a kind without an expiration date. These factors would all lead to underestimates of the number of people who might be disenfranchised.

On the other side of the ledger, some people without IDs might discover they need ID and obtain it before the actual election, and pre-election survey data would not reflect this. In addition, survey-based estimates of those without ID might overestimate the number of people potentially disenfranchised because many of those people would not end up voting anyway, regardless of photo ID requirements. Results from studies using this first methodological approach have varied quite widely, thus making it difficult to draw useful conclusions.

A second approach analyzes turnout by state. However, it is not informative to simply compare a state's turnout one year to the same state's turnout in a previous election year and then infer that the difference is due to a change in the law. This approach is problematic because many factors influence turnout in addition to photo ID laws, therefore changes in either direction could be wrongly attributed to the law. Each election year has characteristics that influence turnout. These include the specific candidates running, the anticipated closeness of the outcome,

the state of the economy, and so forth. And because President Obama's election in 2008 was particularly noteworthy for African-Americans, voter turnout would be expected to be higher. Because so many different factors influence turnout, complex multivariate models are required to take those many influences into account.

Some of the studies that come closest to providing a comprehensive assessment of turnout effects are studies relying on the U.S. Census's post-election turnout surveys – the CPS Voter Supplements. These studies compare turnout across all states with varying levels of photo ID requirements, from those that require no ID at all, to laws like the Pennsylvania one, which requires specific types of photo ID. Three studies have examined turnout using these data (Vercelotti and Anderson 2006; Mulhausen and Sikich 2007; Alvarez, Bailey and Katz, 2008) and the size of the effect on turnout estimated for a photo ID law like the proposed Pennsylvania law is quite consistent.

These studies all suggest roughly the same relatively small effect size – in the neighborhood of 2-3 percent turnout decline from strict photo ID laws. The reason they are characterized as inconclusive is that despite very similar effect sizes across studies, some of these effects achieve statistical significance while others do not. The debate centers less on the magnitude of the effect and more on whether the sample is large enough to detect statistically significant effects (Silver, 2012; Erikson and Minnite, 2009). The appropriate standard errors to be used with these estimates are a subject of debate, and the size of standard errors determines statistical significance, but not effect size.

Nonetheless, when multiple scholars examine data with different statistical models and their results all point to roughly the same effect size, it makes sense to have more confidence in these estimates. Scholars refer to this as convergent validity, because estimates from multiple studies are converging on the same effect size. As discussed in a recent review of these studies as well as an article using both cross-sectional and overtime analyses, the estimated effect on voter turnout is surprisingly consistent – in the 2-3 percent range when going from no photo ID restrictions at all to the kind of restrictions that are proposed in Pennsylvania.

It would be possible to be more confident of this estimate with larger sample sizes, and more replications, but in an analysis of whether increasingly restrictive photo ID laws reduce turnout in a given year, scholars are necessarily limited to a sample size of 50 states. When some of the variables are at the statewide unit of analysis (such as photo ID laws), and others are characteristics of individuals, this changes the precision of the estimates and requires larger standard errors. In addition, when using multivariate models, the inclusion or exclusion of a given independent variable in a model can alter the standard errors of estimate for photo ID laws, thus potentially driving an effect to one side or the other of statistical significance due to differences in model choice. Moreover, very few states have experience with laws as restrictive as Pennsylvania's, so the number of analyses of precisely this kind of change is necessarily small.

Whether this number of would-be voters – 2 to 3 percent – is enough to be of concern is obviously a matter of opinion. This question must be considered in light of potential gains in the legitimacy of election outcomes and overall perceptions of the fairness of the electoral process.

But in Pennsylvania, a 2 to 3 percent reduction in voter turnout based on the approximately 5.7 million voters in the November 2012 election equals approximately 114,000 to 171,000 voters who would be expected not to vote in the face of a Photo ID Law.

#### **X. Photo ID Law's Likely Impact on Perceived Legitimacy of the Electoral Process**

One of the stated goals of the Photo ID Law was to increase the legitimacy of election outcomes in Pennsylvania. The gain posited by those who supported the Photo ID Law was an increased ability to detect and deter voter fraud. However, I understand that both sides in this matter have agreed that there have been no investigated or confirmed cases of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania and no evidence of fraud that would have been or likely will be prevented by this law. The stated gain must therefore be evaluated based on the potential adverse effects of the law on the integrity and legitimacy of elections in Pennsylvania.

Because many information campaigns have unintended as well as intended consequences, it is important to consider whether the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process could actually decrease as a result of the Voter Education Campaign. Given the weaknesses of the education campaign, it seems unlikely that Pennsylvanians will come to perceive election outcomes as more legitimate because of the new law, and it is possible that the Voter Education Campaign adversely affected citizens' perception of the electoral process.

The "Talking points" memo prepared by DOS for public discussions of the Photo ID Law made two points that could have negatively affected the perceived legitimacy of Pennsylvania elections. First, it stated that voter fraud has indeed occurred in Pennsylvania:

- In 2009, a six-month investigation led to forgery and election fraud charges against seven Pittsburgh area workers for ACORN;
- In 2008, Philadelphia's Deputy City Commissioner submitted approximately 8000 fraudulent ACORN-collected voter registration forms for investigation
- In 1994, a federal judge actually overturned the results of a state senate election in Philadelphia, awarding the seat to the losing candidate, after a months-long investigation showed without massive absentee ballot fraud, that candidate would have clearly won the election.

To the extent that this information was widely heard and believed, it undoubtedly decreased voters' confidence in the electoral process. All of the examples cited in the talking points involved voter registration; as a result, implementation of the Photo ID Law would not prevent any of these incidents. Passage of the law would not give voters any reason to feel reassured that these events could not recur. But using these examples to defend the law will have the unintended consequence of undermining public perceptions of the integrity of election results.

Second, the talking points memo suggests that "Voters understand photo IDs are part of our everyday lives. You need a photo ID to cash a check, to board an airplane, to buy cold medicine over the counter, buy alcohol, or buy cigarettes. Why not to vote?" This argument ignores the transportation and documentation issues faced by a not-insignificant portion of

Pennsylvania residents who may have tried and failed to obtain photo ID prior to this law taking effect. In addition, this point demeans voting by equating it with buying cigarettes or alcohol. To equate voting with these other activities trivializes a right that many throughout history fought hard to obtain. To many citizens, voting is the ultimate symbol of American equality. Again, defenders of the law run the risk of undermining the legitimacy of elections by equating voting to buying alcohol or cigarettes.

One can easily imagine media coverage of the 90 year old voter who has voted in the same place and the same way for her entire life, but is turned away because she lacks a photo ID. Lawmakers run the risk of delegitimizing election outcomes if there are widely publicized examples of registered voters who are turned away at the polls or asked to cast provisional ballots due to improper ID. As Red House Communications noted in its proposal:

“Ask U.S. citizens about their right to vote and they likely will respond that it is guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. That it’s the foundation of our democracy. And that it’s a right to be vigorously protected. Most residents will view voting as their right and may have a visceral, negative response if turned away at the polls. Statewide media will be certain to be attentive to the activity at voting precincts.”

If members of certain groups become systematically less likely to vote under the new law, either because they have not been adequately informed about its requirements, or because the costs are just too high for them, this may lead not only to actual disenfranchisement but also to a public perception of disenfranchisement and thus undermine the perceived integrity of elections.

The beauty of the American electoral system is that people have enough faith in the process itself to go along with the outcome, even when it is not in their favor. To lead effectively, leaders need the consent of all citizens, not just those who voted them into office. Thus, when one’s favored candidate does not win an election, it matters a great deal why people perceive this to be the case.

At the national level, very few supporters of losing candidates attribute the undesirable outcome to voter fraud. For example, in 2008, 0.1 percent of a representative national sample of 12,000 voters cited voter fraud as the reason why their side lost (see National Annenberg Election Survey, 2008). References to differences in turnout among various demographic groups are a much more common explanation for why one’s own side lost. For this reason, it is extremely important that the Photo ID Law not be perceived as differentially affecting various segments of the Pennsylvania population. In order for the public to believe that the people have spoken, they must not perceive those to be only the voices of a few.

Advocates of photo ID laws have at times suggested that these laws would actually increase turnout because people would have a greater sense that their vote counted. However, no empirical evidence of such an effect has surfaced thus far, and to date, there is no evidence that voters perceive greater legitimacy in election outcomes as a result of photo ID requirements (see Ansolabehere and Persily 2008).

## **XI. Conclusion**

The Voter Education Campaign did not follow standard practices for public information campaigns. In particular, the Voter Education Campaign did not include pretesting or other evaluative metrics to determine whether voters understood the message of the campaign and were affected as intended. The campaign made no effort to determine the effectiveness of their messages in getting people to bring photo IDs with them to polling places or at helping voters who did not have photo ID to obtain it.

Given the lack of empirical evidence provided about campaign effectiveness, it is impossible for anyone to claim that the Voter Education Campaign accomplished its relatively ambitious goal of making sure no one was denied the right to vote due to the new law. Based on my years of experience and the large amount of research on what constitutes an effective public education campaign, it is my opinion that only those citizens who were already quite politically involved and active were able to follow the many twists and turns of the unfolding Voter Education Campaign. Based on the campaign materials I reviewed, it is extremely unlikely that the Commonwealth achieved its goals of educating all eligible voters about the law, and providing appropriate information to those without suitable IDs. The campaign was inadequately focused on its end goals to achieve this mark.

The original RFQ stated, "The Department is committed to ensuring that every eligible voter is informed of the new requirement, is prepared with photo identification on Election Day and is able to cast a vote." However, no evaluation was conducted to determine whether the Voter Education campaign succeeded in its two goals of informing citizens about the new law and making sure all eligible voters were able to obtain appropriate ID.

There were many possible effectiveness metrics that could have been employed to rectify this oversight. For example, if a dedicated phone line had been used that was specific to voter ID questions, it would have been possible to evaluate the campaign's success in driving people to the phone lines (the current line appears to be used for multiple purposes). During the pre-election period, if we knew how many people made it to the part of the website where information was available on the DOS ID, that could also have served as an indicator of campaign effectiveness.

Best practices also suggest that information should have been collected at the polls to assess how many voters did not have photo ID in 2012. Those voters could then be provided with additional information about how to obtain a photo ID, including following up with those voters prior to the next election to ensure they were able to obtain ID.


If the law takes effect and the Commonwealth is successful in obtaining additional funds for a new voter ID education campaign, these additional funds should not be used to repeat the mistakes of the "Show It" campaign. Instead, the message needs to be more clearly focused on how to obtain free voter ID. The message needs to focus on making it easier for Pennsylvania voters to obtain ID by providing specific information to voters about how to obtain the free DOS ID. But the reality is that no amount of messaging could have overcome the inherent hurdles of

requiring people to get to PennDOT when those people lack driver's licenses and PennDOT has limited accessibility, locations, and hours and days of operation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that this report is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dated: July 1, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Diana C. Mutz". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Diana C. Mutz, Ph.D.  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

# Appendix A



## **DIANA C. MUTZ**

Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and Communication  
University of Pennsylvania  
201 S. 37<sup>th</sup> Street  
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6215  
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Director, Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics  
Annenberg Public Policy Center

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### **Education**

Stanford University, Ph.D., Communication, 1988.

Stanford University, A.M., Communication, 1985.

Northwestern University, B.S. Radio/TV/Film With Highest Distinction, 1984.

### **Positions Held**

Fall 2003 to present: Samuel A. Stouffer Professor of Political Science and  
Communication, University of Pennsylvania

Fall 2003 to present: Director, Institute for the Study of Citizens and Politics,  
Annenberg Public Policy Center

Fall 2007 to present: Senior Fellow in Governance Studies, Brookings Institution

Fall 1999 to Spring 2003: Professor of Political Science and Journalism and Mass  
Communication, Ohio State University.

Fall 1996 to Spring 1999: Associate Chair, Department of Political Science,  
University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Fall 1994 to Spring 1999: Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,  
University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Fall 1988 to Spring 1994: Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and  
School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of

Wisconsin-Madison.

### **Honors and Awards**

2011. Lifetime Career Achievement Award in Political Communication, American Political Science Association.

2011. Political Methodology Fellowship, National Science Foundation.

2008. Elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS).

2007. American Association for Public Opinion Research Warren Mitofsky Innovator Award for Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS).

2007. Awarded the Robert Lane Prize for the Best Book in Political Psychology by the American Political Science Association for *Hearing the Other Side*.

2007. Goldsmith Book Prize from Harvard University for *Hearing the Other Side*.

2005 Doris Graber Prize for Most Influential Book on Political Communication published in the last ten years for *Impersonal Influence*.

2003. Top Paper Award from the International Communication Association, for Mutz, D.C., and B. Reeves. Exposure to Mediated Political Conflict: Effects of Civility of Interaction on Arousal and Memory.

2000. Fellowship, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA.

1999. APSA Robert Lane Award for Best Book in Political Psychology for *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes*. (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

2003. Award for Top Paper in Political Communication division of International Communication Association.

1998. Award for Best Paper on Political Communication Published in 1997, International Communication Association.

1998. Romnes Research Fellowship Award, 1998. \$50,000 award from a university-wide competition for the most promising scholars who are less than five years post-tenure.

1992. Contributing author to P.M. Sniderman, R.A. Brody, and P.E. Tetlock, (Eds.), *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Woodrow Wilson Award for Best Book in Political Science.

1991. Ithiel de sola Pool Award for best paper dealing with political communication presented at the convention of the American Political Science Association.

1990. Selected as one of 50 Top Educators at UW-Madison by Interfraternity Council and Panhellenic

Association.

1989. Winner of Student Paper Competition, American Association for Public Opinion Research.

1989. Nafziger-White Dissertation Award, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

### **Research Support**

Provosts Research Fund, University of Pennsylvania, \$50,000. (Combined with funds from 3 other institutes and centers to enable a 2012 panel study that covers two election cycles).

Russell Sage Foundation: "Obama as Exemplar: Effects of Mediated Intergroup Contact." (with Seth Goldman). \$40,000.

Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University, 2010-2011, salary support for fellowship year.

National Science Foundation Infrastructure Grant: "TESS: Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences," (with Arthur Lupia). 2001-2008, \$3,101,682.

Department of Homeland Security grant for Survey Experiments Related to Terrorism, Disaster Preparedness, and Homeland Security. (with Dr. Matthew Davis), \$186,100.

National Science Foundation Supplement for "TESS: Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences," (with Matthew Davis), 2007, \$200,000.

National Science Foundation, Research Experiences for Undergraduates (REU) grant to fund undergraduate research assistance, \$9,775

National Science Foundation: "In Mixed Company: Psychological Responses to Mediated Representations of Oppositional Political Views." 1999-2001, \$93,358.

National Science Foundation: "Political Discussion in the Workplace: Causes and Consequences of Cross-Cutting Political Dialogue." (with Jeffery J. Mondak) 1999-2002, \$152,253.

Spencer Foundation, "The Company of Strangers: Social Context and the Public Sphere." 1995-1997, \$79,500.

National Science Foundation, "Impersonal Influence," 1993-96, \$45,000.

Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Residential Fellowship at Columbia University, 1991-92, salary plus living stipend.

Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation grants, 1984, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998.

## **Books**

Goldman, Seth K. and Diana C. Mutz. *The Obama Effect: How the 2008 Campaign Changed White Racial Attitudes*. Under contract with the Russell Sage Foundation.

Mutz, Diana C. 2011. *Population-Based Survey Experiments*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mutz, Diana C. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. [Awarded the 2007 Goldsmith Prize by Harvard University; also awarded the Robert Lane Prize for the Best Book in Political Psychology by the American Political Science Association, 2007].

Mutz, Diana C. 1998. *Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect Political Attitudes*. Cambridge University Press, 334 pages). [Awarded the Robert Lane Prize for the Best Book in Political Psychology by the American Political Science Association, 1999, and the 2004 Doris Graber Prize for Most Influential Book on Political Communication published in the last ten years]

Mutz, Diana C., Sniderman, Paul M., and Richard Brody (Eds.). 1996. *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (295 pages).

## **Refereed Journal Articles and Book Chapters**

Mara-Cecilia Ostfeld and Diana Mutz. Forthcoming. "Revisiting the Effects of Case Studies in the News." *Political Communication*.

Dilliplane, Susanna, Seth Goldman and Diana Mutz. Forthcoming. "All Virtues are Relative: a Response to Prior." *Political Communication*.

Mansfield, E. and D.C. Mutz. Forthcoming. "US vs. Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing." *World Politics*.

Dilliplane, S., Goldman, S., and D.C. Mutz. 2013. "Televised Exposure to Politics: New Measures for a Fragmented Media Environment." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (1), pp. 236–248.

Mutz, D.C., and Laura Silver. Forthcoming. "Normative Perspectives on the Spiral of Silence." Chapter in Wolfgang Donsbach, Charles Salmon and Yariv Tsfati, (Eds.), *The Spiral of Silence: New Perspectives on Communication and Public Opinion*.

Mutz, D.C. 2013. "Television and Uncivil Political Discourse." Chapter 6 in Dan Shea and Morris Fiorina (Eds.), *Can We Talk? The Rise of Rude, Nasty, Stubborn Politics*. Pearson.

Mutz, D. C. 2012. "The Great Divide: Campaign Media in the American Mind." *Daedalus* 141(4) 83-97.

- Mutz, Diana C. and Lori Young. 2011. "Communication and Public Opinion: Plus Ça Change?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 75 (5): 1018-1044.
- Goldman, Seth, and D.C. Mutz. 2011. The Friendly Media Phenomenon: A Cross-national Analysis of Cross-Cutting Exposure. *Political Communication* 28: 1, 42-66.
- Mutz, D.C., and Susanna Dilliplane. 2011. Running to the Right: Effects of Campaign Strategy on Mass Opinion and Behavior. Chapter in *Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation*, Benjamin Highton and Paul Sniderman (Eds.). Princeton University Press.
- Mutz, D.C. 2010. The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Role of Canines in the 2008 Presidential Campaign. *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43(4): 1-6.
- Mutz, D.C., and Seth Goldman. 2010. Effects of Mass Media. Chapter in J.F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, and V. M. Esses (eds), *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination*. London: Sage.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2009. Effects of Internet Commerce on Social Trust. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73: 439 – 461.
- Mutz, D.C. & Nir, L. 2010. Not Necessarily the News: Does Fictional Television Influence Real-World Policy Preferences? *Mass Communication and Society* 13: 196 — 217.
- Mansfield, E., and D.C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63, Summer 2009, pp. 425–57.
- Wojcieszak, Magdalena and Diana Mutz. 2009. Online Groups and Political Discourse: Do Online Discussion Spaces Facilitate Exposure to Political Disagreement? *Journal of Communication* 59 (1): 40-56.
- Mutz, D.C. and Brandon Bartels. 2009. Processes of Institutional Opinion Leadership. *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 249–261.
- Mutz, D.C. 2008. Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:521-538.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2007. Effects of "In-Your-Face" Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition. *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 621-635.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2007. "How the Mass Media Divide Us." Chapter 5 in D. Brady and P. Nivola (eds.), *Red and Blue Nation?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2007. "Political Psychology." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Eds.), Oxford University Press.
- Mutz, Diana C. and Jeffery J. Mondak. 2006. The Workplace as a Context for Cross-cutting Political

Discourse." *Journal of Politics* 68 (1): 140-155.

Mutz, Diana C. 2005. "Social Trust and E-Commerce: Experimental Evidence for the Effects of Social Trust on Individual Economic Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69(3): 393-416.

Mutz, Diana C., and Byron Reeves. 2005. "The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust." *American Political Science Review* 99(1): 1-15.

Mutz, Diana C. 2004. "Leading Horses to Water: Confessions of a Daily Show Junkie." *Journalism and Mass Communication*.

Mutz, Diana C. 2002. "The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 838-55.

Mutz, Diana C. 2002. "Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice." *American Political Science Review* 96 (2): 111-26.

Mutz, Diana C. and P.M. Martin. 2001. "Facilitating Communication Across Lines of Political Difference: The Role of Mass Media." *American Political Science Review* 95 (1): 97-114.

Mutz, Diana C. 2001. "The Future of Political Communication Research." *Political Communication* 18 (2): 231-36.

Mutz, Diana C. 2001. "Tolerance." In Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, (Eds.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Oxford, England: Elsevier.

Mutz, Diana C., and Gregory Flemming. 1999. "How Good People Make Bad Collectives: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Public Attitudes Toward Congress," Chapter in Joseph Cooper (Ed.), *Congress and the Decline of Public Trust* (pp.79-100). Westview.

Barnhurst, Kevin G. and Diana C. Mutz. 1997. "The New Long Journalism: The Decline of Event-Centered Coverage in American Newspapers." *Journal of Communication* 47: 27-53.

Mutz, Diana C., and Joe Soss. 1997. "Reading Public Opinion: The Influence of News Coverage on Perceptions of Public Sentiment." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 61: 431-451.

Mutz, Diana C., and Jeffery Mondak. 1997. "Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgments of Fairness and Well-Being." *American Journal of Political Science* 41: 284-308.

Mutz, Diana C. 1997. "Mechanisms of Momentum: Does Thinking Make It So?" *Journal of Politics* 59: 104-25.

Mondak, Jeffery, Mutz, Diana C., and Robert Huckfeldt. 1996. "Persuasion in Context: The Multi-level Structure of Economic Evaluations." Chapter in *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 249-66.

Mutz, Diana C., Sniderman, Paul M., and Richard Brody. 1996. "Political Persuasion: The Birth of a Field

of Study." Chapter 1 in *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, (pp. 1-16).

Mutz, Diana C. 1995. "Effects of Horse Race Coverage on Campaign Coffers: Strategic Contributing in Presidential Primaries." *Journal of Politics* 57: 1015-1042.

Mutz, Diana C. 1995. "Media, Momentum and Money: Horse Race Spin in the 1988 Republican Primaries." In P.J. Lavrakas, M.W. Traugott, and P.V. Miller (Eds.), *Presidential Polls and the News Media* (Boulder: Westview Press), pp. 229-254.

Mutz, Diana C. 1994. "Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience." Reprinted in M.E. Ethridge (Ed.), *The Political Research Experience: Readings and Analysis*, 2nd ed. Guilford, CT: Dushkin.

Mutz, Diana C. 1994. "Contextualizing Personal Experience: The Role of Mass Media." *Journal of Politics* 56: 689-714.

Mutz, Diana C. 1994. "Direct and Indirect Routes to Politicizing Personal Experience: Does Knowledge Make a Difference?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57: 483-502.

Mutz, Diana C. 1994. "The Political Effects of Perceptions of Mass Opinion." In R.Y. Shapiro, M. X. Delli-Carpini, and L. Huddy (Eds.), *Research in Micropolitics*, Vol. 4, (pp. 143-167), JAI Press.

Mutz, Diana C., Roberts, Donald F., and D.P. van Vuuren. 1993. "Reconsidering the Displacement Hypothesis." *Communication Research* 20: 51-75.

Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion on Political Attitudes." *Political Behavior* 14: 89-122.

Mutz, Diana C. 1992. "Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 483-508.

Sniderman, Paul, Wolfinger, Barbara, Mutz, Diana C., and James Wiley. 1991. "Values Under Pressure: AIDS and Civil Liberties." In *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.31-57.

Mutz, Diana C. 1989. "The Influence of Perceptions of Media Influence: Third Person Effects and the Public Expression of Opinions." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 1: 3-23.

Cohen, Jeremy, Mutz, Diana C., Nass, Clifford, and Laurie Mason. 1989. "Experimental Test of Some Notions of the Fact/ Opinion Distinction in Libel." *Journalism Quarterly* 66: 11-17, 247.

Cohen, Jeremy, Mutz, Diana C., Price, Vincent, and Albert Gunther. 1988. "Perceived Impact of Defamation: An Experiment on Third Person Effects." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 52: 161-173.

Chaffee, Steven H., and Diana C. Mutz. 1988. "Comparing Mediated and Interpersonal Communication Data." In R. P. Hawkins, J. M. Wiemann, and S. Pingree, (Eds.), *Advancing Communication Science:*

*Merging Mass and Interpersonal Processes* (pp. 19-43). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Mutz, Diana C. 1987. "Political Alienation and Knowledge Acquisition." In M. L. McLaughlin, (Ed.), *Communication Yearbook 10*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp. 470-98.

### **Research in Progress/ Under Review**

Mutz, D.C. *In Your Face Politics*. Book manuscript; first draft completed.

Mansfield, E.A. and D.C. Mutz. *Men, Women, Trade and Free Markets*. Under review.

Mutz, D.C., and R. Pemantle. *The Perils of Randomization Checks in the Analysis of Experiments*. Under review.

Mansfield, Edward and D. C. Mutz, *American Attitudes Toward Globalization* (working title). Book manuscript in progress.

Mutz, D.C., and Mondak, J.J. *Involuntary Association: The Role of the Workplace in American Civic Life*.

Mutz, D.C. and Chelsea Schafer. *The Face of American Government: Effects of Minorities in High Office on Minority Trust in Government*.

### **Professional Service**

American Academy of Arts and Sciences Membership Selection Panel, Class III, 2011-2013

American National Election Studies Board, 2011-2013.

Provosts' Research Council, University of Pennsylvania

University Committee on Human Subjects Research

President, Elections Public Opinion and Voting Behavior Division of the American Political Science Association, 2010-2012.

Political Communication, Editorial Board

Journal of Politics, Editorial Board

Alexander L. George Book Award Committee, International Society for Political Psychology

David O. Sears Book Award Committee, International Society for Political Psychology



Chair, Goodnow Award Committee, American Political Science Association

Canadian National Election Study, Advisory Board

Goodnow Award Committee, APSA.

International Society for Political Psychology, Book Award committee

Vice-President, Midwest Political Science Association, 2009-2011.

Pi Sigma Alpha Selection Committee for Best Paper

Radcliffe Institute Final Selection Committee, Harvard University, 2006-2008.

APSA Trust and Development Board, 2007-2009.

Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism (DCC) Planning Committee, 2008.  
Wharton School of Business, Dean Selection Committee, 2007.

Chair, Warren Miller Award Committee, APSA, 2006.

Member, Graber Award Committee, 2006.

SAS Personnel Committee, 2004-2006.

Graber Award Committee, 2006.

Editorial Board, *Journal of Politics*, 2004-present.

Board of Overseers, American National Election Studies, 2003-2006.

Chair, Pi Sigma Alpha award committee, Midwest Political Science Association, 2003-2004.

Vice-President, Elections, Public Opinion, and Political Behavior Section of the American Political Science Association, 2002-2004.

Editorial Board, The Ohio State University Press, 2002-2003.

Editorial Board, *Political Communication*, 2001-present.

Co-PI, *Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences*, Center for Human Resources Research, Ohio State University, 2001-2006.

Midwest Political Science Association, Council Member, 2001-2004.

Program Co-Chair, Midwest Political Science Association, 2000.

APSA Political Psychology Book Award Committee, 2000.

Chair, Nominations Committee, Midwest Political Science Association, 1999.

Editor-in-Chief, *Political Behavior*, 1998-2003.

Graber Award Committee, APSA Political Communication Section.

Nominations Committee, Midwest Political Science Association, 1998.

American National Election Studies Pilot Committee, 1998-99.

Executive Board, Elections and Voting Behavior Division of the American Political Science Association, 1997-98.

Program Committee, Midwest Political Science Association, Section Head for Political Psychology and Public Opinion, 1996-97.

Chair, Political Communication Division of the American Political Science Association, 1995-96.

Advisory Board, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1996-98.

Vice-Chair, Political Communication Division of the American Political Science Association, 1994-95.

Editorial Board, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1991-2000.

Editorial Board, *Political Communication*, 1992-1998.

Editorial Board, *Journal of Communication*, 1991-1996.

Conference Planning Committee, American Association for Public Opinion Research, 1994-1995.

Regional (United States) Representative to World Association for Public Opinion Research, 1993-1994.

Secretary, Political Communication Division of the International Communication Association, 1993-94.

Executive Board Member, Political Communication Division of the American Political Science Association, 1992-93.

Chair, Breckinridge Award Committee, Midwest Political Science Association, 1990-91.

Chair, Murray Edelman Career Achievement Award Committee, American Political Science Association, 1991-92.

Steering Committee, University of Wisconsin Survey Center, 1989-present.

Manuscript Reviews for *International Organization*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Political Science Review*, *Poetics*, *Journal of Politics*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Communication*,

*Public Opinion Quarterly, Journal of Communication, Communication Theory, Journalism Quarterly, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Communication Research, Political Research Quarterly.*

**Courses Taught:**

Media and Politics (undergrad), Experimental Design (grad), Empirical Methods of Political Inquiry (grad), Research Design (grad), Public Opinion (undergrad), Elections and Voting Behavior (undergrad), Analysis of Political Data, Communication and Public Opinion (undergrad), Senior Honors Thesis Proseminar (undergrad), Political Communication (grad and undergrad), Mass Media and Political Behavior (grad and undergrad), Quantitative Reasoning (undergrad).

## Appendix B

Appendix B - Case Materials

<b>Description</b>	<b>Bates</b>
04/03/12 PA DOS Request for Quotation for 2012 General Election Voter Education Media Campaign	PA-00005610-643
PA DOS Photo ID Marketing Proposal	PA-00007166-67
PA DOS 2012 General Election Voter Education Media Campaign, Questions and Answers Addendum	PA-00009500-09
03/23/13 Email from K. Cummings to S. Royer et al. re: "Cost Estimates"	PA-00048999-9000
Presentation from Harmelin Media titled "Radio Pennsylvania Network, 2012 Voter ID Proposal"	PA-00100236-242
Bravo Group's 2012 General Election Voter Education Media Campaign, Community Outreach and Public Relations Work Plan	PA-00100387-424
Red House Communications's 2012 General Election Voter Education Media Campaign proposal	PA-00101827-95
04/12/12 Memorandum from M. Sweeney to C. Abruzzo et al. re: "Voter ID Preliminary Project Plan - DRAFT INCLUDED"	PA-00007092-93
04/10/12 Email from R. Ruman to T. Graham et al. re: "Voter ID outreach"	PA-00028561-62
04/27/12 Email from M. Sweeney to S. Royer et al. re: "Voter ID outreach idea"	PA-00032361-62
04/13/2012 Email from S. Royer to M. Sweeney re: "FOR REVIEW: Voter ID Executive Summary"	PA-00034930
06/20/2012 Memorandum re: PA DOS Voter ID Education Campaign Summary	PA-00061774-75
07/27/2012 Email from I. Neveil (Harmelin Media) to S. Royer et al. re: "Follow up from 7/26 meeting/conference call"	PA-00098093-94
09/20/12 Memorandum from M. Rutz (Harmelin Media) to S. Royer re: "PA Dept. of State Voter ID: General Election Media Campaign"	PA-00109026-27
09/20/12 Memorandum from G. Blint (Red House Communications) to S. Royer re: "Voter ID Education Campaign"	PA-00109029-30
09/20/2012 Email from S. Royer to B. Dupler re: "FW: Media Documents for Voter ID 2012 General Election" (with attachments)	PA-00109031; PA-00109032-9072; PA-00109073; PA-00109080-96; PA-00109097-9103; PA-00109104-05; PA-00109106-07; PA-00109108-09; PA-00109110-9394; PA-00109395-9400; PA-00109401
11/05/12 Presentation from Harmelin Media titled "2012 general election Media Recap"	PA-00123991-24024

10/09/12 Email from R. Ruman to M. Wagner et al. re: "RE: Revised TV, radio, print spots"	PA-00124244-45
01/22/13 Email from K. Cummings to H. Barry re: "FW: Status of the Paid Media Campaign"	PA-00124295-96
10/02/12 Email from M. Sweeney to N. Winkler et al. re: "Voter ID Paid Media Campaign Information"	PA-00125515
06/26/12 Email from S. Royer to P. Geho et al. re: "Re: Fwd: RE: Any details regarding the DOS statewide advertising campaign..."	PA-00105264-66
Pennsylvania Voter ID law presentation	
"What's In Your Wallet" League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania print copy	
"Show it" print copy describing what IDs are acceptable	PA-00091000
08/28/12 Postcard titled "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE SHOW IT."	PA-00091594-95
Billboard/Transit print ad titled "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE SHOW IT."	PA-00098106
Billboard/Transit print ad titled "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE SHOW IT."	PA-00098108
10/02/12 Newspaper ad copy with the headline "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE, SHOW IT" with a recommended revised headline of "IF YOU HAVE IT, SHOW IT."	PA-00124240-41
Spanish language "Muestrala" poster/flyer describing what IDs are acceptable	PA-0091278
Russian language voter ID poster/flyer	PA-00125480
Korean language voter ID poster/flyer	PA-00125481
Chinese language voter ID poster/flyer	PA-00125482
04/17/12 Voter ID talking points for the Chris Stagall Radio Show interview	PA-00005030-35
08/07/12 Voter ID talking points for the Bill Anderson Live Talk Radio Show interview - Carol Aichele	PA-00091576-580
08/07/12 Red House Communications script for a thirty second radio spot "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE, SHOW IT!"	PA-00099909
10/2/12 revised script for a thirty second radio spot "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE, SHOW IT!"	PA-00124238-39
10/3/12 revised script for a thirty second radio spot "IF YOU WANT TO VOTE, SHOW IT!"	PA-00124250-51
08/22/12 Email from N. Winkler to J. Pena re: "RE: Spanish TV Spot"	PA-00099751
08/09/12 Red House Communications thirty second television commercial script	PA-00099911
Thirty second PSA script titled "Voter ID Education Campaign" featuring C. Aichele	PA-00123846
10/02/12 revised script for the voter ID television commercial voice over	PA-00124236
10/03/12 suggested revisions to the thirty second television commercial regarding PA voter IDs	PA-00124248-49

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation website information regarding new voter ID Law and the required proof of identification for voting purposes	
Talking Points for Pre-Primary and Election Day Media Interviews	PA-00008802-04
08/30/12 Email from S. Royer to N. Winkler et al. re: "RE: VotesPA Website"	PA-00099864-65
10/02/12 Recommended revised copy for online banner ads	PA-00124234-35
09/28/12 Email from J. McKnight to L. Beachell et al. re: "FW: Voter ID clarification to webpages"	
06/22/12 Overview and specifications for the "Letter to Registered Voters without PennDot ID"	PA-0078554-58
Voter ID Talking Points	PA-00005025-29
05/10/12 Email from S. Royer to D. Burgess re: "Re: Wednesday Clips"	PA-00019761-69
"Bring Photo ID to Vote in November" informational flyer/poster (text only, no graphics)	PA-00020712
"Voter Identification (ID) Education Guide, Action Information Packet" created by the Philadelphia Delegation and Pennsylvania House of Representatives	PA-00030565-30676
Draft letter to voters who have been identified as being registered to vote but who do not have a PennDot photo ID	PA-00056477
Draft letter from C. Aichele to voters informing them of acceptable IDs and that they are entitled to a free PennDot photo ID for voting purposes only	PA-00062696
Draft letter from C. Aichele to voters informing them of acceptable IDs and that they are entitled to a free PennDot photo ID for voting purposes only	PA-00091313
Presentation by votesPA.com titled "Voter ID Guide"	PA-00102025-2041
Automated message script describing the DOS ID and other acceptable forms of ID	PA-00125903-04
Automated message script describing how to receive a free PennDOT ID and describing acceptable forms of ID	PA-00125991
Frequently asked questions pertaining to PA's voter ID law that includes a general information FAQ, a college or university FAQ, a care facility FAQ, a military FAQ, a telephone operator Q&A sheet, the voter identification training agenda, and description of acceptable IDs and how to obtain a PennDOT ID	PA-00004994-5023
08/13/12 "FAQ - Department of State Identification Card"	PA-00095910-11
Spanish language frequently asked questions pertaining to PA's voter ID law that includes only the general information FAQ	PA-00095912-920
Spanish language frequently asked questions pertaining to the DOS ID	PA-00095921-22
A document titled "Department of State Outreach Efforts" listing outreach locations and community events	Listed as Defendant's Exhibit R-2
Spreadsheet of contacts for voter outreach activities with a description of discussions and potential activities	PA-00084898-4916

Spreadsheet of voter outreach activities and event dates	PA-00084917-18
07/26/12 Email from M. Sweeney to J. Riley (Bravo Group) et al. re: "RE: Military Outreach-Voter ID Campaign"	PA-00089760-61
Letter from P. Geho to Members of the PA Legislature regarding the creation of DOS IDs and voter outreach efforts	PA-00098615-16
08/24/12 Document describing the public outreach efforts of the Bravo Group and Skyler Group	PA-00099314-15
09/18/12 Email from M. Sweeney to V. Brown et al. re: "RE: Voter ID for Veterans"	PA-00106095-96
09/07/12 Letter from B. Josephs (Democratic State Representative) to C. Aichele regarding "offensive and threatening language" used in a commercial about PA's new voter ID law	PA-00084296-97
08/12 Memorandum by the Pennsylvania Budget and Policy Center titled "Pennsylvania's Identity Crisis, Rushed Implementation of Voter ID Law Putting Voting Rights at Risk"	PA-00089418-439
09/12/12 Draft letter from C. Aichele to B. Josephs (Democratic State Representative) responding to Josephs's letter about the recently aired voter ID commercial	PA-00099915
10/26/12 Email from C. Aichele to S. Turner et al. re: "Fw: Petition to stop running misleading voter ID ads" and attachments	PA-00113645
10/07/12 Email from W. Correll to ST, VoterID Questions re: "Misguiding Website"	PA-00113839
10/05/12 Email from ST, VoterID Questions to R. Evans re: "RE: Remove ID picture please"	PA-00114366
10/20/12 Email from ST, VoterID Questions to S. Khan re: "RE: Voter ID information"	PA-00114521
10/11/12 Email from ST, VoterID Questions to E. Lucas re: "RE: Voter Photo ID"	PA-00114615
09/24/12 Email from C. Solomon to M. Sweeney re: "Telephone Message - Voter ID Issue"	PA-00114764
Bravo powerpoint (Aug. 3 2012 email between M. Sweeney and J. Riley) (PA-00098470)	PA-00098470
Voter ID Information Card (PA-00106974)	PA-00106974
Revised Voter ID Information Card (PA-00124229)	PA-00124229
Sept. 28 2012 Email from J. Riley (Bravo) to M. Sweeney attaching Master Event List, Master Materials List, and Master Outreach List (PA-00123852)	PA-00123852
Sept. 28 2012 Master Event List from Bravo (PA-00123853) (attached to PA-00123852)	PA-00123853
Sept. 28 2012 Master Materials List from Bravo (PA-00123854) (attached to PA-00123852)	PA-00123854



Sept. 28 2012 Master Outreach List from Bravo (PA-00123855) (attached to PA-00123852)	PA-00123855
July 16 2012 Email from M. Sweeney to P. Geho and P. Dillon providing Bravo's July 13 2012 Master Outreach List and Master Event List	PA-00084897
July 16 2012 Master Outreach List from Bravo (attached to PA-00084897)	
July 16 2012 Master Event List from Bravo (attached to PA-00084897)	
Sept. 7 2012 Email from J. Riley (Bravo) to M. Sweeney providing Bravo's Sept. 7 2012 Master Event List, Master Material Requests List, and Master Outreach List (PA-00102314)	PA-00102314
Sept. 7 2012 Master Event list from Bravo (attached to PA-00102314)	
Sept. 7 2012 Master Outreach list from Bravo (attached to PA-00102314)	
Sept. 7 2012 Master Material Requests list from Bravo (attached to PA-00102314)	
June 20 2012 Email from M. Sweeney to B. Dupler attaching Voter ID Education Campaign summary. (PA-00061773)	PA-00061773
Voter ID Education Campaign summary as of June 20 2012 (PA-00061774)	PA-00061774
Nov. 5 2012 Email from M. Rutz (Harmelin) to S. Royer attaching Voter ID Recap Deck for paid ad campaign (PA-00123898)	PA-00123898
Harmelin's Voter ID Recap Deck from Nov. 5 2012 (PA-00123899)	PA-00123899
Aug. 24 2012 Email from S. Royer to S. Royer forwarding Aug. 24 2012 Email from M. Rutz (Harmelin) that attached Harmelin's recommendation for an online ad campaign and proposed keywords (PA-00098617)	PA-00098617
Harmelin's Aug. 24 2012 recommendation for an online ad campaign (PA-00098619) (attached to PA-00098617)	PA-00098619
Harmelin's Voter ID Recap Deck from Nov. 5 2012 (PA-00123991)	PA-00123991
RFQ # DOS 2012-4 (June 4 2012)	PA-00063070
RFQ# DOS 2012-3 (June 4 2012)	PA-00063035
Buy Detail Report for Cable TV Ad Buy in Youngstown and Buffalo/Niagara Falls (Aug. 27, 2012)	
June 12 2013 Voter ID Project Plan	
June 3, 2013 Email from S. Royer to J. Guyer re "Possible DOS Voter ID Educational Campaign"	

Harmelin flowchart of media campaign	
Voter ID Outreach Summary	
Buy Detail Report for statewide ad buy (9.5.2012)	
9.25.12 Email from M. Sweeney to S. Cotelo (Skyler) attaching revised version of Bravo outreach powerpoint deck	
9.21.12 Email from S. Cotelo (Skyler) to M. Sweeney attaching Spanish-language version of Bravo outreach powerpoint deck	
Harmelin Online Plan Details 8.24.12	
Harmelin Final Media Recap 11.15.12	
Harmelin Final Media Plan 10.20.12	
Harmelin Budget Change Info 7.30.12	
Harmelin Initial Flowchart and Memo 5.4.12	
Harmelin Follow up Summary 7.26.12	
PA Voter ID Information Card	
J. Marks 10.17.12 Email re "RE: Two Important Reminders" (PA-00118828)	
Transcript of Bravo Group (Jennifer Riley) Deposition - June 11, 2013	
Transcript of Megan Sweeney Deposition - June 7, 2013	
Transcript of Red House (Gloria Blint) Deposition - June 13, 2013	
Transcript of Harmelin Media (Lyn Strickler) Deposition - June 14, 2012	
S. Royer 6.3.13 Email to J. Guyer re "Possible DOS Voter ID Educational Campaign"	
Harmelin Voter ID TV Campaign Summary by Market (R-F) report	
"Secretary of Commonwealth Issues Statement on Voter ID" press release (June 25, 2013)	
Various Press Releases from DOS website	

DOS ID FAQs	
DOS General FAQs	
FAQs - Obtaining a free PennDOT Secure Photo ID Card for Voting Purposes	
DOS Voter ID Postcard to Voters	
Email from G. Blint re Exterior-Interior Bus Cards	P. Ex. 0172
Email from Calland re For your review revised layouts with red	P. Ex. 0174
Red House TV Script	P. Ex. 0179
Email from Blint re For Your Review Outdoor Billboards	P. Ex. 0173
Red House Radio Script	P. Ex. 0178
Sun Gazette Newspaper Article - June 27, 2013 "State department secretary - Voter ID law valid"	
10/19/12 Petition for Supplemental Injunction to Enforce Court's October 2, 2012, Order	
10/19/12 Petition for Supplemental Injunction to Enforce Court's October 2, 2012, Order (Exhibits)	
10/31/12 Respondents' Answer and New Matter to Petition for Supplemental Injunction and Response to the Court's October 24 Rule to Show Cause	
11/01/12 Fax from the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to W. Walczak et al. re: "Determination on Petition for Supplemental Injunction to Enforce Court's October 2, 2012 Order"	
Excerpts from deposition and trial testimony of R. Ruman, C. Aichele, J. Santana, K. Myers, J. Marks , R. Oyler, S. Royer, D. Burgess,	
Deposition and trial testimony of S. Royer regarding public education efforts	

# Appendix C

## Appendix C - References

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